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REEXAMINATION.

The City University of New York, Ph.D., 1975
Political Science, general

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1974

BEHAVIORALISM AND ITS CRITICS: A REEXAMINATION

by

AVRAHAM GRANOT

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in Partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York.

1974

This manuscript has been read and
accepted for the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in satisfaction
of the dissertation requirement for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

BEHAVIORALISM AND ITS CRITICS: A REEXAMINATION

by

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"Behavioralism" is a collective term referring to a collective social phenomenon. The difficulties in elucidating the precise meaning of collective terms are notorious; the problem is compounded in the case of behavioralism because behavioralists seem to share a subjective "mood" favoring a science of politics, rather than overt, objective organizational attributes. An investigation of programmatic statements by behavioralists reveals them to adopt six "canons and conventions of modern empirical science" as guidelines to research. The behavioralist ought to search for regularities in human behavior to be expressed in generalizations for the purpose of explanation. He should distinguish statements of fact from statements of value, he should observe political phenomena, attempt to quantify as many of these as possible, and present his findings in a manner which would allow for their verification and falsification.

Since behavioralists employ various techniques and approaches, each emphasizing different canons and conventions, a strict definition of behavioralism is rejected. Instead, "family resemblances" among some of the most common behavioral approaches and techniques are examined in the manner

suggested by Wittgenstein.

A three way analysis is undertaken.

1. Claims made by behaviorists for their achievements are compared to their actual achievements.
2. Assertions made by critics of behaviorism as to its shortcomings are compared to its actual shortcomings. An attempt is made to treat the assertions of both behaviorists and their critics with the same degree of sympathy, respect - and skepticism. All claims are subjected to the same logical and empirical tests.
3. A distinction is made between errors committed by individual behaviorists, and problems inherent in the behavioral program for research.

Findings

1. While behaviorists are united in their search for a "science of politics," different behaviorists have different conceptions of what a science of politics ought to be like. Thus when analyzing, criticizing or praising "behaviorism," it seems more appropriate to speak of "varieties of behaviorism" rather than of "behaviorism" as a monolith. Critics of behaviorism have spent little or no effort attempting to elucidate the meaning of "behaviorism," as a result they have sometimes attributed to behaviorism as a whole shortcomings of one of its varieties, although another variety may in effect be free of that blemish.
2. Critics of behaviorism often did not distinguish between errors of individual behaviorists and problems inherent in a particular

variety of behavioralism.

3. Behaviorists are not prisoners of "Mannheim's paradox," of psychological preconceptions, or of their method, as claimed by some critics. Behaviorists who wrote in the same historical period, were influenced by the same social forces, and utilized the same method, interpreted their findings differently.
4. Behaviorists seek objectivity, but this does not mean that as a result they must treat all values as equal, as some critics have claimed.
5. Behavioralism is not inherently or inevitably conservative or uncritical as many critics have claimed. Some behaviorists supported the status quo, but others were highly critical. Moreover, some major behaviorist figures have lately adopted a more critical view of American politics.
6. Critics of behavioralism were correct when stating that many, but not all behaviorists preferred to examine phenomena susceptible to statistical manipulation over significant political problems.
7. The critics were also found correct when they emphasized that many behaviorists neglect the legal and institutional arrangements of society. Indeed, the most difficult problem inherent in behavioralism in all its varieties is of reducing collective attributes, of which societal, legal, and institutional arrangements are a part. The problem is that of deducing collective group properties from the actions and interactions of individuals, and linking all group properties scientifically. Not all behaviorists have neglected to study collective group properties. The different varieties of

behavioralism may be viewed as resulting from this inability to reduce all group properties. Each "variety," approach or technique utilized by behaviorists may be viewed as a focus on a different group property.

8. A search for regularities in human behavior does not necessitate a "regular" political world as some critics have claimed. Political "irregularities" can be viewed as theoretical regularities and expressed in generalizations. Some behaviorists neglected the study of political conflict, other behaviorists did examine both conflict and consensus.

On the whole, the debate between behaviorists and their critics is found to be characterized more by emotionalism and error than by cool-headed objective analysis.

PREFACE

This dissertation will focus on the debate between behavioralists and their critics. My purpose is to compare claims made by behavioralists for their achievements - and their actual achievements. Simultaneously, I will try to compare assertions made by critics of behavioralism about its shortcomings, and its actual shortcomings. To achieve this purpose I will attempt to treat the assertions of both behavioralists and critics with the same degree of sympathy, respect - and skepticism. All claims will be subjected to the same logical and empirical tests.

Two serious obstacles lie in the way of such an inquiry. The first is the enormous volume of writings, both by behavioralists and their critics; the second is the intense emotions the debate arouses among students of politics, myself not excluded.

To overcome the first obstacle, I will limit myself to an examination of only two fields: American government and comparative politics. An added justification for this self-limitation is that the debate between behavioralists and their critics has centered mainly on these two fields. Even these two fields are too broad for complete coverage, and sampling will be necessary. Thus I will focus mainly, though not exclusively, on the writings of the more well-known authors, both behavioralists and their critics. The second obstacle makes itself felt directly at this point, since no rigorous statistical sampling procedure can be utilized here.

Since behaviorism has been inspired by, and in turn has inspired developments in related social sciences, I will not hesitate to rely on evidence from other disciplines whenever this is necessary to illuminate a particular argument.

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INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, the discipline of political science in the United States underwent a process of self-transformation, a process that subsequently was called "behavioralism" or the "behavioral approach."

Among the factors that brought about the emergence of behavioralism, the influence of Charles E. Merriam must rank first. In 1921, in his article "The Present State of the Study of Politics,"¹ he expressed the two main concerns that were to occupy him for many years. The first of these was his belief that the study of politics has a great deal to gain from close cooperation with other social sciences:

On the borders of politics there have appeared in our day many allied disciplines of kindred stock. Statistics and psychology, biology, geography, ethnology and sociology have all developed and continue to produce masses of material facts, of interpretations and insights, correlations and conclusions, often bearing, directly or indirectly, upon the understanding of the political process. We may appropriately raise the question, to what extent has politics availed itself of the researches and results of these new companions in the great search for the understanding of the phenomena of human life?"²

Merriam influenced the work of his associates at the University of Chicago, among them Harold D. Lasswell, Harold Gosnell, V.O. Key, Jr., Quincy Wright, Leonard D. White, Gabriel A. Almond, Herbert Simon, David Truman, and C. Herman Pritchett.³ All of these played important roles in the development of behavioralism.

Merriam's second concern was with the material conditions of the political scientist:

The best-equipped research man in the best-equipped institution of

learning hardly has machinery comparable with that of the best lawyer in his office, or of the best engineer, or the expert of the large corporation, or the secretary of the chamber of commerce, or the research department of Amalgamated Clothiers.⁴

In 1921, the American Political Science Association appointed a committee on political research with Merriam as its chairman. In 1923, in its report, the committee recommended the establishment of a Social Science Research Council whose main purpose would be to facilitate the work of social scientists by providing them with funds which would allow them the time and equipment needed for research.⁵ The Council was established in 1923 and was also to play a major role in the development of behavioralism.

Another factor in the rise of behavioralism was the arrival in the United States of European social scientists during the 1930's and 1940's, Robert A. Dahl mentions Franz Neumann, Sigmund Neumann, Paul Lazarsfeld, Hans Speier, Hans Gerth and Reinhard Bendix.⁶ These scholars introduced American social science to the works of Marx, Durkheim, Freud, Pareto, Weber, and Michels, convincing American political scientists of the importance of sociology and psychology for an understanding of politics.

The war itself was another factor in the emergence of behavioralism. Many political scientists participated in the war effort in various capacities in different governmental organizations. There they came to realize the large gap that existed between political science theory and political practice.

Political scientists were generally dissatisfied with the state of their discipline. They saw political science lagging behind the other social sciences. They saw the inability of political science to predict or explain the rise of Nazism and Communism. After the war, they saw most of their expertise inapplicable to the understanding and aiding of the new.

emerging states. Discontent was prevalent and new ways were sought to change the discipline.

A number of institutions have greatly facilitated the rise of behavioralism. Dahl stresses the importance of the Social Science Research Council, and especially its committee on political behavior. The 1944-45 Annual Report of the SSRC declares the Council's interest in

...a new approach to the study of political behavior. Focused upon the behavior of individuals in political situations this approach calls for examination of the political relationships of men - as citizens, administrators and legislators - by disciplines which can throw light on the problems involved, with the object of testing hypotheses concerning uniformities of behavior in different institutional settings.

The SSRC committee on political behavior was created in 1945 by E. Pendelton Herring. A new committee was created in 1949 under the chairmanship of V.O. Key, Jr. This committee, later under David B. Truman as chairman, was behaviorally inclined and awarded many research grants to behavioral projects. For example, the Michigan Survey Research Center's 1952 presidential election survey was financed by the SSRC.

Over the years the influence of behavioralism grew as more and more political scientists joined the movement. The Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, which has been described as "the clearest institutional embodiment of the discipline's behavioral tendencies"⁸ was created in 1962. The Consortium is a partnership between the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center and various universities, and it plays a major role in the dissemination of behavioral research methods throughout the discipline. The Consortium

...sponsors summer programs for training faculty and students in behavior research methods, holds conferences of both a training and a research strategy character, serves as a data repository and distribution center, functions as a clearing house for information about

research and about data processing developments, processes data on request, and provides technical assistance in handling difficult or unusual methodological problems.⁹

The growing strength of the behavioral movement found expression in the American Political Science Association. More and more presidents of the Association were chosen from the ranks of behavioralists. The Association's journal, the American Political Science Review became more receptive to behavioralist articles. Between 1963 and 1965 the journal published four times more articles employing quantitative techniques than between 1946 and 1948.¹⁰

The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto, which replaced the Behavioral Science Program of the Ford Foundation, was a major center for the development of behavioralism.

In its early years, the political scientists who were fellows there tended to be discontented with traditional approaches, inclined towards a more rigorously empirical and scientific study, and deeply interested in learning wherever possible from the other social sciences.¹¹

No description of the development of behavioralism can omit the special role that the philanthropic foundations played in that development. Funds provided by the foundations were enormous; in the five years between 1959 and 1964, political scientists received in grants a total of 100 million dollars, with the Ford Foundation providing about 90 per cent of the amount.¹² The foundations, comments Dahl, "tended to view interdisciplinary and behavioral studies with sympathy."¹³ Behavioral research is usually very expensive, and none of the proudest achievements of behavioralism could have been accomplished without foundation support.

Any listing of these achievements must begin with voting studies. Indeed, in its origins the behavioral approach was considered by some as identical to voting behavior research.¹⁴ Ironically, the first two voting

studies using the survey technique were not done by political scientists, but by sociologists and social psychologists from the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. These studies, The People's Choice published in 1944, and Voting published in 1954 examined voting behavior in a single community. The survey technique provided social scientists with a scientific tool with which they could directly record behavior and attitudes of individuals, data which is lacking in aggregate voting statistics. Thus, the authors of the early voting studies could find that more Republicans were to be found at the higher socio-economic levels, that Catholics tend more to vote Democratic than Republican, that people from lower socio-economic status took less interest in the election. They found that "cross-pressured" individuals were last to make up their minds about whom to vote for. They emphasized the importance of membership in groups and of the family as influences on voting behavior. And they discovered the role of "opinion leaders" as brokers in the "two step flow of communications." The authors of Voting list 209 hypotheses that were confirmed by the voting studies.¹⁵

This intrusion into what political scientists considered as their proper domain by other social scientists had a great impact:

...to political scientists dissatisfied with the conventional methods and manners of the discipline, the new voting studies offered encouragement. For in spite of obvious defects, the voting studies seemed to provide ground for the hope that if political scientists could only master the tools employed in the other social sciences—survey methods and statistical analysis, for example — they might be able to go beyond plausible generalities and proceed to test hypotheses about how people in fact do behave in making political choices.¹⁶

It was not long before political scientists entered into the voting behavior arena themselves, mainly under the auspices of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, beginning with The Voter Decides,

and culminating in The American Voter, surely one of behavioralism's foremost achievements.

The authors examined responses to surveys taken of a sample of the national population rather than a sample of the residents of one community. Moreover, the authors compared responses to surveys taken at three different elections, in 1948, 1952, and 1956, enabling them to analyze political change. For instance, they conclude that after four years of Eisenhower in office, fewer people saw the Republican party as opposed to social welfare.¹⁷

While the early voting studies greatly emphasized social characteristics as determinants of the vote, the authors of The American Voter argue that while the composition of the electorate in terms of race, religion or occupation changed little over time, there were fluctuations in the vote. Finding the explanatory power of social characteristics weak, they adopted the attitudinal approach which led them to examine voters orientation to political objects such as the different issues and different candidates in each election. The authors discovered the pervasive force of party identification as a determinant of the vote, their forms of classification of elections into "maintaining," "realigning" and "deviating" elections takes cognizance of both long and short term influences on voting. A maintaining election is one in which party identification is the most powerful influence on the vote. A deviating election is one in which issues or candidates specific to a certain election prove more powerful than party identification, but without affecting long-run divisions of party loyalty. A realigning election makes for basic and long-term changes in party loyalty itself.¹⁸

Behavioralists have not limited themselves to the examination of

voting behavior. In 1959, Herbert H. Hyman¹⁹ directed attention to a "neglected problem": the study of political behavior as learned behavior. Hyman compiled an impressive inventory of findings that demonstrated the importance of examining the ways in which children become acquainted with the world of politics. How does the family affect the political orientation of children? How does it influence their degree of participation in politics? How does the peer group influence political behavior? How do lower-class children differ from higher-class children in their knowledge of politics? Fred I. Greenstein, in Children and Politics²⁰ set out to study childrens' feelings to political authority, the political information they possess, the differences in political development between children in different socio-economic levels and between the sexes. Greenstein found that even among younger children the importance of politicians, especially political executives such as the president and the mayor, was widely acknowledged, although the children possessed little or no factual information about what these executives actually do. He found that children do not view politics as cynically as do adults; rather, they viewed political leaders as benevolent. He learned that party preference develops very early among children. Since adult behavior is strongly affected by early experience, Greenstein concludes that socialization strengthens the status quo. Both the early attachment to political leadership and the early formation of party preference contribute to the stability of the political system.

David Easton wrote:

Traditionalists have been reifying institutions, virtually looking at them as entities apart from their component individuals. At best, in studies of political parties and legislatures, as an illustration, the individual recedes into a shadowy background. He becomes an impassive creature whose presence is never doubted, but who seems to act in the organizations without the normal attributes of a human being.²¹

It is this situation which behavioralists set out to correct, and when studying political institutions, the individuals in these institutions, their motives, attitudes, values and perceptions were their main concern rather than the legal arrangements or policies of these institutions. Behavioralists were following the footsteps of Harold D. Lasswell whose pioneering work emphasized the importance of psychological factors in understanding politics. As early as 1930, in his famous Psychopathology and Politics,²² Lasswell called attention to the insufficiency of institutional categories and the importance of the psychological dimension for a full understanding of political life. It was Lasswell who first examined the behavior of bureaucrats, agitators, judges and other policy-makers in the light of psychological determinants, and the behavioralists' focus on "the behavior of individuals in political situations" must be traced directly to him. Thus in their study of four state legislatures John C. Wahlke and his associates²³ concern themselves mainly with the self-perceptions of the legislators of their roles in the institutions. How do the legislators themselves define their role as it relates to the function of lawmaking? How do legislators perceive of their role as representatives? Is the legislator more oriented to his district or to the state? What is the legislator's attitude to pressure groups?

James David Barber in The Lawmakers²⁴ examined a sample of freshmen Connecticut legislators and grouped them in four classes. "Advertisers" were labelled those who were high in activity in the legislature and low in willingness to return to the legislature. Those low in activity, but high in willingness to return were labelled "Spectators." Those low in activity and low in willingness to return were labelled "Reluctants," and those high in activity and high in willingness to return were labelled

"Lawmakers." Only the "Lawmakers," concludes Barber, had enough self-esteem to be valuable legislators.

Courts were also investigated by behavioralists, in The Roosevelt Court.²⁵ C. Herman Pritchett used quantitative analysis to search for the divisions and regular patterns of alignments within the Supreme Court between 1937 and 1947. He calculated degrees of solidarity within the blocs in the Court and demonstrated a strong correlation between the justices' attitudes on economic issues and their attitudes on issues of individual liberty, two issues around which court alignments were organized. Glendon A. Schubert continued and enlarged the scope of the study of judicial behavior. In his Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior²⁶ Schubert asks such questions as: are blocs of justices more cohesive when the court is divided into two or when it is divided into three blocs? Are large blocs more or less cohesive than small blocs? What is the effect on bloc cohesion when a justice is replaced? What is the relationship between a bloc's size and its power? Who are the most extreme and the most consistent justices?

Lasswell's influence became more directly evident when political scientists began examining the behavior of political leaders. Alexander and Juliette George in the study of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House²⁷ and Arnold A. Rogow in his James Forrestal²⁸ employ Lasswell's formula of the political man, which views him as displacing his private motives to public objects and rationalizing them in terms of public interest. Thus they were able to demonstrate the interaction between the private self and the public man and his policies. Lewis S. Edinger in Kurt Schumacher²⁹ stresses the interaction between his subject's compensatory needs and his political behavior. E. Victor Wolfenstein in The Revolutionary Personality³⁰ searched for psychological factors that drive men to revolutionary leadership.

Fred I. Greenstein examined the methodological problems involved in such studies in his Personality and Politics.

Not all behavioralists have been busy conducting surveys, counting Supreme Court decisions, or searching for motives for the behavior of political leaders. Some have created elaborate models of the workings of political systems deduced from some basic assumptions. Anthony Downs³² starts from the assumption of the rational and selfish voter, transforming the abstraction of a rational selfish man from economic theory into his model of democracy. How should government allocate its resources if its end is to maximize support? How should the opposition react to government policies? How does the voter calculate which party to vote for? What function does ideology fulfill for parties in their quest for power, and for the voters in their quest for benefits? Downs deduces the answers to these and other questions from a small number of axioms.

Karl Deutsch,³³ noting the inadequacies of mechanistic and biological models in explaining political life borrowed from cybernetics and communication theory to present a model of politics which emphasizes the flow of information among the various structures of a polity and among various political systems. Deutsch focused on the capacity of the communication network to transfer information, on the capacity of decision centers to act upon information received, the speed with which decisions are changed when feedback information is received, and the capacity of the political system to change its goals, to learn from experience, to innovate and self-transform.

William Riker³⁴ deduced propositions from the theory of games viewed as a model of political behavior. His most important proposition being the "size principle" which states that coalition builders will form coalitions large enough to win but no larger.

In the field of public administration, a self-transformation began to be felt upon the publication in 1947 of Herbert A. Simon's Administrative Behavior.³⁵ In this work, Simon criticized the conventional wisdom which then prevailed in the field. This wisdom was expressed in a set of "principles" that were thought to have universal validity as guides to the working of administration.³⁶ These principles, stated Simon, which purported to be lawlike generalizations, are actually more like proverbs of literature. "For almost every principle, one can find an equally plausible and acceptable contradictory principle."³⁷ Thus, one principle urges unity of command as essential to the increase of organizational efficiency, another principle states that increased specialization is the only sure way to increase efficiency. A contradiction is apparent, increase in specialization will greatly complicate the command structure of an organization. These principles were not arrived at through empirical scientific investigation. They are worded loosely and ambiguously, and they combine descriptive and prescriptive propositions. Robert A. Dahl made a similar critique of these principles.³⁸ He criticized the vagueness of the principles, their normative character, and their purported universal validity. Organizations are strongly influenced by the culture and values of the society in which they perform. Only painstaking cross-cultural comparative research will yield generalizations that transcend cultural boundaries. Both Simon and Dahl criticized the assumption of "rational man" that administration theorists borrowed from economics. Simon suggested as a substitute his model of "administrative man": "While economic man maximizes - selects the best alternative from among all those available to him; his cousin, whom we shall call 'administrative man,' satisfices - looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or 'good enough.'"³⁹

Empirical evidence for this model of administrative man was presented by Richard M. Cyert and James G. March in their A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.⁴⁰ An examination of the literature of public administration after the publication of Administrative Behavior reveals the extent of the transformation the field underwent. Simon suggested that the focus of students of public administration should be on the decision-making process, a suggestion that resulted in a growing concern with policy making in organizations.⁴¹ Dahl's suggestion that universally valid lawlike generalizations can be arrived at only by cross-cultural comparative research has resulted⁴² in the creation of a Comparative Administration Group.

The developments in public administration have been similar to and intertwined with developments in other fields of political science. Its students have borrowed concepts, theories and research tools from the other social sciences, they have employed system theory, communication theory,⁴³ and the field has not escaped the surge of "the new revolution in political science."⁴⁴

The 1950's also witnessed a reorientation in the field of comparative politics. Dissatisfaction with the prevailing modes of research was voiced by many political scientists. Traditional research,⁴⁵ it was claimed, was concerned mainly with descriptions of governmental institutional arrangements as postulated in the constitution. Its main focus was on the countries of Western Europe. It totally ignored the phenomenon of political change and the interrelationships between governmental institutions and other social forces in a society.⁴⁶ In 1954, a Social Science Research Council committee on comparative politics was established and helped direct the study of comparative politics in new directions. Since then, the field of comparative politics has been characterized by four main tendencies:

"structural-functional analysis, the quest for scientific rigor, concern with non-Western systems, and concern with the broader setting of politics,"⁴⁷ Structural-functional analysis held a particular attraction for students of comparative politics. It provided them with a general framework and a set of seemingly universal categories which could be applied to the analysis of every political system on the globe. Moreover, these categories were refreshingly non-institutional, enabling the political scientist to investigate non-Western political systems for which the traditional institutional categories had little relevance. The most influential work of this kind was The Politics of the Developing Areas⁴⁸ edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman. In the introduction Almond presents the structural-functional framework and its concepts, five scholars then utilize this framework to analyze developing areas. Lucian W. Pye examines the politics of Southeast Asia, Myron Weiner analyzes the politics of South Asia, James S. Coleman studies the politics of Sub-Saharan Africa, Dankwart A. Rustow investigates the politics of the Near-East, and George I. Blanksten examines the politics of Latin America. Almond and Coleman with Lucian Pye also edit the well-known Little-Brown series in Comparative Politics;⁴⁹ the different country-studies employ the same conceptual framework developed by Almond. An emphasis on the dynamics of the political process is exemplified by the prestigious "Studies in Political Development" series published by Princeton University Press and sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council.⁵⁰ In this series, various scholars examine the relationships between cultural, social and political factors and the process of political change.

The psychological dimension of political life was examined by scholars

like Daniel Lerner,⁵¹ who explained the process of development and modernization not so much by the rate of urbanization, industrialization or structural differentiation, but by the ability of citizens to acquire a modern outlook embodied in the process of "empathy" by which a citizen gains a broad-minded universal orientation to social life free from the blinders of tradition. Lucian Pye⁵² explained that difficulties in the modernization of Burma must be traced to personality variables of Burmese elites, among which insecurity, formalism, and rigidity of outlook are prevalent. The concepts of "political culture" and "political socialization," whose origins can be traced back to the pioneering work of Harold D. Lasswell in the 1930's, embody this interest in the psychological setting of politics and have gained by now wide acceptance. A strong emphasis on quantification is to be found in Comparing Nations edited by Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan.⁵³

Developments in the field of international relations have proven no less dramatic than in the other fields of political science. In 1930, out of twenty-four professors of international relations in the United States, eighteen were specialists in international law and organization.⁵⁴ It was political realism⁵⁵ that first greatly influenced the field and focused attention to conflict and power and was later followed by behavioralism and the search for scientific international relations theory.

Like other fields discussed below, a variety of approaches, theories and methods are employed by students of international relations. The decision-making approach was first introduced by Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton M. Sapin.⁵⁶ They directed attention to the individuals and organizations that actually make foreign policy decisions, the information they receive and transmit, the environment in which they operate,

their image of that environment and of the other actors in the international arena. This approach was further refined when it was applied to a concrete case of decision-making.⁵⁷ J. David Singer has called attention to the great contributions the other social sciences can make to an understanding of international behavior:

For decades now, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists have been studying with varying degrees of rigor and creativity the behavior of individuals and groups in a wide variety of settings. Would we not do well to have a general idea of what these scholars have found, so that we can use knowledge - rather⁵⁸ than folklore - as inputs into our theorizing and policy-making?

Singer has collected a great number of works by various social scientists which he deemed relevant to understanding international behavior in a volume he edited.⁵⁹ He now heads a project whose purpose is to find a scientific quantitative explanation for the central concern of the study of international relations, the causes and consequences of war.⁶⁰

Still another approach to the study of international relations was put forth by Morton A. Kaplan⁶¹ who suggested to view the whole global network of political interactions as a "system;" these interactions can then be identified, isolated and examined. Kaplan presented six hypothetical models of international systems, a balance of power system, a loose bipolar system, a tight bipolar system, a universal-international system, a hierarchical system, and the unit-veto-system. Within each of these models he isolated five sets of variables: 1) the rules that describe behavior needed to maintain equilibrium; 2) the rules for changing the system; 3) the structural characteristics of actors in a system; 4) the capabilities of the actors; 5) the level of communication within the system. Examination of these variables will reveal how a system is maintained or transformed.

The contribution of economists to the field is exemplified by the work of Thomas Schelling on bargaining theory.⁶² Simulation of international conflicts has become an important research tool⁶³ as well as other techniques.⁶⁴

This brief review of the development of the discipline suggests several questions. Do all the authors mentioned have anything in common? If so, what is it? Are they all "behavioralists"? How does one distinguish between a behavioralist and other political scientists? These and other questions will be discussed in the next chapter.

Footnotes

¹Charles E. Merriam, "The Present State of the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, XV (May, 1921), 173-185. Reprinted in Merriam's New Aspects of Politics (3d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 63-83. The first edition was published in 1925.

²Ibid., p. 66.

³Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 113. A critical history of American political science is Bernard Crick's The American Science of Politics (3d ed.; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), first published in 1959.

⁴Merriam, New Aspects of Politics, p. 67.

⁵"Progress Report of the Committee on Political Research," American Political Science Review, XVII (May, 1923), p. 311. See also Social Science Research Council, Decennial Report, 1923-1933 (New York, 1934).

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⁷Quoted in Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," p. 17.

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CHAPTER I

WHAT IS BEHAVIORALISM?

A. Terminology

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the 'behavioral approach' in political science is the ambiguity of the term itself, and of its synonym 'political behavior.' The behavioral approach, in fact, is rather like the Loch Ness monster: One can say with considerable confidence what it is not, but it is difficult to say what it is.¹

Writer after writer, friend or critic, bemoans the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the "behavioral approach," but then goes on to analyze it, praise it, or condemn it. The point to be made here is that before any serious discussion of the behavioral approach can take place, the nature of this phenomenon, as well as the terms used to describe it, must be clarified as much as possible.

Part of the confusion arises from the fact that five terms are used interchangeably to describe the same subject. The terms "political behavior," "behavioral approach," "behaviorism," "behavioralism" and "behavioral science" are used as synonyms. In this dissertation the term "behavioralism" will be exclusively used for the following reasons:

1) "Political behavior" must be rejected because "in its lexical meaning, it denotes all human political activity. In this sense, the study of political behavior is the study of politics, and not the study of a subdivision or aspect of politics."² The term "political behavior" is too inclusive, it does not distinguish the special

"political behavior" school from other schools in political science.

2) "Behavioral approach"

While the term "political behavior" is too inclusive, the term "behavioral approach" is too limited. We speak in political science of the "structural-functional" approach, or of the "decision-making" approach, but these approaches are a part of behavioralism, if by an approach we mean "the criteria employed in selecting the questions to ask and the data to consider in political inquiry."³ It becomes obvious that behavioralism is more than an approach, and that the term "behavioral approach" is deficient.

3) "Behaviorism"

The term "behaviorism" is usually used by critics of behavioralism in a derogatory manner. Despite the constant pleas of behaviorists,⁴ who explain that "behaviorism" is a school within academic psychology which originated with J.B. Watson and which seeks to eliminate from psychological research all reference to subjective data, and that behaviorists in political science do not subscribe to such a rigid view to scientific inquiry. The term "behaviorism" nevertheless crops up again and again.

4) "Behavioral Science"

The term was coined by a group of social scientists at the University of Chicago who sought to obtain federal funds for their research, but feared that the term "social sciences" would be confused with "socialism."⁵ "Behavioral science" was corrupted to "behavioralism," which is now the most widely used in political science.

The real source of the ambiguity surrounding behavioralism is to be found not so much in the terminology used to describe it, but in the nature of behavioralism itself.

B. What is behavioralism?

Historically, behavioralism meant a protest movement in political science.

The term served as a sort of umbrella, capacious enough to provide temporary shelter for a heterogeneous group united only by dissatisfaction with traditional political science and comprised of persons who would probably move out in quite different directions once the storm of protest against innovation was passed,⁶

wrote Evron Kirkpatrick. Dahl, however, views behavioralists united by more than just dissatisfaction with traditional political science:

...those who were sometimes called 'behaviorists' or 'behavioralists' shared a mood: a mood of skepticism about the current intellectual attainments of political science, a mood of sympathy toward 'scientific' modes of investigation and analysis, a mood of optimism about the possibilities of improving the study of politics.

For Dahl, then, behavioralism had also a positive aspect: its adherents shared a belief in science. This positive aspect of behavioralism today remains its distinguishing mark, since it has long ceased to be a protest movement.

Before elaborating this aspect, a further distinction is necessary for a clearer understanding of behavioralism.

To precisely what kind of research does the concept of political behavior refer? It is clear that this term indicates that the research worker wishes to look at participants in the political system as individuals who have the emotions, prejudices, and predispositions of human beings as we know them in our daily lives,

wrote Easton. In this view behavioralists are distinguishable from other political scientists by the unit of analysis they examine, namely, the individual. "Political behavior is said to refer to the study of - individuals - rather than larger political units,"⁹ wrote Dahl. This narrow view holds great attraction for the student of behavioralism; it makes the identification of behavioralists relatively easy. However,

many political scientists, including those who hold this narrow view, also propose a wider view of behavioralism. "They are all looking ahead toward some region in space - a science of politics modelled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences,"¹⁰ wrote Easton, who earlier embraced the narrow view. "A behavioral approach is distinguished predominantly by the nature of the purpose it is designed to serve, the purpose is scientific,"¹¹ wrote Van Dyke. According to Truman: "The ultimate goal of the student of political behavior is the development of a science of the political process."¹² And Dahl states that

The behavioral approach is an attempt to improve our understanding of politics by seeking to explain the empirical aspects of political life by means of methods, theories and criteria of proof that are acceptable according to the canons, conventions and assumptions of modern empirical science."¹³

What are those "canons, conventions and assumptions of modern empirical science"? A review of the literature reveals that although different authors suggest different sets of such assumptions,¹⁴ they agree on six assumptions:

- 1) The behavioralist seeks regularities, uniformities in human behavior for the purpose of making generalizations. The higher its level of generalizations, the higher the stage of development of a science, and the better its ability to explain and predict.
- 2) Since statements of fact and statements of value are logically separate and distinct, the latter cannot be deduced from the former.
- 3) The only kind of data acceptable to behavioralists is that which has been collected by observation of empirical reality.
- 4) The validity of behavioralist findings must be testable by reference to behavioral reality. Behavioralist findings should be stated in such a manner as to allow for replication and verification or falsification

by others.

5) Quantification is the most precise form of scientific findings. Behaviorists should attempt to quantify their findings whenever possible and meaningful.

6) Politics is but one aspect of human life. To ensure an understanding of all aspects of human behavior, the behavioral political scientist turns to the other social sciences, their research techniques and their findings.

David Easton has suggested that "political behavior stands for both an intellectual tendency and a concrete academic movement."¹⁵ The content of the "intellectual tendency" consists of the six assumptions listed above. But the movement is difficult to distinguish, mainly because it does not possess any overt physical characteristics, such as geographical location or headquarters, membership rules, policies or any other organizational attributes. Rather, the individuals in the movement are united mainly by a subjective inner feeling of sharing this "mood."

As in most social movements, membership is not a matter of belonging to a formal organization, but of possessing a sense of belonging together, sharing similar assumptions and ideals, respecting one another's interests, seeking reciprocal aid and sustenance, or accepting a common leadership.¹⁶

Identifying the members in the movement, then, is difficult because of the subjective elusive "mood" that its members share. The problem is compounded when we ask how many "assumptions and ideals" must a political scientist adopt before he can be said to share in this "mood" and be properly designated a "behavioralist"? Must he adopt all six assumptions listed above with equal intensity, or may he, for example, adopt three, ignore two, and be critical of one, and still be a "behavioralist"?

This question cannot be resolved in the abstract, but rather by an

empirical investigation of the writings of these commonly called "behavioralists." "The demand for exactness of meaning and for precise definition of terms can easily have a pernicious effect, as I believe it often has had in behavioral science. It results in what has been aptly named the premature closure of our ideas," wrote Abraham Kaplan.¹⁷

A better understanding of the meaning of behavioralism must be the result of inquiry; a precise definition at this early stage in the dissertation will hamper inquiry, rather than aid it. Rather than postulate a priori what is common to all those we commonly call behavioralists, I will attempt to look first for what is, or is not, common to all.

Ludwig Wittgenstein has suggested this approach to the definition of concepts. To illustrate, he gives an example of the analysis of the concept "games."

Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games.' I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: 'there must be something common, or they would not be called "games"-' but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them, you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think but look!¹⁸

Games like tennis and chess involve competition, but the skills involved in each of them are different. If we look now at a child throwing a ball against the wall and catching, the element of competition has disappeared, but the three games mentioned share the common element of amusement.

Wittgenstein calls these common similarities "family resemblances."

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances;' for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. And I shall say, games form a family.¹⁹

I propose to follow this procedure in the analysis of behavioralism.

It is evident that different techniques and approaches are utilized by behavioralists in their quest for science. What are the "family resemblances," if any, among these techniques and approaches? Which of the six basic assumptions of behavioralism are emphasized by which approach and technique? What are the differences rather than similarities among these approaches and techniques? Thus rather than begin with a strict definition, which will only serve as a Procrustean bed into which phenomena must be fit - or be rejected, I propose to make the definition of behavioralism a focus for inquiry, a procedure which may shed some light on the different facets of behavioralism.

C. Behavioralist controversies

1) The value of values

The question of the place of values in political inquiry is one on which conflict and consensus coexist among behavioralists. While behavioralists agree on the logical distinction between statements of fact and value judgments, they differ on the role the behavioral political scientist ought to pursue regarding valuation. Heinz Eulau wrote:

Which is the man in whose service the behavioral persuasion finds its reason for existence? Is he a democratic man? A just man? A power-seeking man? Is he a man who must be controlled because he is brutish and nasty? Or is he a man who must be liberated from the shackles of oppression to live a dignified life? 20
These are philosophical questions better left to the philosophers.

Different men have different values, pursue different goals. The behavioral political scientist can and should investigate and study these values, but as to preferences of some values over others, he should remain neutral and silent, even when his findings "are put to the service of good as well as evil, of freedom as well as slavery, of life as well as death. In this

respect a science of politics only shares the supreme dilemma of all the sciences, natural and behavioral. It would be most presumptuous to assume that political science has at its disposal knowledge of good and evil, of justice and injustice, of right and wrong."²¹ In a later work, Eulau takes a more moderate position, asserting that: "For there is nothing in the logic of science that compels the scientist to commit himself to one of several conflicting public purposes - or to withhold his commitment. Commitment is as defensible as its opposite."²² The behavioral political scientist is first and foremost a scientist and his supreme loyalty is to the canons of science. The dilemma of commitment or noncommitment is a private personal dilemma and the fact that he is a political scientist is only of secondary importance. But now Eulau introduces a new element:

Only if the scientist is a free man can he perform his work, and only if he is a free man can he make the moral choice of participating in or abstaining from political life. I would argue, therefore, that in this respect, at least, science itself dictates a moral choice. Hence the scientist must be forever vigilant lest the freedoms necessary for his scientific work be infringed upon.²³

The behavioralist commits himself to freedom not because it is a universal "good," not because all men ought to be free, but only because lack of freedom may interfere with his scientific work. He is not concerned with all types of freedom - only with the "freedoms necessary for his scientific work." The choice that science dictates here is not moral - as Eulau claims, it is purely egotistical. Science is here the ultimate value; freedom merely its servant. This position itself is a value judgment.

A somewhat different position is taken by David Easton;

Ethical evaluation and empirical explanation involve two different kinds of propositions that, for the sake of clarity, should be kept analytically distinct. However, a student of political behavior is not prohibited from asserting propositions of either kind separately or in combination as long as he does not mistake one for the other.²⁴

This is a more relaxed and moderate position than the one Eulau took--the fact-value separation is kept intact, but rather than leave valuations outside of the scope of the behavioralists' research, Easton allows them to remain, as long as their distinctness from empirical findings and their non-scientific status are recognized.

A third stance is taken by Eugene Meehan, a strong advocate of a science of politics.

Because science cannot condemn genocide, is the political scientist to remain neutral on the subject? Surely, in political science, perhaps more than elsewhere, there are stupidities to be exposed, icons to be shattered, injustices to be damned, evils to be remedied, waste to be deplored, and myths to be exploded. If the academician repudiates all responsibility in such matters, especially in areas where his competence extends far beyond that of the man in the street, or the man in Congress, where on earth can responsibility lie? Knowledge always carries responsibility.²⁵

The political scientist is different from other scientists by his subject matter, and this particular subject matter, namely politics, makes different demands upon him than the subject matter of other social or natural scientists. The behavioral political scientist, according to Meehan's interpretation, has a difficult load to carry, a difficult task to pursue. He must adhere to the universal canons of science, but at the same time he cannot ignore the special calling in the realm of politics. He must be like other scientists, and at the same time different.

Rather than representing a point of agreement, the behavioralist basic tenet of the logical separation of fact and value represents a continuum, a spectrum along which different behavioralists will place themselves at different points. At one end of the spectrum will be found the Eulau position which bids the behavioralist to remain silent on value questions; somewhere in the middle is Easton, who allows the behavioral political scientist to speak of value issues as long as he is aware of

their distinctness from factual statements and of their non-scientific status. At the other end of the spectrum, Eugene Meehan insists that the behavioralist should address himself to valuations if he is to remain true to his profession.

2) The place of theory in behavioralism

Somit and Tanenhaus postulate that

Research should be theory oriented and theory directed. Ideally, inquiry should proceed from carefully developed theoretical formulations which yield, in turn, 'operational-izable' hypotheses. Since theory must take into account the nature, scope and variety of the phenomena under study, the behavioralist speaks of 'low-level,' 'middle-level,' and general theory. The ultimate objective is the development of 'overarching' generalizations which will accurately describe the interrelated phenomena in the same fashion, to use a threadbare illustration, that Newton's laws once seemed to account for the physical world.²⁶

But the behavioralist is asked to be not only theoretical, but also empirical, and as Vernon Van Dyke sees things, "when a contradiction develops between the desire for a high level of generality and the desire for a high degree of reliability, the latter prevails."²⁷

Van Dyke's solution for resolving the contradiction has not been accepted by all behaviorists. There is a conflict among those behaviorists who seek a high level of generality, or "overarching theory," and those who seek a high degree of reliability.

David Easton was the earliest and most forceful advocate of the theoretical orientation among behaviorists. In his The Political System, published in 1953, he reviewed the state of the discipline and put forward suggestions for improvement. There is no such thing as a pure fact, says Easton. "A fact is a particular ordering of reality in terms of a theoretical interest."²⁸ There is an infinity of facts from which every scientist

selects and orders only a small number; the criteria for selecting and ordering these facts, whether conscious or unconscious, are theoretical. The scientist comes to empirical reality already equipped with a frame of reference, or "conceptual framework." There are different levels of theorizing; a "singular generalization" establishes relations between two variables, a "narrow gauge" theory connects a few singular generalizations. The highest state of theorizing is "systematic theory," "the conceptual framework within which a whole discipline is cast."²⁹ It is this "systematic" or "general" theory that is Easton's main concern. Looking at the state of political science, Easton finds it wanting in many respects. Political scientists have still not uncovered the "hard core of political power in society," they accept political conditions as given and neglect to study political change. The concepts of political science remain vague, ambiguous and imprecise. The main reason for this "malaise of political science" is the neglect of general theory; such a theory in political science will serve as a "master plan for empirical research." It will give political science a central focal point which it is so lacking; it will help bring out areas in which research is needed, and will add to the reliability of research already undertaken. To be a mature science, political science must become a theoretical science. At the present, political scientists are too concerned with the accumulation of facts; this conception of science that political science has adopted is too narrow.

At the present, highly empirical stage in the development of the social sciences, there is little need to insist that scientific knowledge must be well grounded in facts. What does need emphasis, however, is that in and of themselves, facts do not enable us to explain or understand an event. Facts must be ordered in some way so that we can see their connections. The higher the level of generality in ordering such facts and clarifying their relations, the

broader will be the range of explanation and understanding."³⁰
 In 1965,³¹ Easton ceases to seek for one unifying "general theory," but he still emphasizes the importance of theory for a science of politics. The behavioral revolution was a dual revolution - it was a revolution in the techniques used by political scientists to gather and order data, but it was also a theoretical revolution.

'Behavioralism' means more than scientific techniques, more than rigor. This alone would indeed mean rigor mortis as its critics from the traditional point of view, both classical and institutional, have been quick and correct to indicate. The behavioral approach testifies³² to the coming of age of theory in the social sciences as a whole.

Easton is well aware of the tension between the demands to theorize, on the one hand, and to be empirical on the other hand. General theory may become so abstract that it becomes difficult to relate to reality. But whereas Van Dyke states that the level of generality of a theory must be determined by empirical considerations, Easton says that

to demand that a theory be actually verifiable at each stage of its development would impose on it an unnecessary severe burden. All that we need demand of theoretical research is that in principle we are able to test it by reference to sensory data.³³

Easton calls for "the autonomy of theoretical research." Theory should not be bound by "facts" - it should be given a free reign to wander and search for insights.

Eulau's critique of Easton is different from that of Van Dyke. Easton's systems theory is untestable because of its teleological nature, and "scientific research can test only causal, not teleological hypotheses."³⁴

David Easton, one of the central figures of behavioralism, is then promptly relegated by Eulau into the ranks of the "ancients," those who study political science in traditional, unscientific ways, rather than in "modern" ways.

Behavioral political science today is just as fragmented and heterogeneous, and maybe even more so, than the political science that Easton described in 1953. It employs a multitude of approaches, methods and theories, its findings are incomparable to one another and noncumulative. Some behaviorists see this as attesting to the vitality and drive of behavioralism, and consequently view any attempt to organize the discipline around a comprehensive framework as a danger to its vitality. Others view this state of affairs as chaotic and intolerable, and continue the search for "overarching theory."

3) The units-of-analysis controversy.

The problem of the proper unit of analysis for social and political inquiry is one of the most important and complex problems of the social sciences. A full discussion of this problem will be made in the next chapter.³⁵ The more modest aim here is to present the controversy among behaviorists about the "proper" unit of analysis for political research.

Behavioralism in its narrow meaning was a reaction to the "institutionalism" of traditional political science. Easton³⁶ discerns three phases in the development of traditional political science. In the first phase, political scientists focused their research on government institutions with the emphasis on their legal and formal aspects. In the second phase, the focus was still on government institutions, but the legalistic approach was rejected in favor of a realist approach: the search for the "real" source of power as opposed to the one constitutionally defined. In the third phase emphasis shifted from governmental to non-governmental structures. The realm of politics has been widened, and the "governmental process" is now viewed as interactions among social groups, with the purpose of influencing

governmental structures.

Although there are marked differences among these three phases, their common denominator is their exclusion of the individual actor, his desires, needs, motivations, and purposes. Statements like "the government decided," "the group opposes," say nothing about the individuals who make up the government, or compose the group. A decision by a group is simultaneously a decision by each individual within it. The main concern of traditional political science, in all its phases, was the decision of the collective, not that of individuals who compose it. Interest groups, political parties, parliaments, governments, etc., were viewed as "black boxes" responding to stimuli, with little or no concern for the human element.

The behaviorists sought to reintroduce man as an actor in the political realm. Thus, we find Kirkpatrick stating that

"the orientation to the study of political science that I identify by the term political behavior 1, rejects political institutions as the basic unit for research and identifies the behavior of individuals in political situations as the basic unit of analysis."³⁷

Lasswell and Kaplan declare

Central throughout are persons and their acts, not 'governments' and 'states.' Terms like 'state,' 'government,' 'law,' 'power' - all the traditional vocabulary of political science - are words of ambiguous reference until it is clear how they are to be used in describing what people say and do."³⁸

And to Eulau "the political behavior of the individual is the central and crucial empirical datum of the behavioral approaches to politics."³⁹

But difficult methodological problems arise when the individual becomes the empirical unit of analysis. Political events are usually large-scale events. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to treat such central topics of political science as war and peace, revolution and stability in terms of individuals. Behaviorists whose main concern is the study of

international relations or comparative politics, seldom refer to the postulate that the individual is the behaviorist unit of analysis. What is found instead is the statement:

The emerging analytical framework in contemporary political theory is the concept of system whether it is employed at the level of sub national, regional, or structural units such as communities, legislative bodies or committees, at the level of national political units, or at the level of the international political system.⁴⁰

Thus, the "Political System," an analytic general framework, is the central unit of analysis for some behaviorists, rather than the individual as an empirical unit of analysis. There is a close connection between the controversy over the behaviorist unit of analysis, and the controversy over the place of theory in behaviorist research. Those behaviorists who insist that theory must be empirically verifiable also insist that the individual be the unit of empirical analysis. Those behaviorists who seek a "general framework" for political science will use "system" as the central theoretical unit of analysis. Those who insist on the individual as the basic unit of analysis and on the verifiability of theory pay for their strict empiricism by limiting the scope of political inquiry.

The student who takes a behavioral approach is not likely to ask broad and vague questions like 'what caused the decline and fall of the Roman Empire?' or whether the military power available to the Soviet block is greater than the power available to the West, or whether liberalism is likely to triumph in Africa... Rather, he is likely to stick to questions that call for a relatively narrow range of evidence and logic.⁴¹

As was demonstrated, not all behaviorists agree with this statement. Those who see the "political system" as the basic theoretical unit of analysis of political science deal with large-scale political processes. They increase the scope of political inquiry at the price of empirical validity and the exclusion of the individual person from politics. Heinz Eulau is aware of the similarity between the "system" type of political analysis

and traditional political analysis, "invariably the system or whole turns out to be the 'state' of old."⁴²

Thus, the concept that for some behavioralists marked a watershed in the scientific development of political science stands now exposed by others as nothing but a new term for a traditional concept.

In the rare cases when the same political phenomenon can be analyzed by different conceptual models having different units of analysis, each conceptual model will result in a different explanation for the same phenomenon.⁴³ Thus, an adoption of a certain unit of analysis by a political scientist will have a great influence on the scope, the reliability and even the nature of his findings. Behavioralist political scientists employ different units of analysis, employ different conceptual frameworks, and differ amongst themselves over the proper scope of the discipline and the reliability of their respective findings.

4) Behavioralism: Pure science or applied science?

In 1950 David Easton wrote an article in which he describes a major transformation in Harold D. Lasswell's intellectual development.⁴⁴

There are two distinctly different phases in Lasswell's development. The first phase extended approximately from 1934 to 1940 insofar as its boundaries can be detected in his writings. In this period he was concerned solely with the development of a purely scientific, objective science of politics. Adhering to the Weberian tradition, he maintained that values lay beyond the margin of the social scientist qua scientist. In this view the task of the political scientist consisted solely in discovering valid universal generalizations. Amoral-ity was the password. But with the outbreak of the Second World War his thinking entered into a new phase.⁴⁵

Lasswell could not remain aloof from an event such as World War II which threatened the very existence of western civilization. "In the second phase, on the contrary, he believes passionately that the social sciences

are doomed to sterility unless they accept the contemporary challenge and say something about our ultimate social objectives."⁴⁶ Lasswell is a "scholar divided against himself," he seeks, on the one hand, to make the study of politics "scientific" - exact, objective, ordered; on the other hand he recognizes that a science of politics that does not address itself to "social objectives" is a doomed enterprise. In a world of peril, the political scientist cannot remain "neutral," he must become a "policy scientist" - commit himself to the survival of democracy.

It is ironic, perhaps, that a generation after Lasswell underwent this intellectual transformation, David Easton himself underwent a very similar transformation in his intellectual development. In his The Political System, Easton warns that undue emphasis on the reformative and prescriptive aspects in the research of political scientists may deflect resources needed for establishing a solid base of scientific knowledge. "At the least, the application of knowledge ought not to overshadow the discovery of general causal relations; at the most, it ought to play only a secondary role in the first stages of a social science."⁴⁷ Political science is "immature," its store of knowledge is small and not very reliable. The main concern of political scientists should be to expand their store of knowledge and to increase its reliability before it can be applied.

In 1957, Easton's position becomes considerably less moderate.

If there is one feature for which behavioral research is indeed distinguished, it is this: the new political science conceives of its objectives as first and foremost the pursuit of pure or unapplied knowledge. It begins with the assumption that to change an institution one must first understand how it works and that the task of understanding has scarcely begun.⁴⁸

Although in The Political System, Easton recognizes the need to continue a reformative political science, he wants to subordinate it to the search

for pure knowledge. But later, no mention is made of that need, no sense of urgency is felt. Political scientists can go on leisurely with their research until that day in the future when they decide they have "enough" "hard" knowledge and are ready to help society.

The events of the 1960's in the United States were for David Easton what World War II was for Harold Lasswell. The Viet Nam War, the political assassinations, race riots, the "discovery" of poverty, these caused Easton to rethink his position on the proper role of behavioral political science. In 1969 he writes: "Mankind today is working under the pressure of time. Time is no longer on our side."⁴⁹ The world is in crisis, the political scientist can no longer stand aside and continue leisurely to seek basic knowledge. "We can no longer take the ideal scientific stance of behavioralism that because of the limitations of our understanding, application is premature and must await future basic research."⁵⁰

Lasswell suggested that if political science is to contribute to the survival of democracy, the political scientist should become a "policy scientist" - make his research useful for democratic policy makers. But Easton is aware of the difficulties involved here.

In the application of his knowledge the political scientist explicitly, or unwittingly, accepts the value premises of those he serves. His posture of neutrality has the added consequence of undermining his will or capacity ~~to~~ challenge the broader purposes to which his knowledge is put.

Instead, Easton suggests the establishment of "A Federation of Social Scientists" - an organization that will include social scientists from various disciplines who will concern themselves with current major problems, will study them, suggest solutions, and will work for their implementation.

As a result of his intellectual transformation, David Easton sees

now the whole discipline in a new light. Not only do the policy scientists accept the current value premises, even those behavioralists not directly involved with policy issues, those who searched for "pure" science, have also been subservient to the "prevailing political or moral premises about what is desirable or possible."⁵² Political science has failed to anticipate the major crises of the 1960's, it has not addressed itself to the problems of violence, poverty, race, urban crises, etc. The discipline wore "collective blinders;" it was guilty of selective inattention. It never challenged the value premises of the national leadership; it never examined its own normative premises.

An intellectual transformation is a painful experience. Old and cherished beliefs, assumptions and values must be discarded, mistakes must be admitted. Knowing how most of mankind find it so difficult to part with their comfortable set of basic guiding ideas even in the presence of facts that contradict them, the development that Lasswell and Easton underwent seems the more remarkable. But because they could not reject all their past commitments, both seek a compromise between their old self and their newly-discovered world. Both seek to avoid a too painful "cognitive dissonance," both are "scholars divided against themselves," seeking ways to restore the tranquility they experienced before an internal struggle disrupted it. This search for inner psychic consistency leads to intellectual inconsistency.

The first phase in Lasswell's development is called by Easton, the "elitist phase." Influenced by Pareto, Lasswell sees political science as the study of the value hierarchy in any society with emphasis on the top of this hierarchy - the elite. But an elitist conceptual framework is antagonistic to democracy, says Easton. It assumes that in any society,

power and influence are concentrated in a few hands. In his second phase of intellectual development, Lasswell insists on support for democracy, but now "it becomes contradictory to seek to preserve and extend democracy while at the same time insisting that power lies in the hands of the few."⁵³

Lasswell does not discard entirely the elitist framework.

Lasswell seems now in the process of scrapping the elitist framework, but instead of clearly revealing the non-democratic underpinning of this schema, he unsuccessfully attempts to reconcile elitism with democratic assumptions. The elite is now re-defined as the masses out of which the leaders are drawn.⁵⁴

Rather than a clear break with the past, Lasswell continues to use his favorite terminology, but he redefines it in such a way that it now means the opposite of its original meaning.

For Easton, too, the break with the past is difficult. Although his intellectual transformation enables him to see the world in a new light, he clings desperately to his pet schema, systems analysis, and continues to declare its usefulness.

This mode of analysis suggests that at the outset we inquire into the presence or absence of demands for the considerations of these matters most directly related to the critical issues of the day. Who, if anyone, has put demands into the system about these issues? What kinds of needs and wants give rise to demands that have been made? Why were the demands so slow in emerging during the last two decades as the present crises were taking shape?⁵⁵

The fact remains that many, not all of them even social scientists, asked these questions, anticipated the crises to come, without the aid of systems analysis, and that those political scientists, well equipped with "scientific tools," including Easton himself, remained silent.

The process of intellectual development that Lasswell and Easton underwent has been described above because its importance transcends its merely personal aspect. It serves to illustrate the controversy among and within behavioralists as to their proper function in society. It also causes one

to feel that there must be something wrong in a conception of a science of politics when two of its most distinguished and sensitive practitioners must change their outlook under the impact of world conflicts. It is, indeed, strange to find political scientists, with their long tradition of studying conflicts, wars, revolutions and upheavals, being taken by surprise by such events, overwhelmed, and starting a search for "new" means for coping with such events intellectually.

Summary

In this chapter I have, first, chosen the term "behavioralism" over other terms which I found deficient. In facing the problem of defining behavioralism, I have suggested that more precision in definition may be achieved as a result of this inquiry, rather than be postulated at its inception. Some controversies among behaviorists over the proper place of values, the proper unit of analysis and the proper role of theory in behavioral inquiry have been discussed. Another controversy involved the role of the behaviorist as a policy scientist. Although an examination of empirical and theoretical work done by behaviorists is reserved for the next chapters in this dissertation (in this chapter I rely almost wholly on programmatic works of behaviorists), it already seems apparent that while behaviorists are united in viewing science as their goal, they have different conceptions of the meaning of science.

Footnotes

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²Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. ix.

³Ibid.

⁴David Easton, "The Current Meaning of Behavioralism," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. by James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 12. Heinz Eulau, "Segments of Political Science Most Susceptible to Behavioristic Treatment," in Ibid., pp. 35-36.

⁵James G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," in The State of the Social Sciences, ed. by Leonard D. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 29-30.

⁶Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on Traditional Political Science," in Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, ed. by Austin Ranney (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 11-12.

⁷Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," p. 19.

⁸David Easton, The Political System (2d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 201.

⁹Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," p. 19.

¹⁰David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 8.

¹¹Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis, p. 159.

¹²David Truman, "The Implications of Political Behavior Research," Items, V (December, 1951), 37.

¹³Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," p. 19.

¹⁴Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 7; Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach," p. 12; Truman, "The Implications of Political Behavior Research," pp. 37-39; Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1967), pp. 177-78; Heinz Eulau, "Political Behavior," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XII, 203; Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), pp. 21, 22. Van Dyke, Political Science, pp. 158-160.

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- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 14.
- ¹⁷ Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 70.
- ¹⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (2d ed.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 31.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p. 32.
- ²⁰ Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 133.
- ²¹ Ibid., p. 136.
- ²² Heinz Eulau, "Tradition and Innovation: On the Tension between Ancient and Modern Ways in the Study of Politics," in Behavioralism in Political Science, ed. by Heinz Eulau (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 12.
- ²³ Ibid., p. 13.
- ²⁴ Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 7.
- ²⁵ Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 265.
- ²⁶ Somit and Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science, p. 178.
- ²⁷ Van Dyke, Political Science, p. 158.
- ²⁸ Easton, The Political System, p. 57.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Ibid., p. 4.
- ³¹ Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis.
- ³² Ibid., p. 22.
- ³³ Easton, The Political System, p. 315.
- ³⁴ Eulau, "Tradition and Innovation," p. 17.
- ³⁵ The problem is discussed in Ernst Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 536-546. Among the few political scientists that address themselves to it are Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, pp. 123-127, and his Micro-Macro Political Analysis (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), especially pp. 1-19, and J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics, XIV (October, 1961), 77-92.

- ³⁶Easton, The Political System, pp. 149-199.
- ³⁷Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach," p. 12.
- ³⁸Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 3.
- ³⁹Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 14.
- ⁴⁰Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," in American Political Science Review, LX (December, 1966), p. 876.
- ⁴¹Van Dyke, Political Science, p. 196.
- ⁴²Eulau, "Tradition and Innovation," p. 16.
- ⁴³Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 689-718. Allison convincingly demonstrates that each model results in a different explanation for the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union in the crisis.
- ⁴⁴David Easton, "Harold Lasswell: Policy Scientists for the Democratic Society," Journal of Politics, XII (1950), 450-77. For a less generous interpretation of the same transformation see Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), 191-197.
- ⁴⁵Easton, "Harold Lasswell: Policy Scientist . . .", p. 459.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 451.
- ⁴⁷Easton, The Political System, p. 85.
- ⁴⁸David Easton, "Traditional and Behavioral Research in American Political Science," Administrative Science Quarterly, II (1957), 113.
- ⁴⁹David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," reprinted in The Political System, 2d ed., p. 329.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., p. 335.
- ⁵¹Ibid., p. 343.
- ⁵²Easton, The Political System, 2d ed., p. 362.
- ⁵³Easton, "Harold Lasswell," p. 463.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 473.
- ⁵⁵Easton, The Political System, 2d ed., p. 373.

CHAPTER II

CRITICS AND BEHAVIORALISTS

A. Critiques of Behavioralism

Behavioralism was met with criticism from its inception, and the debate between behavioralists and their critics continues into the present. The critics come from all segments of the discipline, and even from within the behavioral movement. While the early critics represented an "old," philosophical, and traditional political science, many young political scientists became critics of behavioralism, especially in the late 1960's.

Among the most notable early critics of behavioralism were Hans J. Morgenthau, who in his Scientific Man Versus Power Politics,¹ which was published in 1946, criticized a political science that ignores or minimizes the importance of power in human affairs, and seeks scientific solutions to social and political problems. Eric Voegelin, in his The New Science of Politics,² which was published in 1952, criticized mainly the pretensions of the new political science to value neutrality. Another major critique of behavioralism was Bernard Crick's The American Science of Politics,³ published in 1959. Crick traced the history of American political science, and the interrelationships between developments in the discipline and different currents in American political thought. He was highly critical of the Chicago school and especially its two major figures, Merriam and Lasswell.

The debate between behavioralists and their critics has reached what must be considered its shrillest moment upon the publication of Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics⁴ in 1962. The book consists of four essays, the first, by Walter Berns, is a critique of various voting studies. The second, by Herbert J. Storing, the book's editor, is a critique of the work of Herbert Simon. In the third essay, Leo Weinstein criticizes the work of Arthur F. Bentley, and the fourth by Robert Horwitz is a critique of Harold Lasswell's writings. All four writers were students of Leo Strauss, who wrote the epilogue to this work. The book was less than generous to those criticized. To cite a telling example:

The new political science puts a premium on observations which can be made with the utmost frequency, and therefore by people of the meanest capacity. Thus it frequently culminates in observations made by people who are not intelligent about people who are not intelligent.⁵

The review of this work in the American Political Science Review was just as harsh, for example: "This is a serious book, deadly serious, fanatically serious."⁶ This debate hides a double irony: The book was criticized by John H. Schaar and Sheldon S. Wolin, both non-behavioralists. Both became later critics of behavioralism, and Wolin in particular utilized arguments similar to those he criticizes now.

Some major behavioralist figures have also been critical of behavioralism, mainly of its narrow view, that which posits the individual as the sole unit of analysis for behavioral research. David Easton, David Truman, and V.O. Key, Jr. all point out that such a view excludes from behavioral research phenomena important for understanding political life. Robert A. Dahl emphasized the ahistorical character of such research.⁷

The late 1960's witnessed a new wave of criticism directed at behavioralism. This wave was distinguished not so much by the originality of the

critiques, as by their great vigor and quantity, and by the fact that they were written mostly by a younger generation of political scientists.⁸ It was not accidental that this new wave of criticism coincided with growing unrest in the United States over international and domestic issues.

What is the content of the many critiques directed at behavioralism? What were behaviorists criticized for?

The critiques can be classified under two broad categories: 1) critiques concerning values; 2) critiques concerning the political. It will become evident shortly that these two categories are far from resembling water-tight compartments, but are rather open to interactions between them.

1) Critiques concerning values

a) The behavioral political scientist, or for that matter anybody else, can never become value free. This is probably the most often repeated critique of behavioralism.

The recognition of facts requires not only sensory awareness, but judgments as to value and significance. As a matter of fact, it is only by fitting the data made available to the senses into some preformulated conceptual scheme that the individual is able to perceive facts at all,"

wrote John H. Hallowell in 1944.⁹

The same view is repeated in 1972. "The experience of which we are aware has already been selected and shaped by the mind itself."¹⁰ This is the Kantian view which sees the human mind as active, searching, and distinguishing among sense impressions according to categories which precede these impressions in the mind.

Another explanation for the inability of behaviorists to achieve objectivity refers to "Mannheim's paradox."

With increasing frequency and self-assurance, the scientific objec-

tivity of American social science is proclaimed by some of its prominent practitioners. Various explanations are offered for the onset of social science's golden age, but central to most of them is the claim that modern social science has managed to resolve Mannheim's Paradox, namely, that in the pursuit of truth, the social scientist himself is handicapped by the narrow focus and distortions implicit in ideological thought,

wrote Joseph LaPalombara.¹¹ Peter Euben chides behavioralists for their failure "to confront Mannheim's Paradox."¹² Karl Mannheim, like Marx, wrote that "our thinking is determined by our social position."¹³ Here the mind's distortion of reality results from forces external to itself. Mannheim admitted that objections based upon the relativity of knowledge can be directed at Marx himself. To save himself from the same fate, Mannheim invented the concept of "free-floating intellectuals." According to Mannheim, the intellectuals alone are free from attachment to any social interest. Intellectuals are recruited from all social strata, but their affinity is based on their common education. They represent all points of view in a society, but are able to examine critically their own social roots, and arrive at the objective interest of society as a whole.

However, according to the above critiques, behavioralists cannot become value free, either because of preconceptions within the mind, or because of forces external to the mind.

b) A second critique directed at behavioralism concerning the question of values is the assertion by behavioralists that they themselves have no values: "Whereas acting man has necessarily chosen values, the new political scientist as pure spectator is not committed to any value; in particular he is neutral in the conflict between liberal democracy and its enemies,"¹⁴ wrote Leo Strauss.

Here, it seems, that to the extent that the behavioralist has succeeded in realizing his goal of value-neutrality, he is being criticized for it.

c) But a little later Strauss writes that "there is then more than a mysterious pre-established harmony between the new political science and a particular version of liberal democracy."¹⁵

d) And to add to the confusion, Strauss also criticizes the behaviorists for treating all values as equal. They are "teaching the equality of values," and "denying that there are things which are intrinsically high and others which are intrinsically low."¹⁶

The same view is shared by Voegelin, who criticized Weber, and by implication, behaviorists, who "treated all values as equal."¹⁷

e) Another critique of behavioralism blames behaviorists not for treating all values as equal, but for preferring some values to others. It speaks of the "inevitable tendencies within the behavioral approach to view with approval the political system as static, closed, conservative."¹⁸

To sum up, then, behaviorists have been criticized for being unable to achieve their goal of ethical neutrality, for being able to achieve that same goal, for treating all values as equal, for preferring liberal democracy, and for preferring a conservative political system.

2) Critiques concerning the political

One of the most often repeated critiques of behavioralism is that behaviorists avoid research on important political problems. Behaviorists, wrote the editors of Apolitical Politics "select their topics not by any criterion of political significance, but rather by criteria determined by their methodology."¹⁹ Eric Voegelin asserted that

"the use of method as the criterion of science abolishes theoretical relevance. As a consequence, all propositions concerning facts will be promoted to the dignity of science, regardless of their relevance, as long as they result from a correct use of method."²⁰

Bernard Crick states that: "It is deemed more important to reach statistically testable conclusions than socially significant generalizations."²¹

And David Truman criticized behavioralists for "defining the problem at hand in terms of a favorite technique rather than insisting that the problem set the technique."²²

Implicit in all these statements is the assumption that following the criterion of "method," or "technique," or searching for "statistically testable conclusions," one cannot examine important social and political problems. Two questions immediately come into mind: 1) Is this a correct assumption? 2) If, as the critics claim, it is correct, why is it so? There is, however, another question that demands further analysis. What are those "socially significant generalizations," those "problems," or "criteria of political significance" that behavioralists presumably neglect? Or in other words, what is the "political"?

The critics give more than one answer to this question. As early as 1957 Arnold A. Rogow wrote an article aptly titled "Whatever Happened to the Great Issues?" It is the "great issues" which have been neglected. Rogow lists some of them.

To begin with, the present capitalist system has not abolished poverty and want. There are still between twenty and thirty million people in the United States, according to government figures, who live on incomes at or near the base subsistence level.²³

Another great issue is the question of "the morality of planned obsolescence in a world of scarcity and want."²⁴ Rogow is well aware that "many of the 'great issues' are value issues."²⁵ What is "politically significant" then, are great issues which are value issues, questions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, equality and inequality.

Another answer to the question "what is the political?" is provided

by Leo Strauss:

The reduction of the political to the sub-political is the reduction of primarily given wholes to elements which are relatively simple, that is, sufficiently simple for the research purpose at hand yet necessarily susceptible of being analyzed into simpler elements ad infinitum. It implies that there cannot be genuine wholes. Hence it implies that there cannot be a common good.²⁶

The political then, is the whole, though Strauss is far from explicit as to what he means by a "whole." Sheldon Wolin explains: "Of all the authoritative institutions in society, the political arrangement has been singled out as uniquely concerned with what is common to the whole community."²⁷ Strauss does not claim that behavioralists ignore the political because it is unsusceptible to behavioral methods. On the contrary, he sees these methods as successful, too successful, in effect, for they have reduced the political whole to non-political parts. Moreover, they have eliminated the "common good." Strauss, like Rogow, views the political as inherently imbedded in universal values - Rogow's "great issues" and Strauss' "common good" both refer to ultimate universal questions of value.

Another component of the political is evident in Wolin's description, where he speaks of a "political arrangement," and of "authoritative institutions." But, claims Leo Strauss, behavioralists have relegated to the background the legal and institutional arrangements of society.²⁸ As noted earlier, some behavioralists have made this same critique. David Easton wrote in 1953:

A rounded analysis of a political event, therefore, requires some attention to the situation as well as to the psychological data involved. Although this fact seems, at this point, to be obvious, the truth is that numerous efforts at investigating the psychological aspects of activity still tend to ignore the situational determinant. A good portion of psychological research leaves the unmistakable impression that motivations are the primary, if not exclusive, factor in shaping political institutions.²⁹

And David Truman wrote in 1955:

The center of gravity in the behavioral sciences is individual or at least non-institutional in character. This implies that an uncritical adoption of the methods and propositions of behavioral science involves taking over the questions and problems - and limitations - of the latter and that one who does so risks ceasing to be a political scientist.³⁰

Political institutions, then, are a major component of the political, and according to the critics, behaviorists ignore these institutions.

In his important article "Political Theory as a Vocation,"³¹ Sheldon Wolin sets out to search for the implications of the behaviorists' emphasis on the need for scientific methods for improving the study of politics. Wolin rejects the idea that "methods per se do not presuppose a philosophical view of things, but are neutral or instrumental, analagous to the technician in being indifferent to the purpose of their master."³²

The adoption of method has profound implications for the scientist and his findings; Wolin stresses two of these implications:

The alleged neutrality of a methodist's training overlooks significant philosophical assumptions admittedly incorporated into the outlook of those who advocate scientific inquiry into politics. These assumptions are such as to reinforce an uncritical view of all existing political structures and all that they imply.³³

Here Wolin states the familiar position that adoption of scientific modes of inquiry leads the political scientist to accept the status quo uncritically. It is the second implication in the adoption of method that is more interesting: "For the employment of method assumes, even requires, that the world be of one kind rather than another if technique is to be effective."³⁴ Thus, from the goal of behaviorists to search for regularities and uniformities in human behavior, "it follows that the methodist is in trouble when the world exhibits 'deformities' or emergent 'irregularities' because there are inherent limits to the kinds of questions which the methodist deems appropriate."³⁵

A somewhat similar opinion is voiced by Hans J. Morgenthau:

Modern theorists of politics are repelled by history; for history is the realm of the accidental, the contingent, the unpredictable. They are instead fascinated by the rational model of the natural sciences, which appears to be free of these blemishes that stand in the way of the thorough rationalization of politics.³⁶

Thus, according to Wolin and Morgenthau, in order for the scientific student of politics to achieve his goal of describing and explaining regularities and uniformities in human behavior, the social world itself must be "regular," devoid of upheavals, "deformities," wars. Thus, the third component of the political, the phenomenon of conflict, is eliminated from the repertoire of behavioralism.

Summary

I have discussed ten critiques directed at behavioralism. Under the rubric of critiques concerning values, were the critiques that 1) behavioralists cannot achieve value neutrality because a) a priori categories in the mind give form and meaning to sense impressions, or b) the social matrix in which the scientist works inevitably conditions and distorts his view of reality; 2) behavioralists are not committed to any values; 3) behavioralists are committed to liberal democracy; 4) behavioralists treat all values as equal; 5) there are inevitable tendencies within behavioralism to support conservative political systems, or to be uncritical of political reality;

Under the rubric of critiques concerning the political, the critiques were: 6) Behavioralists select topics for research by methodological criteria rather than by criteria of political significance; 7) Behavioralists ignore "great issues" because they involve values; 8) Behavioralists have rejected the political conceived as the common good; 9) Behavioralists

ignore political institutions; 10) Behaviorists cannot study conflict and history.

The critics' image of the political is that of values, in terms of the common good, or "great issues," over which there is societal conflict that is managed by political institutions.

At this point I will introduce a further distinction among the critiques of behavioralism. What critiques address themselves to inherent or inevitable shortcomings of behavioralism conceived here as a program for research into political life? And what critiques are directed at shortcomings of individual behaviorists? This distinction has been largely overlooked both by behaviorists and their critics; moreover, the significance of this distinction cannot be overemphasized. If it can be demonstrated, as I will attempt to do, that many of the critiques directed at behavioralism actually refer to shortcomings of certain individuals, as distinct from problems inherent in behavioralism, the debate between the behaviorists and their critics will be, of necessity, perceived in a different light.

Thus in analyzing the work of behaviorists I will use this list of critiques and ask for each critique: Is it inherent in the behavioral program? Or, is it due to an error committed by an individual behaviorist? Or, is the critique justified at all? Are behaviorists inherently and inevitably not value neutral, or were just some behaviorists not value neutral? Is it inherent for behaviorists to treat all values as equal, or did some behaviorists treat all values as equal, or did behaviorists really treat all values as equal, and so on with the rest of the critiques.

Another distinction that must be added here is a distinction between

methods. Critiques of behavioralism often speak of "method" and "methodists," Behavioralism, however, consists of many and varied methods and approaches. Is it possible then that shortcomings attributed to behavioralism are shortcomings of certain of the methods used by behavioralists, and that other behavioral methods are free of these shortcomings?

B. Evaluating Behavioralism by Its Own Criteria

Besides the criteria provided by the critics of behavioralism, it is important, for the sake of fairness, to evaluate the work of behavioralists by their own criteria by which they themselves consider the proper way of conducting a scientific inquiry. Abraham Kaplan differentiates between "logic in use" and "reconstructed logic." "Logic in use" refers to the actual work done by the scientist, while the "reconstructed logic" refers to the explicit formulation of the "correct rules" and principles for conducting scientific inquiry.

A reconstructed logic is not a description, but rather an idealization of scientific practice. Not even the greatest of scientists has a cognitive style which is wholly and perfectly logical, and the most brilliant piece of research still betrays its all-too-human divinations. The logic-in-use is embedded in a matrix of an alogic-in-use, even an illogic-in-use. The reconstruction idealizes the logic of science only in showing us what it would be if it were extracted and refined to utmost purity.³⁷

Moreover, in evaluating behavioralist "logic in use" with its own "reconstructed logic," it is not inevitably the logic in use that may be found lacking. It might as well be concluded that the reconstructed logic may be deficient.

I will now turn to a discussion of three principles of behavioral reconstructed logic: the ideal of scientific explanation, the ideal linkage of levels of analysis, and the ideal dependent and independent variables

for a behavioral study of politics.

1. The ideal of scientific explanation

Behavioralists constantly stress their search for regularities of behavior to be expressed in scientific generalizations. It would be fair to assume, and it has been assumed,³⁸ that they adopted the model of scientific explanation proposed by logical positivists. This model, formulated by, among others, Karl Popper and Carl G. Hempel, states that

to give a causal explanation of a certain specific event means deducing a statement describing this event from two kinds of premises, from some universal laws, and from some singular or specific statements, which we may call the specific initial conditions.³⁹

A law can be universal only "if a statement of its meaning does not require reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location."⁴⁰ This form of explanation is the only one that is genuinely scientific because each of its constituent parts can be objectively tested and falsified. The sentence which states the determining or initial conditions can be empirically tested, the universal law upon which the explanation is based can also be empirically tested and the logic of the deduction, i.e., whether the event to be explained logically follows from the premises can be examined. This model of explanation, argue its adherents, can and should be used in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the study of history. At a later date, Hempel added another type of explanation which he also considered as scientific, "probabilistic explanation."⁴¹ A probabilistic explanation, like a deductive explanation, is nomological, that is, it is based on a general law, but that law is no longer universal; it does not cover all the events to be explained. The law is probabilistic-statistical - it can only state that if the determining conditions materialize, there is

a certain statistical probability that the event will follow. The criterion of deduction was dropped because no particular event can be deduced from a statistical law.⁴²

This model of scientific explanation has been subject to great controversy. The best way to evaluate its usefulness is, I believe, by evaluating it in the light of actual work done by behavioral political scientists. This model of scientific explanation will also be used here as a measuring rod to determine the extent to which behavioralists have approached this scientific ideal.

2. Ideal linkage of levels of analysis:
Methodological individualism and political institutions

Central throughout are persons and their acts, not 'governments' and 'states.' Terms like 'state,' 'government,' 'law,' 'power' - all the traditional vocabulary of political science - are words of ambiguous reference until it is clear how they are to be used in describing what people say and do.⁴³

This statement, by Lasswell and Kaplan, is unmistakably similar to a doctrine known among philosophers of science as "methodological individualism."

Here is a similar statement by another adherent of this doctrine.

The ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people who act more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions and understanding of their situation. Every complex social situation, institution or event is the result of a particular configuration of individuals, their dispositions, situations, beliefs and physical resources and environment. There may be unfinished or halfway explanations of large-scale social phenomena (say, inflation) in terms of other large-scale phenomena (say, full employment), but we should not have arrived at rock bottom explanations of such large-scale phenomena until we have deduced an account of them from statements about the dispositions, beliefs, resources and interrelations of individuals.⁴⁴

Thus, according to this doctrine, a political scientist cannot explain the decline of parliaments by the increased power of the executive branch of

government, or the emergence of a military-industrial complex as a result of the cold war - until he has deduced these collective terms from statements about the behavior of individuals who compose these collective phenomena. Involved here is the basic tenet of behavioralism that demands that only data that has been obtained by observation should be accepted as scientific data. Individuals can be observed, maintains the methodological individualist, while a "state" cannot be.

There are, however, great difficulties in translating the principle of methodological individualism into practice.

a) Groups and institutions have properties that individuals do not have. They have "emergent" properties. A group can be cohesive; an individual cannot be. Admittedly, there are group properties that are in the nature of a statistical regularity of individual behavior. "The cohesiveness of a group may be defined, say, as the ratio of the number of people within the group with whom its members say they would prefer to be stranded on a desert island to the total number of votes for people within and without the group."⁴⁵

There are, however, institutional, holistic, molar or macroscopic terms which cannot be reduced to regularities of individual behavior because the terms themselves have a measure of vagueness around them. There is no exact fit between the term and the phenomena it describes. "It is a marked feature of our use of many collective terms that most of the individual details in their extensions cannot be specified," wrote Ernest Nagel.

b) Wholes and their properties cannot be observed, asserts the methodological individualist, but in truth, certain aspects of institutions can be observed, and certain aspects of individual behavior cannot be observed. A legislature in session can be observed, while the intentions of

the individual legislators cannot be.⁴⁷

c) Not only are many social facts irreducible to facts of individual behavior, social laws are irreducible to laws of individual behavior. Social laws cannot be deduced from laws of individual behavior, the laws of a social system may be different from the laws of its parts, but mainly because composition laws, those which state the nature of the composition of the parts and from which laws of the whole can be derived might break down after a certain level of complexity. A composition law which states how five individuals interact in a group may not be valid for a group of a thousand people. A new variable in the form of fear of large numbers of people may start to operate now with the result that prediction of individual behavior becomes impossible.⁴⁸

Methodological individualism has been forged as a weapon against the methodological principles of sociological or metaphysical holism. This principle, in its extreme form, views whole social systems as the proper unit of analysis for the social sciences, and claims that individual behavior can be explained by holistic laws different than the laws of individual behavior. The difficulty of this principle is that it must view the role of "great men" of history as insignificant. Since social life is ruled by group laws, if this particular leader would not have risen, a substitute one would have, and the course of history would not have been changed. The debate between holists and individualists is not purely methodological, but has also strong ideological overtones. Holism has been criticized as being equivalent to historicism or historism, the view that the course of history is pre-determined by laws that cannot be resisted by the individual.⁴⁹ Holism has also been criticized for the famous "fallacy of reification," viewing collective properties, such as the "will of the

state" as concrete, different and above the will of the citizen. Methodological individualism has been linked to liberal laissez-faire liberalism.⁵⁰

In 1971, Heinz Eulau published an important article which adds a great deal to the clarification of the Micro-Macro Dilemma.⁵¹ Eulau starts by saying that "linking social units of different size and therefore, of possibly different structural character, is the most important methodological problem of political science."⁵² Political science is concerned with units larger than individuals: pressure groups, political parties, wars, revolutions, have been and still are the central foci of political science, and Eulau, knowing that "wholes are difficult to observe as wholes," seeks to reconstruct wholes from the individuals composing them. "The smaller the units of action about which propositions are made, the more rigorous seems to be the type of analysis that ensues; the larger the unit, the more discursive the analysis is likely to be."⁵³ When finding similarities or differences between the behavior of individuals in several political collectives like nations or parliaments, then behavioralists usually explain these by shifting the level of analysis; "macro-phenomena are used to explain individual behavior, or, as the case may be, individual behavior is used to explain macro-phenomena by way of inference."⁵⁴ To be truly scientific, a proposition about the behavior of collectives "can be tested at these units' own level and cannot be tested at the level of sub-units or individual members." Like the ideal of a scientific explanation, this last proposition of Eulau will also serve as a measuring rod to determine how in fact behavioralists have treated the unit-of-analysis dilemma.

Eulau now differentiates among five types of properties that groups or collective social phenomena have:

- a) Integral properties. - A group's integral properties belong only

to the group as a whole, and not to its parts; they cannot be reduced to properties of the individuals composing the group. There are four different types of integral properties:

i) "Descriptive attributes." - A group's "age" (the length of time it existed is different from the "median age" of its members), the group's size or territorial or organizational boundary, or its wealth, the amount of money collectively owned; all these are the descriptive attributes of a group.

ii) "Organizational attributes." - These include a group's constitution, its rules of behavior, its rules for acceptance to the group, etc.

iii) "External relations." - This refers to the type of relationships between the group as a whole and other institutions. There are three types of such relationships - domination, subordination, or equality.

iv) "Action or performance." - This designates the fourth and last type of a group's integral properties, mainly its decisions or policies. Indications of such actions are laws enacted, money spent, etc.

b) Distributive properties. - There are, according to Eulau, two types of group distributive properties:

i) If the individuals composing a group are of a certain age, or race, or sex, have a certain income, or education level, these integral properties of the individuals composing a group become the distributive properties of the group as a whole. By performing mathematical operations on the integral properties of individuals, we can arrive at the distributive properties of a group.

ii) Other distributive properties of a group are the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the individuals composing the group, and these too can be added or reconstructed into group distributive properties.

c) Relational properties. - Relational properties of groups are the most difficult to investigate scientifically. They are "group characteristics that arise out of interactions between and relationships among members of a social unit."⁵⁵ It is relatively easy to ascertain the distributive properties of a group - its median age, its median income, or the distribution of certain attitudes within it. It is also relatively easy to find and observe a group's integral properties - its age, constitution, policies. But behavioralists have made little or almost no headway in empirically capturing a group's relational properties. Relational properties are constructs that describe group behavior as a whole, rather than as derived from its integral properties. Thus, the construct "cohesion" describes close relationships among group members. The construct "tension" will characterize disagreements among group members. Other relational properties are a group's culture, or ethos; these are relational properties - they emerge from group interactions. The notorious ambiguity of emergent constructs is a result of different definitions - how much disagreement makes for tension? how many shared attitudes make for "culture"? Emergent properties cannot be arrived at by a summation of a group's distributive properties.

d) Structural properties. - The structural properties of a group refer to a stable pattern of interaction among its members, something like a group's "organizational chart." Eulau warns here against reifications, such as viewing a family or a government as a "structure." "Structures are not 'things' like stones are things; they are qualities or properties of things like the roundness or flatness of a stone."⁵⁶ Structural properties are also emergents; they characterize the group as a whole and cannot be a summation of distributive properties.

e) Contextual properties. - Contextual properties are induced from the group's environment. A "rural" environment, or a "working-class neighborhood" are contextual properties of groups. The contextual properties of the group should not be mistaken for properties on its own level - a labor union may exist in a middle-class environment.

To repeat, the question I will ask when examining behavioral research is: How have behaviorists treated the important problem of linking different levels of analysis?

3. The ideal dependent and independent variables for a behavioral science of politics

The third principle of behavioral reconstructed logic that merits a close scrutiny is the "interdisciplinary principle." Behaviorists seek more intimate relationships among political science and the other social sciences.

The behavioral persuasion in politics is not readily contained by the conventional, academic subject matter boundaries. Its interdisciplinary orientation stems, at least, initially, from the very simple assumption that man's political behavior is only one aspect of his total behavior, and by no means a very important aspect,⁵⁷

At first glance, little objection can be voiced against the "interdisciplinary principle." Psychological, sociological and economic variables have been utilized by political scientists from the days of Socrates and Aristotle for describing and explaining political life. However, the vagueness of the interdisciplinary principle can mean several things. It can mean that teams of social scientists from different disciplines should work together on specific problems. It can mean that political scientists should be trained in at least one more, and ideally, all other social science disciplines. It can mean the borrowing of research techniques by political scientists from the other social sciences. And it can mean a desire

for the same units of analysis, utilizing the same techniques and producing the same generalizations, theories and laws of human behavior.

Is there some "best" way in ordering the relationships among the social sciences? Is the creation of the different disciplines of the social sciences merely a result of historical accidents or organizational convenience, or is there an element of rationality in this division of labor?

Despite assertions to the contrary,⁵⁸ social phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their extreme complexity. "The initial picture, then, is one of multiplicity of operating conditions, a compounding of their influence on the dependent variables, and an indeterminacy regarding the effect of any one condition or several conditions in combinations,"⁵⁹ writes Neil Smelser in an excellent article describing the relationships among the social sciences. The "incompleteness"⁶⁰ of the social sciences, the division of labor among them is their response to this complexity.

Smelser uses four criteria to describe and distinguish the different social sciences: their choice of dependent variables and independent variables, the way they logically order the relationships among these variables and their research methods. The division of labor among the social sciences is based upon the principle of ceteris paribus, i.e., all other things being equal. Each social science has deliberately limited its realm of investigation, since it cannot possibly investigate all aspects of social life; it will regard them in Smelser's terms as "givens," as constants. Thus the economist who studies the cause of inflation will regard the political system as exogenous to his research, and the political scientist who studies the impact of inflation on voting behavior will in turn not try to explain the causes of inflation. The same process is then repeated within

each discipline - each social science does still encompass a wide array of variables. Each social scientist, within his own discipline, will again relegate some variables to the role of parameters; variables to be held constant, while he attempts to explicate the relationships between dependent variables, those conditions to be explained and independent variables, those which explain.

What variables did behavioralists choose to be their dependent and independent variables? Smelser himself gives an answer:

Investigations using the behavioral approach to politics are concerned explicitly with the determinants of political behavior. A list of those determinants, moreover, reads very much like a general catalogue of determinants in sociology and psychology. Voting behavior, for example, has been shown to be influenced by role, education, socio-economic level, religion, and family, as well as by various psychological variables. Indeed, it is somewhat arbitrary to assign this new tradition of research to either political science, sociology, or psychology, since variables from all three disciplines are liberally intermingled, and very similar research is conducted by those who call themselves sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists.⁶¹

But behavioralists have done other things besides study voting behavior. Only an empirical investigation of different varieties of behavioralism will reveal whether behavioralists have in fact sought and found only non-political determinants for political behavior.

C. An Analysis of Some Behavioral Literature

Three behavioral works will now be analyzed. The works are: 1) The Civic Culture, by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba;⁶² 2) The Governmental Process, by David Truman;⁶³ and 3) Comparative Politics, by Gabriel Almond and C. Bingham Powell.⁶⁴ There are two reasons for the choice of these particular works: 1) Each work emphasizes a different unit of analysis. The three works represent a chain of units of analysis from the individual

through the group to the whole system. Thus the variety in behavioralism will become apparent. 2) All three works are very well known, and all have been heavily criticized. Thus it will be possible to examine the merits of both the works and the critiques.

The three works will be analyzed with the criteria discussed below, those provided by behaviorists and those provided by the critics. What are the consequences of choosing one or another unit of analysis? How did the authors link different levels of analysis? How does the work compare with the nomological model of scientific explanation? What aspect of the political did the different authors emphasize, if any? What, if any, are the values explicit or implicit in these works, and above all, what are the problems inherent in these different varieties of behavioralism, as distinct from any shortcomings of the authors of these works?

1) The Civic Culture

a) The unit of analysis. - The unit of analysis chosen by the authors of this book is the individual; the research tool is the sample survey. A representative sample of the population was interviewed in the five nations studied (the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Mexico). The purpose of the work is to examine the "political culture," the psychopolitical environment in which different democratic institutions function. The authors reject anthropological definitions of culture as a relational emergent property, such as "cultural ethos."⁶⁵ Instead, they adopt this definition: "The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation."⁶⁶ In other words, Almond and Verba define political culture as the distributive property of the nations studied, and they are well aware

of that fact: "one respondent has no knowledge of the other respondents and no interaction with them, certainly none that is explored in our study."⁶⁷ But the authors are not satisfied with just an examination of differences and similarities in the "political culture" of the five nations examined. They try to link the distributive properties of these nations to other properties, which they actually have not examined at all. They try to find congruence between types of political culture and types of political structure, between the distributive and the structural properties of the groups they studied.⁶⁸ The authors also seek to find "the way in which political culture affects democratic government; more specifically, we shall ask how far it goes towards creating and maintaining stable and effective government."⁶⁹ Here the authors seek a causal connection between the "political culture," the distributive properties of the group, and its "stability" and "effectiveness," its relational emergent properties. Two comments need to be made about this linkage attempt: 1) In this study, only distributive group properties have been empirically investigated, to the exclusion of any other type of properties of the five nations. 2) The authors decided that the "stability" of a country can be very easily determined: "a brief glance at history will tell which of these (countries) is more stable."⁷⁰ This most obviously is not a scientific procedure for establishing the stability of a nation, a procedure which would allow for replication or verifiability of the findings. It seems that the authors use individual behavior to explain a macro-phenomenon such as stability, a methodological error that involves a shift in the level of analysis. To be methodologically sound, both sides of the proposition would have to be on the same level of analysis.

b) Uniqueness and generality

According to Hempel, a law can be universal only "if a statement of

its meaning does not require reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location," or in the case of a probabilistic law, it must hold for most spatio-temporal locations at a known probability. How then do the generalizations in Civic Culture rate on any "uniqueness-generality" scale? How close do they come to the ideal of scientific explanation?

As for unit of analysis, it is clear that the authors have ventured outside the realm of those generalizations they can make on the basis of their data. They have tried to increase the range of their generalizations by illegitimately linking distributive, structural and relational properties of the nations they examined.

The authors classify political orientations into three types:

1) cognitive orientation - what the citizens know and believe about their political system; 2) affective orientation - how the citizens feel about their political system; 3) evaluational orientation - how do citizens judge and evaluate their political system.

The authors also divide the political system into three components:

1) the institutions of these systems; 2) the persons who now fill roles in these institutions; 3) the policies of these institutions.

Accordingly the authors distinguish three model types of political cultures: a "parochial" political culture, where most citizens have little knowledge of their political system and expect nothing from it; a "subject" political culture where citizens know about their system, but view themselves as passive and as lacking any influence on the system; and the "participatory" political culture, in which citizens feel oriented both to the "output" and "input" of the system, where they feel competent to influence the system.

Accordingly, the authors sought to find similarities and differences

among the respondents in the five countries as to the extent they view their governments as having an impact on their lives. They examined how attentive are the respondents to public affairs and how ready they are to express political opinions. They investigated how much pride the respondents take in their political system and how they expect to be treated by governmental officials. But still, it is difficult to accept the term "political culture" for a certain distribution of attitudes among the citizens of a nation. 1) Culture is a group's relational property. It is not a summation of individual attitudes, but a holistic macro group property that emerges from interactions among group members. 2) "Our study is but a snapshot in a rapidly-changing world,"⁷¹ admit the authors, but then they go on to call this "snapshot" the "political culture" of a nation, a phenomenon that evolved over a long period and which is much more permanent than a snapshot. Once more, the authors tried to increase the generality of their findings, this time to give them a longer temporal validity than the data warrant. By linking "political culture" to "democratic stability," the authors link two group-attributes which they simply have not investigated. The only scientifically legitimate generalizations are those based on the data examined, which bear upon distributive properties in and among the five nations studied. Thus, the "national profiles,"⁷² the summation of the particular distributions of attitudes toward political objects in each nation, or a generalization that links distributive properties among the nations such as: "education increases political participation" can be viewed as legitimate empirical scientific generalizations. Even these generalizations are firmly tied to limited and specific spatio-temporal locations. Geographically, they hold only for the five nations studied, and temporally,

they hold only for a very short time duration.

c) The political in the Civic Culture. - The authors have not studied the behavior of the five nations as collectives - they have studied the behavior of citizens in these five nations. They have not studied the integral, relational or structural properties of these five nations, their constitutions, their policies, their structure of power or their political culture. They have not studied the governmental structures, the political parties, or the interest groups in these countries. They have not linked scientifically and empirically the integral, relational and structural properties with the distributive properties within or across the countries studied. They have studied only the distributive properties of these nations, and established links among them. The authors did not view the political as only a dependent variable. While they did not investigate empirically the impact of the government on the citizenry, they did investigate the citizens' opinions as to the impact of government on their lives.⁷³

d) Values. - The authors' values are not difficult to detect and it is these values which have irked many of their readers. The authors derived their idea of the "civic culture" from an examination of British history. British political culture was

Neither traditional nor modern, but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture which permitted change, but moderated it. This was the civic culture.⁷⁴

Historical evidence, however, suggests that this view is an idealized picture of British history. R.R. Palmer, in his The Age of the Democratic Revolution paints a picture of British history and politics that is much less civic than that presented by the authors of The Civic Culture. He

described eighteenth-century England as a country that witnessed mass deportations of political dissidents. A country where indictments for treason, based on false evidence, were issued by the government against "rebels." Parliament passed laws which prohibited assemblies to gather without the presence of an officer of the law, habeas corpus was suspended and many agitators were put in jail without trial.⁷⁵

The authors of the Civic Culture have turned their idealized picture of British political culture to a norm. They have evaluated the "political cultures" of the other countries in the light of that norm and found them to be "deviations"⁷⁶ from the norm. The authors have actually generalized from a very time-bound distribution of opinions found in the United States and Britain to a universal, timeless and "good" "civic" culture."

When the authors found a low degree of political involvement among American citizens, they reject an evaluation of this phenomenon in terms of what they call the "rationality-activist view" which suggests that where democratic citizens are inactive, a flaw exists in the democratic process. Instead, Almond and Verba suggest that the reality they found should become the norm and the "rationality-activist" theory be rejected.⁷⁷

Which of the flaws in The Civic Culture results from limitations inherent in the method used, namely, survey research, and which results from the way the two particular authors chose to write their book?

a) With survey research one cannot examine the relational properties of a group, no matter who employs the tool. As the authors admitted, a sample is made up of individuals who do not know each other and who have not interacted with each other. This should not lead to underestimate the value of survey research, as a research technique it is singularly suitable for the examination of a group's distributive properties; different research tech-

niques are necessary to examine different aspects of social life. It is the authors who have claimed to have captured the "political culture" of the five nations, in effect, they have defined political culture as "that which results from the findings of survey research."

b) Survey research is a modern research tool. There are no historical survey research findings. The authors of this work have been criticized here not for turning to other historical data to substantiate and increase the validity of their results, but for employing a distorted view of history.

c) The authors have ignored the political, seen in terms of political institutions; they have not studied these institutions, but have examined the attitudes of the citizenry toward these institutions.

d) The authors have been uncritical of the status quo as they found it in the United States and chose instead to criticize the theory that holds that non-participation is a symptom of a deficient democracy.

But are these normative assumptions a function of the method used as some critics of behavioralism stated? Logically, there is nothing in survey research or in comparative analysis that would "compel" any scientist to view his own political system as "good" or superior to others. The authors could just report their findings without any evaluation as to the working of the different political systems as to their adequacy. Moreover, one is free to compare his own country to others and find it to be the least adequate. Now the Greeks viewed all other cultures as "barbarous." While this can be understood psychologically, it cannot be justified from a logical perspective. Empirically speaking, as the dissertation progresses I hope to present behavioralists who used survey research, found a low level of political participation in the United States, but whose interpretation of

these facts was diametrically opposed to the interpretation of Almond and Verba.

2) The Governmental Process⁷⁸

David Truman was a student of Charles E. Merriam at the University of Chicago. Later, as Chairman of the Social Science Research Council Committee on political behavior, and as President of the American Political Science Association he was instrumental in the development of behavioralism. His book The Governmental Process was published in 1951. It was heavily influenced by Arthur Bentley's The Process of Government. Unlike many behavioralists, Truman did not view the individual as the empirical unit of analysis for political science. As a result, his work, though first very influential, was subjected to many critiques.

a) Units of Analysis. - It is obvious that for David Truman, the group rather than the individual is the unit of analysis: "The uniformities consequent upon the behavior of men in groups are the key to an understanding of human, including political, behavior."⁷⁹ Truman distinguished between a "categoric group," individuals who share a common characteristic, and "groups" which are distinguished by the interaction among their members. "It is the interaction that is crucial, however, not the shared characteristics."⁸⁰ There are, however, difficulties in this classification. Even a "categoric group" made up of individuals who have similar characteristics, has emergent properties such as nationalism. The world is divided into nations, every person is born into a nation, so there really are no pure "categoric groups;" they possess another attribute besides shared characteristics. Truman, in fact, is well aware that "we do not, in fact, find individuals otherwise than in groups; complete isolation in space and time is so

rare as to be an almost hypothetical situation,"⁸¹ but he does not find his classification faulty.

Methodological individualists justify their choice of the individual as the unit of analysis by a methodological reason: the individual is readily observed. David Truman gives a different type of reason: "The group experiences and affiliations of an individual are the primary, though not the exclusive, means by which the individual knows, interprets and reacts to the society in which he exists."⁸² Truman is saying in effect that the integral, relational and structural properties of the group have a strong impact on individual behavior, or the group's distributive properties. Truman's criterion for justifying the group as the unit of analysis is the importance of these properties, an importance which methodological individualists tend to ignore or minimize. The problem remains that Truman, like methodological individualists, cannot and does not observe the "interactions" among the group members or the group's relational properties and cannot, empirically and scientifically, link the different group properties into generalizations that explain human behavior.

Holistic group properties are for Truman the independent variable, they shape and explain individual attitudes, or the group's distributive properties. Truman relies for evidence on different studies that show individuals changing their attitudes to conform to a group's norms.

The group's "pressure" on the individual, its relational property, is inferred rather than observed. Moreover, this relational property has not been "reduced," it has not been divided into its components and then reconstructed into a "whole."

An interest group for Truman is a "shared-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in the society,"⁸³ Here Truman refers to

two different group properties: 1) "Shared attitudes" refers to the distributive group properties. The question is, in operational terms, how many attitudes have to be shared for them to qualify as an "interest"? 2) It is the "claims" that the group makes, its policies, its integral properties which make up the other half of an "interest-group," but a policy may be decided upon by a majority vote, or just by the group's leadership, leaving many who did not share in the attitudes that formed the policy. This picture gets even more confused when Truman writes:

Preservation and strengthening of the group's cohesion become the prime objectives of the active minority, for without cohesion, the group becomes ineffective, and without a measure of effectiveness, either the leadership must change, or the group must cease to exist.⁸⁴

The group's leadership, its structural properties, have a great impact on its cohesion, relational emergent properties which in turn influence the group's distributive properties, the attitudes of its members, and its integral properties, its policies. How to capture empirically all those different properties and how to link them on the same level of analysis is an unsolved problem to this day.

b) Generality and uniqueness. - The most important and well-known explanation offered by Truman is the "overlapping membership" hypothesis. If any society "maintains its stability, however, it may do so in large measure because of the fact of multiple membership."⁸⁵ Individuals belong to various and different groups which have various and different interests. To keep their cohesion and their ability to achieve their aims, interest group leadership must put forth moderate demands, because extreme demands would of necessity alienate parts of the group's membership and decrease its cohesiveness and effectiveness. Moderate group demands in turn help maintain the stability of a political system. Several problems arise

regarding this explanation.

i) the generality problem. - The explanation appears to fit Hempel's model of a nomological scientific explanation. The stability of every society is explained by overlapping group membership. Empirically, however, in many countries, and probably even in the United States, people will join like-minded groups rather than groups different in their orientation. Some of these countries nevertheless do not exhibit any less stability because of the cleavage this created. Joseph LaPalombara, for example, studied Italian interest groups and found almost no overlapping group membership.⁸⁶

ii) the direction of impact. - To Truman, individual behavior is determined primarily by the group or groups to which he belongs. It is very conceivable, however, for a situation to arise in which an individual may belong to different groups and actually swing these groups to his cause. A group theory cannot explain phenomena of leadership, a leader may unite conflicting groups to pursue a single overriding purpose.

iii) the unit of analysis. - The main problem with the explanation is that it has not been arrived at empirically. Truman has not observed, operationalized, measured and determined the rate of impact of the different group properties on the integral properties of individual members in the groups. The proposition is simply not empirical; it cannot be verified or falsified empirically and its scientific status therefore is closer to zero than to any general law.

c) The political. - Truman is well aware of the importance of the "political culture" for the operation of any political system.

These widely held but unorganized interests are what we have previously called the 'rules of the game.' Others have described these attitudes in such terms as 'systems of belief,' as a 'general

ideological consensus,' and as 'a broad body of attitudes and understanding regarding the nature and limits of authority.'"87

In Truman's language these "potential groups" are the matrix within which real group politics occur. They are the background to the play of politics, and come to the foreground only when "serious disturbance" "will result in organized interaction and the assertion of fairly explicit claims for conformity."88

Truman encompasses more of the political than those who employ survey research. The price he pays is being less empirical and scientific than they are. There can be little doubt that group conflict and adjustments is an important part of political life. There are, however, two other and crucial political phenomena which Truman neglects.

i) the national interest. - The "national interest," the "common good," the "general will," the "collective unconscious" - these vague and troublesome terms describe relational emergent group properties. But while Truman allows "groups" to have "interests," he does not allow a "nation" to be viewed as a "group," or have an "interest."89 Truman, however, cannot prove, either logically or empirically, why a group within a nation can have an interest and why a nation cannot. He in effect did not prove empirically that any group has an interest. Thus, Truman is a holist, but only partially, only up to a certain point. In an age in which nationalism is a most powerful motivating force, Truman denies its existence: "We do not need to account for a totally inclusive interest, because one does not exist."90 Again, Joseph LaPalombara, who studied Italian interest groups found that public officials saw policy making in terms of the national interest, rather than as the result of conflicting group pressures.91

ii) leadership. - Truman's fear of a total holism extends to the

phenomenon of leadership. "The explanation of a national complex like the Soviet Union wholly in terms of Stalin or the 'description' of the intricacies of the American government in terms of a Roosevelt is quick and easy."⁹² But any explanation of Soviet behavior that does not account for a leader like Stalin is just as deficient as an explanation of Soviet behavior just in terms of Stalin. Any explanation of the behavior of such a complex as a whole political system must include all the properties of such a "group" and the linkage among them.

d) Values. - Since there is no national interest that may conflict with particular interests of particular groups in a society, and since there is no leadership capable of molding and directing particular group interests to certain national goals, nations are being directed by a particular constellation of group balance. The direction in which any nation is moving is the result of an accidental balance of power among certain groups. Group conflict is moderate and pragmatic because group members have no overriding loyalties or values to which they are committed. Their only commitment is to non-commitment, to achieve psychic balance through social balance.

What are the problems inherent in the group approach as distinct from problems stemming from David Truman's particular version of it?

a) Truman has succeeded neither in reducing holistic group properties to their component parts, nor in reconstructing these parts. This, however, is not due to any particular shortcoming of Truman, but a problem inherent in his approach. Thus, 18 years after the publication of The Governmental Process, Heinz Eulau wrote:

Most large collectives - legislatures, electorates or nations - do not readily lend themselves to such procedures. They possess properties that cannot be identified and measured in terms of the

attributes of interactions of individuals. These "emergent" characteristics - a group's morale, cohesion, nationality, integration, and so on, require the invention of new methods of inquiry. Moreover, whereas a group's output (court decisions, legislative appropriations, gross national product, and so on) are usually measured and measurable only at the group level of analysis, relevant inputs are often measured or measurable at the individual or micro level.

b) On the other hand, the denial of the existence of national emergent properties, and the denial of the importance of leadership are particular to Truman. Truman's attempt to explain all politics by reference to interest groups is a failure, tacitly admitted by Truman when he speaks of "potential interest groups" which are in effect the distributive properties of the nation.

c) The values expressed by Truman are his own and are not inherent in his approach. Truman is uncritical of American politics and praises the non-commitment and moderation involved in its practice. Logically, there is no reason to assume that one cannot study pressure groups and conclude by indicting them. Empirically, this is exactly what was done by E.E. Schattschneider in his Politics, Pressures and the Tariff.⁹⁴ Schattschneider examined the impact of economic groups on the tariff revision of 1929-1930. His main source of data were the 20,000 pages of public hearings before the Committee of Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House on the Hawley-Smoot Bill. He relied mainly on documentary evidence in which the integral properties of the groups, their policies, were expressed.

Schattschneider found that while the general public would be affected by the decision, organized business groups dominated the public hearings.⁹⁵ Moreover, the government favored these groups by providing them with confidential information.⁹⁶ Schattschneider is highly critical both of the

government and of organized pressure groups:

The function of pressure politics is to reconcile formal political democracy and economic autocracy. If the overlords of business are not masters of the state, they seem at least to negotiate with it as equals.⁹⁷

He concludes with this statement: "To manage pressures is to govern; to let pressures run wild is to abdicate."⁹⁸

Schattschneider was a traditionalist, but he was a sophisticated traditionalist. (I venture here the hypothesis that behavioralists' views of traditionalists are really a straw-man they created. I attempt to demonstrate in this dissertation that the same fate awaited behavioralists from their critics.) Although he relied mainly on documentary evidence, he was well aware that group integral properties are not its only properties; "Within single groups there are centers of agitation and areas of indifference."⁹⁹ Moreover, he advises government that in order to weaken the effects of pressure it should exploit disagreements within groups.¹⁰⁰

To return to David Truman and The Governmental Process, a generous reading of his work will commend it for focusing attention on the importance of holistic group properties at the time when many behavioralists chose the narrow view of behavioralism as a focus on distributive group properties.

3) Comparative Politics¹⁰¹ - Functionalism in Political Science

a) Units of analysis. - "We need to look at political systems as whole entities shaping and being shaped by their environment,"¹⁰² The whole system is the unit of analysis of functionalism. The authors of Comparative Politics are, however, ignoring the problems of observing whole political systems, or of testing empirically any of their propositions.

But the whole system is not the only unit of analysis of functional analysis. For example, the authors define a "structure" as "particular sets of roles which are related to one another."¹⁰³ a proposition which refers only to the distributive properties of a "structure," ignoring its holistic properties. Here empirically, the individual is the unit of analysis. The authors speak of "social structures and institutions as performing functions in systems."¹⁰⁴ Here the structure as a whole is the unit of analysis. Characteristic of this approach is its shifting of levels of analysis.

b) Uniqueness and generality. - Structural-functional analysis was adopted by political scientists to enhance their ability to examine political behavior in the emerging developing countries. The traditional concepts of political science such as "the state," "interest groups," "legislatures" were useful only as long as they were utilized for analyzing politics in western developed states. Structural-functional analysis provides the political scientist with a set of concepts that can be utilized for the examination of every political system.

Instead of the term "state," the concept of a "political system" is suggested. A political system encompasses all interrelated activities which relate to the use of legitimate coercion. Thus the concept can be utilized to analyze political systems ~~that~~ are not states, tribes, for example.

Rather than political institutions, the approach employs the concept "political structure." Every political system has some structure to maintain order. Political systems thus can be compared as to the degree of differentiation and specialization of the structures. The heart of the approach lies in its emphasis on political functions. To maintain itself every political system, be it a primitive tribe or a modern industrialized

state, must perform several universal functions. In every political system the young are socialized into the prevailing mores and customs. In every political system interests are made public, become aggregated and press for action on the political structure in the form of "output functions," the making of laws, decisions and their application.

The emphasis on the performance of functions frees the investigator from a rigid institutional outlook. Rather than search for a parliament, he can now ask which structure performs the "rule-making" function; rather than search for well-differentiated organized interest groups, he now asks which structure performs the "interest-articulation" function. Political systems can be compared by examining which of the structures perform their functions.

1) the limits on generality. - Structural-functional analysis purports to explain the functioning of every political system. The categories used in the analysis, however, are far from being universal. Functionalism

proposes to understand the politics of all societies in terms of such functions. For instance, as 'interest articulation' whose definition is strongly influenced by the bargaining culture of our own civilization, but which is far from being guaranteed appropriateness elsewhere.¹⁰⁵

The reach of the approach is not as universal as claimed by its authors.

For example, Frances Fitzgerald, in her celebrated Fire in the Lake,¹⁰⁶ describes Vietnamese culture as stressing obedience and unanimity rather than conflict and bargaining. The Vietnamese learned from childhood to repress any feelings that might bring them into conflict with others. This delicate network of relationships extended from the family to the state, and when it was destroyed by Western intervention, the country was plunged into chaos.

The advocates of the approach are also certain of the high scientific status of their approach. They search for a "unified theory of politics."¹⁰⁷ They claim that "the ability to explain and predict in the social sciences is enhanced when we think of social structures and institutions as performing functions in systems,"¹⁰⁸ or "our purpose is to develop an analytical scheme which will enable us to explain the characteristics of any political system."¹⁰⁹ Can these claims be taken seriously? Hempel himself examined "The Logic of Functional Analysis."¹¹⁰ He finds that the explanations of functional analysis differ considerably from his model of a nomological scientific explanation. A functional explanation is "not by reference to causes which 'bring about' the event in question, but by reference to ends which determine its course."¹¹¹ When functional analysts in political science speak about a certain structure performing "interest articulation," we already know, by hindsight, which of the different structures has performed the articulation. But we do not know the probabilities of which structure would perform what kind of interest articulation. There is no general law under which the phenomenon can be subsumed.

When the lack of operational definitions is added, it is not surprising to find Hempel sharply downgrading the scientific importance of functionalism. He sees it only "as a program for research guided by certain heuristic maxims or 'working hypotheses.'"¹¹²

c) The political in functional analysis. - Functional analysis totally ignores the important political phenomenon of leadership. It views the political system as activated by "inputs" from the "environment," which through "conversion processes" are churned into "outputs."

Like group theory, the analysis denies initiative to leaders to direct a political system to new goals. Functional analysis also ignores

the phenomenon of power - the question it asks is "how does a political system operate"? not "who governs"? What power do the different structures have, and how does this power affect the performance of their functions? These questions are not asked by structural functionalists.

d) Values. - Functional analysis has been criticized for being inherently conservative. If every "structure" performs a "function" for the maintenance of the system, is not a normative assumption which justifies the existence of these "structures" inherent in this type of analysis? Not so, replies Robert Merton, one can view structures as performing "dysfunctions" for the system and actually reveal the need for change.¹¹³ One can focus on inputs into the political system without having inevitably to condemn demands made upon the system. The analysis is, however, open to the intrusion of values because it does not allow for a rigorous testing and verifying of its hypotheses.

However, the analysts do not distinguish between "just" and "unjust" inputs or demands, or between "corrupt" and "honest" conversion processes." "The symbol of an 'input' is made to stand equally for a civil rights protest, a deputation from the National Rifle Association, and a strike by the U.A.W."¹¹⁴

Once again the question is asked, "what are the problems inherent in the structural-functional approach as distinct from problems that refer to Almond and Powell's particular version of it?"

a) "It is the task of political science research to ascertain how change in any one of the parts of a political system affects other parts and the whole,"¹¹⁵ wrote Almond and Powell. There can be little objection to this statement, especially when many behavioralists were conducting research on minute aspects of politics with little emphasis on the interdepen-

dence of the parts of the political system. The problem inherent here is again that of reduction, reconstruction and the linkage of different levels of analysis.

One functionalist, at least, has grave doubts over the ability of deducing holistic group properties from individual properties:

We have severe doubts that there is any reasonable probability that the kind of macrophenomena we try to account for can be explained in terms of either individual or small group behavior, because the composition laws necessary for such a reductive explanation are not known and perhaps may never be known. (There may not even be any such laws to discover.)¹¹⁶

And as Barrington Moore, Jr. has stated in his critique of another version of the structural-functional approach:

Until it can prove its utility on much more concrete materials, where only fragments of the scheme are likely to be applicable, the over-all system will continue to resemble a theology more than a system of scientific discourse.¹¹⁷

Almond and Powell, in treating political systems as "entities" committed the reification fallacy. They have treated a construct which refers to collective properties as a concrete "thing;" this, of course, is not inherent in the approach.

b) The phenomenon of leadership is ignored by advocates of the approach. The approach focuses only on overt behavior of "structures," rather than on the subjective psychological dimension of social life. Almond has been aware of this defect in focusing on "political culture."

c) As Robert Merton has indicated, functionalism is not inherently conservative, and Almond and Powell concur:

Among the principal criticisms of functional-systems theories are the arguments that they imply an equilibrium or harmony of parts and that they have a static or conservative bias. The conception of 'political system' which we follow in this book is one of interdependence, but not one of harmony.¹¹⁸

d) Functionalists, I think, could escape the teleological straight-

jacket in which they find themselves if they would declare that they intend to examine the effects of action by a certain structure on other structures and the society as a whole. The consequences of such action can be conceived as causes for other actions by other structures. For example, the coal miners' strike in Britain had caused events to happen in other British "structures." The functionalist could then examine whether the events that occurred were intended by those that activated them. He could compare these intentions and consequences to other strikes in Britain or in other countries. He could search similar consequences in other countries or other periods that were caused by different structures, and so on.

The assumption of the "universality of function" is no more than a truism that has become a straightjacket. To say that every society is governed, and that in different societies different "structures" perform different universal "functions" is no more than saying that different societies have different constitutional arrangements which interact in various ways, hardly an original **o**bservation. The political scientist is free to ask both what the cause and the consequence of a particular action is, rather than search for a "structure" that fulfills or does not fulfill a preordained "function."

Summary

In this chapter I have first outlined the major critiques directed at behavioralism. I have then discussed some scientific principles that behavioralists adopted as their goals and analyzed three well-known behavioral works in the light of these goals and critiques. The conclusions resulting from the analysis are:

- a) Behavioralists, at least as represented in these three works,

have not succeeded in reducing holistic group properties. They have not succeeded in deducing collective social phenomena from the interrelations of individuals. Indeed, the three works analyzed focus on different levels of analysis precisely because of this inability. The generality of the theoretical scope of the works has an inverse relation to the degree of precision in the data: The critique that charged behavioralism with reduction is erroneous. Truman has declared the non-existence of a common good. He has not reduced it.

b) The critics also erred when they suggested that adoption of behavioral "method" (significantly, they do not refer to any specific method), automatically implies an uncritical attitude to political phenomena. The three approaches analyzed here, at least, had no inherent bias; the bias that was, was that of the users of the approach, and it was demonstrated that different users had different values and biases. This point will be brought into sharper focus in Chapter IV.

c) Political institutions, including political leadership, were de-emphasized in all three works. In the group approach, and in functionalism, political institutions are viewed as epiphenomena, dependent variables, activated by social forces with no initiative of their own. In The Civic Culture, the impact of institutions on citizens is examined, but only through the responses of these citizens, not an examination of the institutions.

d) While survey research allows for great precision and quantification, both the group approach and functionalism focus on aspects of social life that are difficult to observe and quantify. Here the authors are clearly motivated to examine what they deem significant, rather than by narrow methodological considerations.

More critiques and works of behavioralists will be examined as the dissertation progresses.

Footnotes

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⁵Ibid., p. 326.

⁶John H. Schaar and Sheldon S. Wolin, in American Political Science Review, LVII, 1 (March, 1963), 126.

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- ¹⁴Leo Strauss, "Epilogue," in Storing, Essays, p. 324.
- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 326.
- ¹⁶Ibid.
- ¹⁷Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 20.
- ¹⁸McCoy and Playford, Apolitical Politics, p. 75.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 7.
- ²⁰Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 8.
- ²¹Crick, The American Science of Politics, p. 220.
- ²²Truman, "The Impact on Political Science," p. 62.
- ²³Arnold A. Rogow, "Comment on Smith and Apter, or Whatever Happened to the Great Issues," American Political Science Review, LI (1957), 763-775.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 774.
- ²⁵Ibid.
- ²⁶Strauss, "Epilogue," p. 323.
- ²⁷Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1960), p. 2.
- ²⁸Strauss, "Epilogue," pp. 311-312.
- ²⁹Easton, The Political System, p. 207.
- ³⁰Truman, "The Impact on Political Science," p. 60.
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- ³³Ibid.
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- ³⁵Ibid.
- ³⁶Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 141-142.

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⁴⁶Ernst Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 538.

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⁵³Ibid., p. 175.

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⁷⁰Ibid., p. 74.

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⁷⁴Ibid., p. 8.

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⁷⁸Truman, The Governmental Process. Some critiques of the work are Oran R. Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 79-92; Roy C. Macridis, "Groups and Group Theory," in Comparative Politics, ed. by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press), pp. 139-144. A favorable view of the group approach is Robert T. Golembiewski "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes in Analysis and Development," American Political Science Review, LIV (1960), pp. 38-51. A direct critique of Truman's book is Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach," American Political Science Review, LIV (March, 1960), 15-33.

⁷⁹Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 23.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 24.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 48.

⁸²Ibid., p. 21.

⁸³Ibid., p. 37.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 188.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 168.

⁸⁶Joseph LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," in Comparative Politics, ed. by Harry Eckstein and David A. Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 424.

⁸⁷Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 512.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 50-51.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 50.

⁹¹LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory," p. 429.

⁹²Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 49.

⁹³Heinz Eulau and James G. March, eds., Political Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 60. Eulau ignores here the attempt by Karl W. Deutsch, in his Nationalism and Social Communications (2d ed.; Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967) to study nationalism empirically. Deutsch does not choose the individual as his unit of analysis. His focus is on the process of communication, where the message, which fills the space among individuals, is the unit of analysis. The work is actually an examination of the process of nation-building, rather than of the emergent property "nationalism." Deutsch knows of the difficulties in operationalizing such concepts as "national consciousness" and "national will," but he himself does not succeed in operationalizing them. See pp. 170-186.

⁹⁴E.E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963). It was first published in 1935.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 165.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 212.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 287.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 293.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 290.

¹⁰¹The most well-known works advocating the "structural-functional" approach in political science are Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed. by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64; Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics. Some methodological problems involved in the approach are discussed in Don Martindale, ed., Functionalism in the Social Sciences: The Strength and Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965).

¹⁰²Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, pp. 13-14.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁰⁵Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics, XXV, 1 (September, 1971), 34.

¹⁰⁶Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (New York: Vintage, 1972).

¹⁰⁷Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 9.

- 108 Ibid., p. 28.
- 109 Ibid., p. 37.
- 110 Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 297-300.
- 111 Ibid., p. 303.
- 112 Ibid., p. 329.
- 113 Robert Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in On Theoretical Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1967), especially pp. 91-100.
- 114 Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," p. 1078.
- 115 Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 13.
- 116 Robert T. Holt, "A Proposed Structural-Functional Framework for Political Science," in Martindale, Functionalism in the Social Sciences, p. 108.
- 117 Barrington Moore, Jr., "The New Scholasticism and the Study of Politics," World Politics, VI, 1 (October, 1953), p. 133.

CHAPTER III

THE BEHAVIORALISTS REPLY TO THEIR CRITICS

A. Behavioralism in the 1950's and 1960's

The most prominent feature of the writings of behavioralists in the 1950's and 1960's was the attempt to minimize the importance of normative issues in political life. This attempt took three different forms.

1) The "cross-pressure" theory

The "cross-pressure" theory was first suggested by the authors of The People's Choice in 1944:

Suppose an individual is both prosperous and Catholic. How will he make up his mind? Or suppose he belongs to the Protestant faith and lives in a poor section of the community? Which of the conflicting influences will win out? People who are subject to contradictory and opposing influences of this kind are said to be under cross pressures.¹

When people desire and shun a course of action in about equal degrees, they often do not decide for or against it, but rather change the subject or avoid the matter altogether. For many clashes of interest, the easy way to get out of the uncomfortable situation is simply to discount its importance and give up the conflict as not worth the bother.²

The cross-pressured citizen is the apolitical citizen; he does not vote, he is apathetic, the different pressures have neutralized him. The authors of Voting write,

How could a mass democracy work if all the people were deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by some people is not without its benefits, too. True, the highly interested voters

vote more, and know more about the campaign, and read and listen more, and participate more; however, they are also less open to persuasion and less likely to change. Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship and might culminate in rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout the community.³

Low interest in politics by some of the citizens in a mass democracy contributes to the flexibility of the political system.

Low interest provides maneuvering room for political shifts necessary for a complex society in a period of rapid change. Compromise might be based upon sophisticated awareness of costs and returns - perhaps impossible to demand of a mass society - but it is more often induced by indifference.⁴

Rapid change for whose benefit? Made by whom? From where to where?

What for?

That is the paradox. Individual voters today seem unable to satisfy the requirements for a democratic system of government outlined by political theorists. But the system of democracy does meet certain requirements for a going political organization. The individual members may not meet all the standards but the whole nevertheless survives and grows. This suggests that where the classic theory is defective is in its concentration on the individual citizen. What are undervalued are certain collective properties that reside in the electorate as a whole and in the political and social system in which it functions.⁵

The authors of Voting believe that by summing up the attributes they found in their sample of a thousand citizens in Elmira, New York in 1954, they have arrived at the emergent properties of the American political system. Praise for non-participation in and indifference to politics was also found in the works of Truman and Almond and Verba discussed in the previous chapter. A favorable view of the cross-pressure theory is also found throughout Martin Lipset's Political Man.⁶

2) Robert E. Lane and positivism

Robert E. Lane follows a different course in his attempt to minimize the importance of value issues in politics. This is ironic because Lane

was perhaps the first behavioralist to take a skeptical view of the cross-pressure theory.⁷ In his article, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence,"⁸ Robert E. Lane, after first establishing that the United States is affluent and using as his evidence a host of surveys, finds that the impact of affluence on political behavior is expressed by:

1. "interpersonal trust has increased since the war and the immediate postwar period,"⁹
2. that there is a "very low sense of partisan alarmism"¹⁰ i.e., that the American citizens do not attach much importance to which party wins the election.
3. "The evidence is strong that ideological divisions, suspicion, prejudice and sense of difference, especially as these relate to political matters, are declining."¹¹
4. With regard to race relations, Lane finds that

. . . for most white people, neither the Negro's problem nor the 'threat' of integration in their own communities (and certainly not elsewhere); is sufficiently important to determine partisan choice: the politics of consensus can go on around this 'American dilemma,' within sound of the battle, but relatively undisturbed by it.¹²
5. "I am persuaded that there has been a growing state of confidence between men and government, perhaps especially men and politics, during the Age of Affluence."¹³ Affluence weakens traditional human ties, ties to class, race, party, religion are breaking down. Ideology, politics, prejudice, suspicion are being replaced by reason, trust, moderation. But, not only affluence, science, too, contributes to the movement from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. In a later article, aptly titled, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society"¹⁴ Lane

concludes that "the political domain is shrinking and the knowledge domain is growing."¹⁵ There is then a shift from emotion to reason, from tradition to science, from values to facts. The area of reason increased in direct proportion to the area of unreason that shrinks. Wealth and science are viewed as always problem solving and never as problem generating. The issues that remain are susceptible to solution by scientific means, there are no "great issues" that one can get emotional and ideological about. There is here an equation of reason with goodness. A rational, objective, unemotional universalistic society is the good society; in it there is "the substitution of error for evil."¹⁶ People are bad because they do not know better, more and better education, knowledge, science will make for good and better human beings.

Robert E. Lane also examined in depth fifteen ordinary middle income Americans and these are some of his findings:

The self is an instrument, a measure, a model for judging society; what it does to the self becomes generalized and embodied in social judgment. We have said that the view of the self in Eastport is objectified; men tell their life stories with candor but with little introspection, little account of feeling, hardly any reference to good or bad behavior; there is not much on how they have been "badly used" or "given all the breaks" by society. What, in another culture, might have been an exercise in social judgment with the self as the criterion, here has not such a theme. When in Greece men's concept of themselves involves a rather touchy sense of "honor" and in China moral reputation turns on the complex issue of 'face,' in Eastport the nearest thing is "status," this is the individual's reward for achievement, like the men's account of themselves, the criteria by which status is measured are more objective, involve fewer calculations of a normative nature.¹⁷

Here is another similar finding:

Community makes for solidarity relationships among men. That is its great virtue. But democracy works best where men are relatively more free to combine and recombine in a flexible fashion and where, as in Eastport, each is a free-standing unit. Those seeking intimacy seek totalitarianism; nor is this a chance relationship.¹⁸

And another:

America is the land of the cool friendships; they are often transient; many times they have 'ulterior,' that is, business, motives; they are multiple and changing, they are the friendships of a Gesellschaft urban society; they are contractual, the product of a long history of movement from status to contract. This style of personal relationships has permitted the nation to absorb many immigrants, to pack up and move to the West or wherever opportunity beckoned, to find satisfaction in something less than complete intimacy. Many observers, including many European psychoanalysts, deplore this style and speak of the deterioration of the human community as, in their loneliness, they observe this situation. But, on the whole, this style seems to support an open democratic system better than the many closed intimate enduring circles of friendship produced by the folk, or Gemeinschaft, way of life. Out of this latter style comes the effort to duplicate the intense interpersonal relationship on the political plane and to establish a more intense leader-follower linkage. This way leads to charismatic politics, personalization, submission.¹⁹

Robert E. Lane has seemingly found the perfect answer to "Mannheim's paradox." When he describes the citizens of Eastport as each being a "free-standing unit", or when he says that "the view of the self in Eastport is objectified", he says in effect that not only the intelligentsia is "free-floating", not only the intelligentsia is unattached to any class, race, party, or religion, everybody is value free. Lane seeks a perfect fit between subject and object, between reason and reality, between a value free social science and a value free world. He attempts to achieve universal truth by simply universalizing the object of truth.

Lane is here within the tradition of positivist philosophy whose leading figures postulated that once the human mind is liberated from theological and metaphysical modes of inquiry and instead follow the canons of positive philosophy which emphasize observation and correct reasoning, prejudice, religion and all normative issues will disappear from the world. A "fixed social order will result"²⁰ and the "revolutionary crises which harass civilized people will then be at an end."²¹

3) Pluralism

The third means utilized by behavioralists to minimize the importance of normative issues is the adoption of the pluralist view of power in the United States.

Robert A. Dahl is, of course, the major spokesman among behavioralists for this "pluralist" view of power in America. His writings will be dealt with more fully shortly, but a short citation summarizes his view:

This system of dispersed inequalities is, I believe, marked by the following six characteristics:

1. Many different kinds of resources for influencing officials are available to different citizens.
2. With few exceptions, these resources are unequally distributed.
3. Individuals best off in the access to one kind of resource are often badly off with respect to many other resources.
4. No one influence resource dominates all the others in all or even in most key decisions.
5. With some exceptions, an influence resource is effective in some issue-areas or in some specific decisions, but not in all.
6. Virtually no one, and certainly no group of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence.²²

The impression conveyed here is of a political system in which all groups have a measure of political influence, in which no group is denied access to the decision making process, and in which the interests of all groups are considered when decisions affecting their interests are taken. Since the vital interests of no group are threatened or neglected, conflict will be mild and manageable.

To sum up then, some behavioralists have praised political apathy and indifference for contributing to the stability of the American political system. Others have viewed science and affluence as eradicating all

vestiges of irrationality, prejudice and extremism. Pluralists emphasized the sharing of power among all groups in the system. The picture of American politics conveyed by these writings is of a stable, tranquil and rational political system, the possibility of any future reversal is not even contemplated.

These writings of behavioralists, and the critiques they have generated, are by now familiar to most students of politics. My main concern in this chapter is with the behavioralists' replies to criticism. Some have done so by a direct counter attack, others by subtle changes in their outlook, or, like Easton, by major shifts in their values. I will now discuss the content and manner of some behavioralists' replies to criticism.

B. Ideal Types, Real Types, and the Political Thought of Robert A. Dahl

1) The early Dahl

Dahl's Congress and Foreign Policy²³ was published in 1950. In this work, Dahl's main concern is the diminishing influence of Congress on foreign policy making and the concomitant growing influence of the presidency in this area. Dahl explains these developments and unabashedly normative, suggests ways to increase cooperation between the two institutions in foreign policy decision-making.

More revealing of Dahl's "early period" is the book Politics Economics and Welfare²⁴ which he wrote in collaboration with the economist Charles A. Lindblom, and which was published in 1953. As a first step, this work will be compared to the picture of American politics described previously.

a. Values

The purpose of Robert E. Lane was not merely a separation between facts and values in social science, but an elimination of values from social life. As demonstrated, he sought and found a value free America for a value free social science. Dahl's position is more complex and sophisticated.

He agrees that a social science ought to be value free. "Ought" statements cannot be logically deduced from "is" type statements and cannot be verified by reference to empirical evidence. He also claims that his work is value free: "Most of the book . . . is intended to be empirical social science and not value statements."²⁵

The purpose of the book is to find "what are the conditions under which numerous individuals can maximize the attainment of their goals through the use of social mechanisms."²⁶ Dahl is well aware that different individuals have different values, that values may and usually are, and will always be, in conflict not only among individuals but also within them, that values can be goals but can also be means to other goals. To facilitate his inquiry, Dahl takes two steps. 1) "What we have done is simply to postulate the goals to be maximized."²⁷ 2) "Goals are postulated that will command wide agreement so that the dispute over goals themselves will be minimized in the subsequent analysis of the politico-economic prerequisites for the attainment of these goals."²⁸ Dahl's concern here is methodological, he postulates that some variables will be viewed in his analysis as "givens" or constants so that he may concentrate on the relationships among other variables. It is unclear, however, whether Dahl and Lindblom are only suggesting an analytical agreement on values whose

purpose is methodological, or whether they are describing an empirical concrete agreement on values, because they also write that "the 'great issues' are no longer the great issues."²⁹ In both cases the purpose is the same, technique can be now utilized to achieve both a perfect social science and a perfect social order, without having to face fundamental conflicts over goals and values.

b. Incrementalism

The comparison here is between Dahl and Lindblom in 1953, and Lindblom in 1957 when he published his "The Science of Muddling Through."³⁰ Viewed chronologically, the comparison reveals that Lindblom's attitude to incrementalism has become more rigid, dogmatic and ideological. In 1953, Dahl and Lindblom consider the means available to man for improving his ability to rationally calculate and achieve his goals. Incrementalism is presented as but one out of four comprehensive processes, the others being science, calculated risks, and utopianism. Here one finds the authors aware that small incremental changes may be insufficient for the achievement of some goals, that small changes may in effect be more risky than choosing an entirely new policy. Even utopianism is partly praised for providing man with goals and aspirations.³¹ All this is in sharp contrast to Lindblom's position in 1957 when he declared dogmatically that incrementalism is the only way for achieving desired policies.

c. Bureaucracy

Dahl is aware that red tape, inflexibility, and wastefulness

are just as characteristic of bureaucracy as objectivity and rationality. He is aware that bureaucracy is inimical to political equality. The leaders of bureaucracies, labor unions, business corporations, armies, wield great influence over public policy making. They are "influencing nominations, campaign contributions, voting turnout, voters' attitudes, opinion leaders, legislation, the White House, and administrative action."³² There is politics within an organization, and in its relation to society at large and its institutions. Dahl knows that "if improperly employed it [bureaucracy] may snuff out the central core of Western values."³³

d. Industrialization

Dahl and Lindblom are aware of the problems involved in industrialization:

. . . it is difficult to say whether the great benefits of industrialization have offset the numerous losses in prime goal satisfactions like respect, affection, friendship and solidarity generated by the disruption of small, cohesive geographical groups with considerable autonomy. ³⁴

Where Robert E. Lane gleefully "found" in the United States a total lack of community, Robert A. Dahl is deeply worried that this might just happen.

e. All is well in America

To many behavioralists the major problems of the United States have already been "solved." It is now time for enjoying the peace and tranquility while making some slight improvements. In contrast, Dahl points out some of the major problems that the United States still faces. The "top 5 percent of the population had as much income to divide up

among themselves as the bottom 40."³⁵ With obvious consequences for the political realm: "income is a crucial factor in gaining political influence and control." He knows that "producers are more highly organized than consumers,"³⁶ and as a consequence "between elections, for most purposes the local constituency of the Congressional politicians is made up of tiny but influential minorities of wealth, status and power."³⁷ Dahl knows that Negroes do not share in American democracy³⁸ and warns that a "balance" theory of American politics can be easily misused because of its lack of precision. Balance can be a "subtle disguise for the status quo; existing elites in business, farm organizations and trade unions acquire a vested interest in balance, because presumably any disturbance to their positions is a sign of imbalance."³⁹

The differences between Dahl and other behavioralists are substantial. He does not seek to eliminate values but to maximize them, he does not hesitate to offer recommendations for change and improvement. Dahl is "relevant," he is "policy oriented," his writings are free of jargon, he is not ahistorical, and he rarely quantifies. If all this seems surprising, it is because his critics have focused almost all of their attention only to one period of Dahl's intellectual development. They have almost totally ignored his "early period."

2) Dahl's "Pluralist" period 1956-1961

A comparison between Dahl's "early period" and his "pluralist" period reveals four differences. 1) In 1953, reality was compared to an ideal and was found wanting. In 1956, the same reality is described but is now highly praised. In 1953, Dahl wrote: "The autonomy of the passive,

unorganized and powerless is often the sacrificial victim of the active, organized and powerful minorities."⁴⁰ But in 1956, he writes that

. . . what we call democracy - that is, a system of decision-making in which the leaders are more or less responsive to the preferences of non-leaders - does seem to operate with a relatively low level of citizen participation. Hence, it is inaccurate to say that one of the necessary conditions for 'democracy' is extensive citizen participation.⁴¹

Clearly, the "facts" remained the same, the change occurred in the values of the author. 2) Moreover, the ideal which in the early period seemed as a moral measuring rod for the evaluation of American political life is itself found deficient while reality is praised. 3) As a result of this switch no recommendations for improvement were made by Dahl in his entire pluralist period. This is in sharp contrast to his early period, when he and Lindblom recommended an increase in workers' participation in the decisions of the firm. They urged "tax reform, transfer payments and subsidized government services."⁴² to increase political equality. They recommended old-age pensions, medical care, school lunches, day nurseries, increased opportunities for education and more. 4) In 1953 Dahl and Lindblom wrote "in the United States, the South as a whole has never been a polyarchy for negroes."⁴³ In 1956, however, Dahl states "the full assimilation of negroes into the normal system already has occurred in many Northern states and now seems to be slowly taking place even in the South."⁴⁴ Here Dahl was probably buoyed by the Supreme Court ruling in 1954 in *Brown v. Board of Education* which ordered the integration of American schools, and by inference, of other institutions. In retrospect, this optimism seems somewhat premature.

3) 1966, the new, or old, Dahl

A major shift in Dahl's political attitudes becomes evident in 1966 upon the publication of Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.⁴⁵ In an article in this volume, which he edited, Dahl launches a frontal attack on one of the great myths of American social science, the myth of the great American consensus, a myth that Dahl himself has helped so much to perpetuate.⁴⁶ American history was not as consensual as conventional wisdom tended to regard it. Dahl finds ten instances in American history that involved a "conflict over national politics of extreme severity."⁴⁷ Next, he sets out to explain the costs of consensus: the political dissenter has very little chance to influence the direction of American politics. "If he enters into a third party, he is condemned to political impotence. If he enters into one of the two major parties, he constantly sees his principles compromised or even forfeited."⁴⁸ Two consequences follow for the political system, 1) dissenters, frustrated by their impotence, may turn to apathy or violence and 2) the system is not subjected to any radical critiques as to its basic values and modes of operation. Access to the political system is not as universal as described in Who Governs, extremism, violence and alienation are deep seated in American history and politics.

Dahl embarks in his "Epilogue" on an indirect critique of his own theory of "dispersed inequalities."

Organized pluralism creates two problems that have not yet been solved anywhere. For one thing, since all resources except the vote are unequally distributed, some minorities (one thinks of the uneducated poor in the United States) may not have much in the way of political resources to bargain with: They have the ballot - and little else.⁴⁹

Inequalities are not as neatly dispersed as Dahl believed them to be between 1956 and 1961. Dahl then criticizes some of the basic premises of other behavioralists. 1) The relationships between affluence and political conflict is complex. The growth of affluence does not automatically diminish political conflict. 2) The relationship between psychological, social and political variables is complex. "I wish to leave completely open the murky empirical question of how political alienation may be related, if at all, to strictly social and psychological factors."⁵⁰ "I assume that a citizen might be alienated from the political system in which he lives without being neurotic."⁵¹ 3) American government, so highly praised by many behavioralists for its spirit of compromise, pragmatism and adjustment, has become too remote, bureaucratic, elitist and technocratic, and Dahl welcomes a new opposition that would strive "to reconstruct the Leviathan to a more nearly human scale."

This theme is repeated by Dahl in his After the Revolution. He wrote the book in response to the proliferation of revolutionary slogans such as "participatory democracy" and "power to the people" in the late 1960's. His purpose in the book is to demonstrate that the problems of authority and its legitimacy are complex and not given to simplistic one dimensional solutions. Participation is not the only criterion to legitimate authority, people will receive as binding decisions made by specially qualified individuals. Moreover, many will regard as too costly the need to participate themselves in the making of decisions and will be all too happy to delegate that authority. The modern nation state is large and complex, different structures within it must function according to different criteria of authority. A bureaucracy must be

organized hierarchically even in a democracy.

Dahl is aware, however, that the raising of the demands for greater participation, although simplistic, are expressions of real grievances and cannot be simply brushed aside. He is well aware that

. . . in American society a number of resources are distributed in extremely unequal fashion from which it follows - again the conclusion is, so far as I know, unchallenged - that the opportunity to make effective personal choices, and hence the degree of individual freedom and opportunity, are markedly unequal in the United States.⁵²

Dahl is well aware that "power has gravitated to the American Corporate giants"⁵³ and suggests greater democracy in these corporations on the model of the workers councils in Yugoslavia. He suggests "neighborhood government," greater autonomy and participation in communities to remedy the growing remoteness of government from its citizens.⁵⁴

4) Real types and ideal types

At the heart of Dahl's political thought lies the methodological distinction between "polyarchy" and "democracy." He formed the concept "polyarchy" as early as 1953 to serve as a descriptive concept of those political systems which come closest to "democracy" - an ideal type. "In some societies the democratic goal is still roughly approximated, in the sense that non-leaders exercise a relatively high degree of control over leaders. The constellation of social processes that makes this possible we call polyarchy."⁵⁵ This concept formation enables Dahl to perform a number of operations. 1) To search for the conditions that account for the rise of polyarchies, a task which he first undertook in Politics, Economics and Welfare, and then continues and greatly expands in Polyarchy published in 1971.⁵⁶ His first concern is with the historical sequence which has led to the creation of polyarchy. Was a

measure of contestation evident only among the elite, and the general public allowed to participate only later, or did participation precede contestation? Was a regime transformed to polyarchy by revolution or evolution? In a dependent country was a struggle for polyarchy combined with the struggle for independence? Next, Dahl examines what type of socio-economic order is best suited for the emergence of polyarchy. Are the chances for polyarchy better in a pluralistic social-economic order or a centrally dominated one? Are the chances better for polyarchy in economically developed countries or in a less developed one? Dahl is aware of the importance of the psychological setting of political institutions and examines what sets of beliefs, attitudes and values among political activists are conducive to the rise of polyarchy.

Dahl uses both cross-national and diachronic data, the result reveals the great variety of conditions that account for the rise of polyarchy in many different nations. Yet despite the seeming uniqueness of experience of every polyarchy, Dahl succeeds in formulating generalizations that, although not as general as laws, are invaluable to every student of democracy.

The distinction Dahl makes between "polyarchy" and democracy also enables him 2) to measure the deviation between his real and ideal types. In 1953, he wrote:

Now if governments were placed on a continuum running from full achievement of democracy to an exclusively unilateral dictatorship, no real world instance would fit either end of the continuum. Polyarchy and modern dictatorship would both fall a good deal short of the extremes. And they would be closer together than ardent democrats would find comfortable.⁵⁷

Here Dahl measures how far polyarchy deviates from an ideal type democracy, how far real dictatorship deviates from an ideal-type dictatorship,

and how far is polyarchy from real dictatorship. The changes in Dahl's outlook discussed previously can be viewed as 1) changes in the distance Dahl finds between his real and ideal-type democracy, 2) changes in the real type, 3) substitution of the real type for the ideal type.

It is important to note that Dahl's change of heart, or more accurately, his readoption of values he held earlier, occurred before the wave of criticism that erupted in the late 1960's. His writings are not a direct response to these critiques, they however constitute a response to those critics who claimed behavioralists are prisoners of the Mannheim paradox, or of their methodology, that behavioralists cannot be critical of their society, or cannot study conflict and history. As demonstrated, the behavioral political scientist is free of all these mythical limitations, he can err, learn from experience, and change his mind. As to those critiques directed specifically at Dahl,⁵⁸ they focused mainly on his pluralist period. As a result any opinion of Dahl formed just by reading these critiques will be distorted. An investigation of the full range of his writings reveals that Dahl's pluralist period was an exception or "deviation" from his political outlook.

C. Heinz Eulau and the Limitations of Behavioralism

"Potentially at least, all segments of political science can be treated behaviorally,"⁵⁹ wrote Heinz Eulau in 1962. Eulau is an empirical behavioralist and is well aware of the great methodological problems confronting behavioralism. This awareness does not diminish his enthusiasm and optimism for the future of behavioralism, however, this enthusiasm in turn leads him to treat the gap between the performance and

purported potential of behavioralism in a manner full of inconsistencies and confusion, mainly because he adopts the narrow view of behavioralism.

1) Eulau on methodological individualism

"The root is man, I don't think it is possible to say anything meaningful about the governance of man without talking about the political behavior of man--his acts, goals, drives, feelings, beliefs, commitments and values."⁶⁰ Eulau is clearly a methodological individualist, he is committed "to the individual person as the empirical unit of analysis"⁶¹ and to the interview as "the main tool of behavioral analysis."⁶² He denies any conflict between behavioral and institutional analysis: "political institutions are never more or less different from the patterns of behavior of the people who create them or the regularities of their actions,"⁶³ and should, therefore, be examined in terms of the individuals who compose them. The first inconsistency exhibited by Eulau appears when he speaks of "an institutional or situational environment that shapes and patterns certain types of interpersonal relations."⁶⁴ An institution, then, has an environment which is different from the regularities of behavior in it, institutions are more "than the patterns of behavior of the people who create them or the regularities of their behavior." The inconsistency becomes even more apparent when Eulau says that "the context or setting is the critical factor in political behavior,"⁶⁵ and grows even stronger: "Indeed even if one knew nothing about a man's personality, a great deal of his political behavior could be satisfactorily explained in social or cultural terms alone."⁶⁶ Two conclusions can be drawn from this inconsistency: 1) Eulau's decision to adopt the individual as the empirical unit

of analysis must then be viewed as arbitrary, he cannot prove logically or empirically its superiority to other units of analysis. 2) Despite his claim, there is a conflict between behavioral and institutional analysis. Amazingly, Eulau is well aware of the nature of the conflict. Institutional environmental phenomena are largely "holistic" and "collective," the culture of a society, its language, its customs, the rules of an organization, its purpose, cannot be explained by reference only to the individuals in a society or an organization. Eulau is aware of the importance of holistic collective phenomena for political inquiry. Ignoring culture leads to attempts to transport political institutions which function well in one culture, but are usually total failures in another. He is well aware of the difficulties involved in forming precise collective terms, the term culture, he informs us, has 250 different definitions. The main reason for this difficulty is lack of agreement on how many patterns of behavior must be shared before we know these patterns to be a "culture."⁶⁷ "The culture concept puts the accent on wholeness which guards us against taking behavior in a functional area - be it sports, religion, the economy or the politics - out of its cultural context."⁶⁸ Awareness of one's culture is aroused upon exposure to another culture. Culture is all embracing, one is born into it and accepts it as "natural." Exposure to other cultures will prevent a culture-bound political science and would hopefully eliminate the fallacy of viewing other cultures as "deviants" from one's own culture.

Eulau's own most important empirical work, The Legislative System,⁶⁹ can serve as an example of the deficiencies of a rigid and arbitrary commitment to the individual as the empirical unit of analysis. In this work, Eulau and his collaborators are

interested mainly in the perceptions of the legislators as to their own various roles in four state legislatures. With regard to their lawmaking roles, some legislators perceive their role as "ritualists" concerning themselves mainly with parliamentary procedures. Others view themselves as "tribunes," advocating the will of the community. Some perceive themselves as "inventors," initiators of policy, and others as "brokers", referees among conflicting groups in the legislature. The legislators also differ in their definition of their roles as representatives. Some view themselves as "trustees," following only the dictate of their conscience. Others view their representative role as that of "delegates" - expressing the views of their constituents. Some legislators see themselves more oriented to their districts than to the state, others are more oriented to the state. Some legislators perceive themselves as "facilitators," having a friendly attitude to interest groups, others are "resisters", feeling hostile to pressure groups. There are, however, two methodological difficulties with this work. 1) "Role," which is the central organizing concept of this work is a "holistic" concept. Roles are defined, prescribed, approved and sanctioned by the "culture" - that elusive, ill defined collective phenomenon. 2) While some holistic phenomena and concepts sneak into the research through the back door, others are excluded openly, by Eulau's own admittance: "In The Legislative System John C. Wahlke and his colleagues began with the institutional setting of the legislature as the given."⁷⁰ The decision to view the "institutional setting" as a given is purely arbitrary, as has been demonstrated earlier, and leads Eulau to criticizing his own work:

. . . in their study of four state legislatures John C. Wahlke and his associates treat the attitudes, perceptions, orientations and norms of individual legislators and compare the distribution of individual responses in the legislatures rather than the structures of behavior patterns of the four legislatures as collectives.⁷¹

This is as clear and self-admitted an example as can be found of the sacrifice of the significant for an elusive precision. The authors did not examine the power of the legislatures in relation to the power of interest groups in the respective states, or in relation to other institutions such as the governor. They have not examined the policies of these legislatures, the different influences on these policies, or the consequences of these policies. They have not examined how the four states cope with problems of employment, transportation, health care, etc., and what role, if any, do the legislatures play with regard to these problems. Why should "the attitudes, perceptions, orientations and norms" of individual legislators be the concern of political scientists at all? If they do, this has to be demonstrated by relating these attitudes to the broader questions suggested here.

In the introduction to his book Micro-Macro Political Analysis,⁷² Eulau attempts to solve the micro-macro problem. He first warns of some common fallacies made in attempts to relate individual and collective behavior. a) The fallacy of reasoning by analogy: The fact that two collective units are homologous does not allow for their treatment as analogues. The fact that New Haven has a two party system like the United States as a whole does not mean that a study of New Haven can tell us something about American politics on the federal level. New Haven is simply not a sample of American politics. b) The fallacy of reasoning by inference: one cannot infer the behavior of a whole from the behavior

of its parts - an individual can be unstable but be a part of a stable group. One can also not infer the behavior of a part from the behavior of the whole, a court can be "just," but that does not mean that all of its judges are "just." His reply to critics who claimed that behavioralists study individual behavior without saying anything about collective behavior is a) if the political scientist has "good theoretical grounds" for studying individuals, he cannot be criticized for doing what he wants to do. The critique, however, has usually been, and he himself has made it,⁷³ that the individual was chosen as a unit of analysis for reasons of methodological convenience rather than for "good theoretical grounds." b) The individual himself is a "whole," says Eulau, and can be both the object and subject of analysis. This is true, of course, and is actually a reminder that there is no special merit in choosing the individual as a unit of analysis, he is not an irreducible social atom, he is complex, and many of his properties cannot be readily observed, just as some group properties cannot.

Units of analysis can be compared only on the same level of analysis, and their properties can be correlated only at the same level. What Eulau suggests as a solution to the micro-macro dilemma is as follows:

Rather than thinking of micro and macro in dichotomous terms, the political scientist is better off if he thinks of a 'micro-macro continuum.' What in this continuum is micro and what is macro depends on the point on the micro-macro scale where the observer 'dips in,' where he fixes his object unit of analysis.⁷⁴

Eulau, however, has failed to establish the unidimensionality of his scale. The "holists" versus "individualists" debate is in effect a debate over the possibility of this unidimensionality. It is the absence

of composition laws which renders reconstruction of laws of individual behavior into laws of collective behavior impossible, and which makes groups as social phenomena different from individuals, which means they cannot be put on a continuum as a scale.

2) Eulau on history and politics

"Despite disclaimers and intentions to the contrary, there seems to me little room for doubt that the actual content of almost all the studies that reflect the behavioral approach is a-historical in character. Yet the scientific shortcomings of an a-historical theory in political science are manifest,"⁷⁵ wrote Robert Dahl.

Eulau admits that behavioralism is ahistorical, he also admits that political change is important to a political science. But he rejects the idea that behavioralism is intrinsically ahistoric. He rejects historical reconstructions in favor of causal relationships. The difficulty, however, is that "Behavioral studies rely on talk, and dead men do not talk."⁷⁶ He rejects documentary evidence because "documents may be neither typical nor representative, but rather parataxic, more indicative of the writer's idiosyncratic interpretations than of widely held cultural understanding."⁷⁷ This off-hand rejection of documents as evidence in political inquiry cannot be accepted on any rational grounds.

Holistic integral group properties are usually expressed in documents. These documents must be included as data for the social scientist who seeks an understanding of human behavior. Documents are especially important to the political scientist, the "outputs" of the political system are often cast in the form of documents such as laws, budgets, treaties and policy statements. If the political scientist is not to view

all political behavior as a result of non-political determinants, he must view the integral properties of the state in the form of documents as independent variables, as shapers and determinants of behavior. A decision to view a priori only one type of group properties as the sole determinants of behavior is arbitrary and unscientific. The question is an empirical question and an object for inquiry. In different situations, different group properties in different combinations will determine behavior. The fact that not all group properties are susceptible to investigation with questionnaires does not mean that they also cease to operate in the social world.

Public documents are objective, typical and representative, and private documents, to a skillful researcher, may reveal more than a questionnaire, despite the inevitable bias they contain. Eulau's position is strange because he is well aware that questionnaires too are not free of bias. "Political behavior, as all other human behavior, has not only form and content but also meaning for the actors who play the game of politics."⁷⁸ Eulau rejects a behavioristic, as distinguished from a behavioralistic approach to the study of political behavior. Regularities in external behavior tell the political scientist little of what he wants to know, the same behavior may have different meanings to different actors. Thus, the individual must be the unit of analysis if one wants to compare external behavior to its meaning. The problem for the behavioral political scientist is four fold: 1) the observer gives meaning to what he observes; 2) the observer observes himself while observing others, and gives meaning to his own behavior; 3) the observed gives meaning to his behavior; 4) both observer and observed may err in the

meaning they give to their behavior, by means of rationalization, for example. The problem is succinctly put by Eulau:

. . . if our observations of political behavior are to meet the test of inter-subjectivity, agreement between observer and observed, the meaning given to behavior by the observer and those given by the observed, must be captured in a single structure of meaning that is internally consistent.⁷⁹

Otherwise, even two observers who share the same values and the same theoretical frame of reference, may still make different observations of the same phenomenon - because of the unconscious meaning that affects their observations.

Rejection of documentary evidence and institutional analysis leads Eulau to an absurd position which sees a scientific study of history as beginning with the creation of behavioralism. The only objective and scientifically acceptable data is that acquired by behavioral methods: "As cross sectional studies accumulate, for instance, in the voting field, it becomes increasingly possible to study change and infer causation from the presence or absence of correlations."⁸⁰ However, by 1968 he even rejects cross sectional comparison over time because changes may be "in opposite directions and compensatory, making only for marginal results that indicate little or no change,"⁸¹ and recommends as the best method for analyzing social change longitudinal research with the individual as the unit of analysis.

In 1969, Eulau cited Robert A. Dahl's Who Governs as an example of the convergence of behavioral and historical analysis, Dahl's description of the history of New Haven's different elites is a reconstruction of historical events and an institutional analysis, by no means based on longitudinal research.⁸²

3) Eulau on values

A change of great magnitude occurred in Eulau's thought over the fact-value controversy. In the Behavioral Persuasion his position is simple:

Which is the man in whose service the behavioral persuasion finds its reason for existence? Is he a democratic man? A just man? A power seeking man? Is he a man who must be controlled because he is brutish and nasty? Or is he a man who must be liberated from the shackles of oppression to live a dignified life? These are philosophical questions better left to the philosophers.⁸³

Value conflicts are not susceptible to scientific investigation, and thus remain outside the realm of inquiry of the political scientist. If questions of fact and value are not kept separate "we would soon have a 'democratic' political science, a 'communist political science,' an 'anarchical political science,' a 'Catholic political science' and so on."⁸⁴ In 1969, however, Eulau admits that "a value free social science is impossible,"⁸⁵ and embraces a notion which amounts to an acceptance of a "democratic political science." Since a scientist can work only in a democratic environment which permits freedom of speech and inquiry,

. . . science itself dictates a moral choice. Hence, the scientist must be forever vigilant lest the freedoms necessary for his scientific work be infringed upon. In this connection, then, the modern scientist, whether natural or behavioral, carries on his shoulders the burden of an ancient problem.⁸⁶

In summary, two types of inconsistencies are prevalent in Eulau's thought. The first type is an inconsistency resulting from a change of mind. An opinion held in one stage of his work is rejected in favor of another through a process of learning and development. His change of position over the issue of objectivity in political science is of this type.

The second type of inconsistency is much more prevalent in Eulau's thought, much less rational, and stems from the conflict between the needs of political knowledge and the demands of a behavioral science. Eulau is well aware of both these needs and demands, but constantly fails to establish the rationality for choosing the demands of behavioral science. His attempts to do so are the direct cause of his inconsistencies. He 1) recommends the individual person as the empirical unit of analysis for behavioralism, 2) denies any conflict between behavioral and institutional analysis, 3) calls the environment the "critical factor in political behavior," 4) agrees that this environment is largely holistic, 5) agrees that holistic environmental phenomena are not susceptible to analysis with the individual as the empirical unit of analysis, 6) but still recommends that historical change be studied by longitudinal research - which totally ignores collective phenomena, 7) then he suggests that this self-imposed limitation is a sign of strength rather than weakness!

The behavioral researcher is well advised on strategic grounds to seek solutions of the micro-macro problem in research sites where behavioral research is viable. This self-imposed limitation of research attention is proof of strength, not weakness in the behavioral persuasion in politics.⁸⁷

This self-imposed limitation is, of course, a sign of weakness, not of strength, and amazingly Eulau knows this only too well: "War and peace, freedom and justice, order and revolution are a concern of political science," but

. . . linking different levels of analysis, the levels of individual or small group behavior and the global levels of institution, community or nation, constitute a major unsolved item on the methodological agenda of the behavioral persuasion, and a challenging one.⁸⁸

8) The most consistent inconsistency in Eulau's thought appears in 1969, in a book he published that year he uses his own empirical work, The Legislative System, as an example of an unsuccessful attempt to analyze collective phenomena in terms of the individuals composing them. In an article in a book which he edited and which was published that same year he uses The Legislative System as an example of a successful reconstruction of a collective phenomenon from its individual parts,⁸⁹

In answering the critics of behavioralism, Heinz Eulau's difficulties stem mainly from his adoption of a narrow and rigid definition of behavioralism, a definition that many behavioralists have rejected. While rejecting documentary evidence for lack of objectivity he does not even mention the behavioral technique of content analysis whose main purpose is to increase objectivity in the study of documents. Moreover, in his 1971 article, which was discussed at length in chapter two, he greatly clarifies the unit of analysis problem, and reveals the great number and complexity of group properties, many of which cannot be captured empirically with the aid of questionnaires.

D. The Counter-offensive

Both the events of the late 60's, and the wave of criticism directed at behavioralism resulted in some soul searching among major behavioralist figures.

Martin Landau, whose work will be discussed here, is certainly not as important a behavioralist as Easton, Dahl, Lasswell or Eulau. His work is included because it aims directly at this latest wave of criticism.

In 1972, Professor Martin Landau's book Political Theory and Political Science⁹⁰ was published. Six of the eight chapters in the book had been published earlier as articles in various scholarly journals. The first two chapters are new and constitute an answer to "some of the major criticisms against the application of scientific methodologies to the study of politics."⁹¹

1. Can political science become a science?

The first critique to which Landau replies is that political science cannot become a science "that possesses the scientific properties of physics."⁹² Any such statement, writes Landau, is hypothetical by nature, open to inquiry, and those who are optimistic about the chances of a scientific political science "bear the burden of proof."⁹³ Unlike Arnold Brecht,⁹⁴ Landau does not claim that political scientists have at their disposal a unified and agreed upon "Scientific Method." But he also sensibly rejects the opposite and just as extreme view "that scientific successes have been random events, sheer accidents or the results of plain luck."⁹⁵ Methodological issues are and will continue to be hotly debated, but if the scientific methodology of political science is not perfect, it still is a "powerful apparatus" which can and should be utilized to increase political knowledge.

2. On triviality

The second and most recurring critique directed at scientific political scientists is that they choose for research problems most susceptible to quantification and not those that are most politically significant. Strangely enough, Landau's counter critique is directed at the method by which this criticism has been arrived at rather than its substance.

If Morgenthau and Wolin have concluded that quantification has trivialized our work, have they not assigned a "grade?" There must be a scale involved in this judgment, probably unidimensional, ranging from trivia to importance--and by some count of some sample, they had plotted the 'quantifiers' on this scale.⁹⁶

We all count and quantify, says Landau, and accuses the critics of behavioralism⁹⁷ of measuring the triviality in behavioralism crudely, unconsciously and imprecisely without "an estimate of the probable error involved."⁹⁸ Landau ignores the fact that the critics of behavioralism do more than just count and measure, they make value judgments, any scale of "significance" and "triviality" is by its nature a scale of values, which, according to Landau's own standards should be left outside the realm of scientific inquiry. Landau also conveniently overlooks that David Easton, in an article from which Landau quotes, does provide a precise measurement of the triviality of scientific political science.

There can be little doubt that political science as an enterprise has failed to anticipate the crises that are upon us. One index of this is perhaps that in the decade from 1958 to 1968, this Review published only three articles on the urban crises; four on racial conflict; one on poverty; two on civil disobedience; and two on violence in the United States.⁹⁹

Easton has not established the unidimensionality of his scale, nor has he established the propriety of the American Political Science Review as a representative sample of the writings of political scientists, but he is much more precise than those critics of behavioralism which Landau chose to criticize.

Landau has still not addressed himself to the content of the critique. The charge of triviality can be arrived at impressionistically but still be true. To refute it one would expect Landau to measure

scientifically and rigorously the "size" of triviality in behavioralism and prove the critics wrong. But nothing of the sort takes place, in effect, Landau admits that "there are those who do avoid theoretically interesting or socially compelling problems because such problems are resistant to our technical repertoire."¹⁰⁰ To the question how many are "those who avoid theoretically interesting or socially compelling problems" Landau has no answer.

Easton's "index of triviality" is much more precise when compared with Landau's assessment of the achievements of behavioralism,

. . . it should be clear even to the most obdurate of opponents that whatever the pretension, extravagance, even foolishness, to be found in the last 15 years of social scientific effort, it has produced results that warrant a substantial investment of our resources.¹⁰¹

Why should this be clear? What are these "results," and how much is "substantial?" If, as Landau advises, we ought to pursue "a policy of systematic doubt,"¹⁰² it is obvious that 1) he does not take his own advice, 2) his statement must be viewed as an hypothesis which needs proof, and which he did not prove. Landau now stands guilty of what he accused the critics of science of doing, namely, measuring unconsciously and imprecisely. Even if one agrees that scientific political science has produced "results," questions will remain, "how many?" "of what quality?" and "how much?" should be invested in the enterprise. Just like Morgenthau and Wolin who "measured" unscientifically the defects of scientific political science, so Landau now "measures" its achievements.

3. On relevance

As noted earlier, Landau is fully aware of the existence of "theoretically interesting or socially compelling problems." A statement which could accurately serve as a definition of what the critics

of behavioralism called "relevant" problems. When discussing development theory Landau writes: "Interest in these [developing] countries was originally stimulated by matters of practical concern, which is the way most inquiry begins."¹⁰³ Practical concern or "relevance" is approved here as a guide to political inquiry. It is only when replying to critics of behavioralism and their charges of the "irrelevance" of scientific political science that Landau reverses his position and is set upon the destruction of "relevance" as a guide to inquiry.

Landau levels two charges against the quest for "relevance."

- 1) What seems relevant may simply not be relevant.

We often do not recognize a relevant problem when we see it, and just as often the problem we think is relevant vanishes before our eyes. There are events and states of affairs that are disturbing. They are dislocating, even ominous, and assume threatening proportions. We are certain that something is dreadfully wrong. But what is it that is wrong?¹⁰⁴

- 2) The second critique of the relevance criterion states that scientific inquiry guided by seemingly irrelevant criteria has resulted in relevant findings.

If we take a page out of history, it has happened that findings taken as trivial opened the way to remarkable discoveries. Consider, for example, these trivialities and the changes they brought: the attraction of chaff by amber, the twitching of a frog's legs, and the attraction of iron filings by a 'lode-stone.' It is a great marvel, Sir George Thomson has written, that such trivialities often lead to astounding results. All of this, I hasten to add, is not to be taken as a proposal to concentrate on trivia; it is, rather, that the trifles of today may be of great moment tomorrow.¹⁰⁵

A summary of Landau's new position on the issue of "relevance" will state a) one may study the seemingly relevant and come up with irrelevancies, b) one may study irrelevancies and come up with relevant results. To the obvious question "what is to be done" Landau answers: continue

basic research, "to cultivate science on its own terms and for its own intrinsic purposes,"¹⁰⁶ a lofty statement devoid of any empirical reference. Landau finds no problem in the rather tenuous distinction between "basic" and "applied" science, "in the attainment of the solutions of a problem, it is the findings of a theoretical science that are applied."¹⁰⁷

There are at least four objections to Landau's line of argument.

1) In studying what we think is relevant, and for that matter even while engaging in "basic research," there is always the possibility that we may come up with a wrong answer, or that we actually asked the wrong question. But we will never know it if we ask no question and find no answers. To find that what common sense sees as relevant is actually irrelevant is a major scientific discovery which will pave the way for other scientists to find the relevant. 2) The distinction between "pure" and "applied" science is not as clear-cut as claimed by Landau. "In fact," wrote Abraham Kaplan, no enemy of behavioralism,

. . . much of what is called applied science can be seen as such only in a subsequent reconstruction: a theory is developed in the course of dealing with a problem of so called 'application,' it is abstracted from such contexts, then afterwards referred back to them as 'applied science.' A great deal of science, in other words, is 'applied' long before it is 'pure.'¹⁰⁸

Studying the relevant greatly contributes to theoretical "pure" science.

3) Landau is committing what Kaplan calls the "ordinal fallacy." The problem with Landau's suggestion to concentrate on basic research until enough is known to be applied with certainty is that more research is always needed. How do we know when is the exact moment when we have "enough" reliable knowledge and are ready to apply it? "We are playing lightning chess - with the difference that if we stop to analyze all the

variations the more will be made for us, and with supreme indifference to its outcome."¹⁰⁹ A deliberate abstention of political scientists from the investigation of important policy issues will improve neither policy decisions nor political science. 4) David Easton has suggested, as a solution to the relevance issue, the creation of a Federation of Social Scientists. "The tasks of such a federation would be to identify the major issues of the day, clarify objectives, evaluate action taken by others, study and propose alternative solutions, and press these vigorously in the political sphere."¹¹⁰ And this without terminating basic research. Landau has not measured how many studies of trivia have resulted in relevance, nor has he measured how many studies of the seemingly relevant have resulted in trivia, we do not know what the probabilities of each are. Easton's proposal has at least the merit of increasing the probability that social science research will result in both relevant and theoretical findings.

4. The Mannheim Paradox

Behavioralism has been accused by its critics for its inability to free itself from the famous Mannheim paradox.¹¹¹ The main prisoner of the paradox, claims Landau, is Mannheim himself. If one claims that all knowledge is inevitably socially conditioned and therefore necessarily unobjective, this claim itself must be viewed as socially conditioned and unobjective, "the thesis which asserts the necessary impossibility of an objective validity in the social sciences is itself invalid."¹¹² The acceptance of the Mannheim paradox by the critics of behavioralism is self-defeating, a total inevitable relativity of all knowledge does not allow for any universally valid and objective criteria by which their

claim can be found "truer" than those of behavioralism. Landau makes a valuable distinction between objectivity and neutrality. "Men, even scientific men, are not angels."¹¹³ Scientists are not neutral, but social science is objective, or at least can become so. Such objectivity is achieved through the submission of all scientific research to a "network of highly redundant and visible public checks to protect against the inclusion of erroneous items in the campus of knowledge" with experience as the criterion by which every scientific finding is to be accepted or rejected. Any "hypothesis which cloaks itself in privilege or protects itself from observation is on its face faulty."¹¹⁴ There are two major problems with these formulations: 1) Landau views "experience" as a universal "given," and the struggle between behavioralists and their critics as a struggle between those who turn for "experience" to validate their theories, and those who seek to perpetuate dogmas while shielding them from this test. The problem is, however, different, and far more complex. What Landau takes for granted is actually very problematic. What exactly is that "experience" which the social scientist ought to refer to? What are the "facts" of the social sciences? Are they the external behavior of persons, or should the meaning these persons attach to their behavior also be included among these facts? Are the "facts" of the social sciences "individual facts" or "social facts?" Can the power of a president be observed, or the stability of a regime? Landau simply ignores the everyday problems of the working political scientist. Has Landau ever observed a "structure," a "function," a "political system," a "consensus," or a "revolution?" 2) Not only is there a multiplicity of "experiences" by which social science hypotheses can be checked, the different "approaches" in political science and the other social

sciences, which are a consequence of these different "experiences" make for a multiplicity of "publics" who check these "experiences." Can a political scientist employing a "structural-functional" type of analysis refute one who employs a decision-making "theory"? And vice-versa? In the social sciences there is a multiplicity of "experiences," a multiplicity of "approaches" or "theoretical frameworks," some of which, like the various versions of "systems analysis" can be hardly tested by reference to experience, and a multiplicity of "checking publics" having different checking "standards." The consequence is a multiplicity of "objectivities." Moreover, Landau's view is similar to the view taken by Karl Popper some twenty years earlier. In criticizing Mannheim, Popper claimed that "what we call 'scientific objectivity' is not a product of the individual scientist's impartiality, but a product of the social or public character of scientific method."¹¹⁵ However, a far less benign view of the scientific community is provided by C. Wright Mills in his discussion of academic cliques. The academic community is not ruled solely by the criterion of "scientific objectivity," cliques in effect are attempts at different interpretations of this objectivity. To enlarge the prestige of its interpretation a clique will utilize various means.

The giving of friendly advice to younger men; job offers and recommendations of promotion; the assigning of books to admiring reviewers; the ready acceptance of articles and books for publication; the allocation of research funds; arranging or politicking for honorific positions within professional associations and on editorial boards of professional journals.¹¹⁶

It is the complexity of the "experience" with which the social sciences are confronted, the difficulty of exact measurement and verification of parts of this "experience," mainly the

holistic group properties, which causes the proliferation of "schools," approaches and cliques. While C. Wright Mills' view of the academic community is too harsh, Popper's and Landau's view is too idealized.

5. On Kuhn's Paradigm

Landau is at his best in his discussion of Thomas Kuhn's controversial book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions¹¹⁷ and its impact on political science. Behavioralists were quick to embrace Kuhn's notion of "normal science."

If we take Truman, Almond, Eulau, Holt and Richardson, it is rather evident that they are looking toward a day when a normal political science will emerge. They long for a disciplinary consensus, for the paradigm that eliminates dissensus as it produces science, and a mature science at that. But they may be asking for more than they anticipate.¹¹⁸

Landau is well aware that Kuhn's "normal" science is a "closed society," "authoritarian," and is not "anything a reasonable scholar should look forward to."¹¹⁹ The critics of behavioralism¹²⁰ have been quick to point out the oppressive qualities of the "behavioralist paradigm." They have also, not surprisingly, focused on the revolutionary aspect of Kuhn's theory. Since the emergence of a new scientific paradigm is, according to Kuhn, not based on any rational objective criteria, the critics of behavioralism viewed their conflict with behavioralism as a naked struggle for power. Landau now embarks upon a refutation of Kuhn's thesis, "normal science" and "scientific revolution" are not dichotomous, the two are not mutually exclusive historically. Revolutions and normal science coexist, rather than follow each other chronologically. The concept "paradigm" is vague, has too many meanings, and can be applied to too many diverse situations, so that it is actually difficult to say what is not a paradigm. Paradigm changes should be rational, urges Landau,

. . . what is required to break monopoly is, by definition, competition. And the principle of 'maximum empirical testability,' with testability understood as the rule of independent external checks, guarantees this by demanding that all theories, no matter how unorthodox, be considered.¹²¹

Landau is here clearly normative, the conflict between behavioralism and its critics should be a competition between competing theories, to be decided by reason and evidence, and not by power. Empirically, however, it is hard to believe that behavioralism, though not as monolithic as a paradigm, will give up its supremacy in the discipline when presented with a superior theory.

Summary

This chapter has hopefully led to an increased awareness of the complexity of behavioralism. An analysis of the full range of Dahl's intellectual work served here as an answer to those critics who claimed an inherent conservative bias of behavioralism. Heinz Eulau was seen struggling to reply to critics from within a conceptual net of his own creation, trying in vain to justify a rigid conception of behavioralism. Even he came lately to an understanding of the great complexity of political phenomena and the concomitant difficulties of capturing them empirically and relating them to each other. Martin Landau, unlike Eulau, almost totally ignores the many problems involved in a quest for a science of politics. He demonstrated the falsity of some critiques of behavioralism, but ignored those critiques that were not false.

Footnotes

¹Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Goudet, The People's Choice, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 56. The first edition was published in 1944.

²Ibid., p. 62.

³Bernard E. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 314.

⁴Ibid., pp. 314-15.

⁵Ibid., p. 312.

⁶Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1960).

⁷Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959). On p. 201 Lane wrote:

The theory of withdrawal effect on the conflict between an individual's reference groups has some support, but requires specification of the nature of the identification (intensity, objective-subjective), the nature of the group (type and homogeneity), and the nature of the issue (group relevance, individual salience), before accurate prediction can be attempted.

A similar view is expressed by William H. Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 64-68.

⁸Robert E. Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," American Political Science Review, 59:4 (December, 1965), pp. 874-95, reprinted in M. Rejai, ed., Decline of Ideology? (Chicago/New York: Aldin Atherton, 1971), pp. 100-206.

⁹Ibid., p. 169.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 177.

¹¹Ibid., p. 192.

¹²Ibid., p. 199.

¹³Ibid., p. 203.

¹⁴Robert E. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review, 31 (1966), pp. 649-62.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 658.

¹⁶Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 324.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 470-71.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 227.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 466-67.

²⁰Auguste Comte, Introduction to Positive Philosophy, The Library of Liberal Arts, p. 29.

²¹Ibid., p. 30. Comte's predecessor, Saint-Simon, wrote of the "epoch of the positive system" which will be distinguished by a lack of conflict over metaphysical questions. See Frank E. Manuel, The New World of Henry Saint-Simon (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1963), p. 155. Logical positivists, in many respects different from early positivists, retained their faith in science as eradicating political conflicts. "According to them, this philosophy was to perform important social functions: to provide a scientific approach to personal convictions, notably, and thereby help eradicate irrational prejudice, ideological fanaticism, and the use of brute force in public affairs." Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday), 1969, p. 173.

²²Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 228. Some of the problems involved in treating a city as an autonomous political system are discussed by Mark Kesselman, "Research Perspectives in Comparative Local Politics: Pitfalls and Prospects" in Comparative Urban Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1972, pp. 10-30.

²³Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950).

²⁴Robert A. Dahl, Charles E. Lindblom, Politics Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1953).

²⁵Ibid., p. xxi, also p. 27.

²⁶Ibid., p. xxi.

²⁷Ibid., p. xxi.

²⁸Ibid., p. 21.

²⁹Ibid., p. 3.

³⁰Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Vol. 29, No. 2., Spring 1959, pp. 73-88.

³¹Ibid., pp. 78-88.

³²Ibid., p. 256.

³³Ibid., pp. 261.

³⁴Ibid., p. 269.

³⁵Ibid., p. 135.

³⁶Ibid., p. 341.

³⁷Ibid., p. 359.

³⁸Ibid., p. 279.

³⁹Ibid., p. 506.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 360.

⁴¹Robert A. Dahl, "Hierarchy, Democracy and Bargaining in Politics and Economics" in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz, eds., Political Behavior, A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 87. See also A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago and London, 1956), pp. 150-51, where the American political system is highly praised.

⁴²Dahl, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp. 441-43.

⁴³Ibid., p. 279.

⁴⁴Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 139.

⁴⁵Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966).

⁴⁶In A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 132, he wrote in glowing terms:

In a sense, what we ordinarily describe as democratic 'politics' is merely the chaff. It is a surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying consensus on policy that actually exists in the society among a predominant portion of the politically active members. . . .

That politics can be the creator of consensus does not appear as a possibility here.

⁴⁷Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. 50. Also pp. 51-53.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 65.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 396.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 399.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 399.

- ⁵²Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 106.
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 115.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 153.
- ⁵⁵Dahl, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p. 275.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 287-319. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971).
- ⁵⁷Dahl, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p. 276.
- ⁵⁸Especially J. Peter Euhem, "Political Science and Political Silence" in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, eds., Power and Community, pp. 3-58. Also in the various articles in McCoy and Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics.
- ⁵⁹Heinz Eulau, "Segments of Political Science Most Susceptible to Behavioristic Treatment," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1962), p. 27.
- ⁶⁰Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 3.
- ⁶¹Ibid., p. 13.
- ⁶²Ibid., p. 114.
- ⁶³Ibid., p. 15.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., p. 17.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 17.
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 85.
- ⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 63-67. *Italics added.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 66.
- ⁶⁹John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962).
- ⁷⁰"Tradition and Innovation: On the Tension between Ancient and Modern Way in the Study of Politics" in Heinz Eulau, ed., Behavioralism in Political Science (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), p. 6.
- ⁷¹Heinz Eulau, Micro-Macro Political Analysis (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), p. 3.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 1-19.

⁷³See Eulau's critique of The American Voter in American Political Science Review, Vol. LIV, December 1960, pp. 993-94.

⁷⁴Eulau, Micro-Macro, p. 17.

⁷⁵Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," p. 24. Some others who address themselves to this problem are: Richard Jensen, "History and the Political Scientist" in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Politics and the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 1-28. See also Melvin Richter "The Historical Approach to the Study of International Politics" in Vernon Van Dyke, ed., Some Approaches and Concepts Used in the Teaching of International Politics (Iowa City, Iowa: 1957), pp. 8-15.

⁷⁶Eulau, Behavioral Persuasion, p. 127.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 70.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 69.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 113-14.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 129.

⁸¹Heinz Eulau, "Political Behavior," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 210.

⁸²Eulau, "Tradition and Innovation," p. 6.

⁸³Eulau, Behavioral Persuasion, p. 133.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 137.

⁸⁵Eulau, "Tradition and Innovation," p. 12.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁷Eulau, Behavioral Persuasion, p. 124.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 123.

⁸⁹Compare "Tradition and Innovation," p. 5, where he wrote "the issue of behavioralism versus institutionalism has largely disappeared," to Micro-Macro Political Analysis, p. 3.

⁹⁰Martin Landau, Political Theory and Political Science: Studies in the Methodology of Political Inquiry (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972).

⁹¹Ibid., p. viii.

⁹²Ibid., p. 8.

⁹³Ibid., p. 8. Landau's position is somewhat similar to that of W. G. Runciman: "The only safe prediction to make about a branch of knowledge is that it is bound to change one way or the other, and probably in a direction that few of its practitioners at a given time would suspect", Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1969), pp. 19-20.

⁹⁴Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundation of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

⁹⁵Landau, Political Theory, p. 9.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 10.

⁹⁷Landau refers specifically to 1) Leo Strauss, "An Epilogue" in Herbert J. Storing, (ed.), Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), pp. 305-27. 2) Sheldon S. Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, 1969, pp. 1062-82. 3) Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe, eds., An End to Political Science: The Caucus Papers (New York: Basic Books, 1970. 4) Hans Morgenthau, "Reflections on the State of Political Science," Review of Politics, Vol. 17, 1955, pp. 431-60. 5) Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics, (Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967).

⁹⁸Landau, Political Theory, p. 10.

⁹⁹David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, December 1969, p. 1057. *Italics added.

¹⁰⁰Landau, Political Theory, p. 12.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 159.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁰⁸Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1969), p. 381.

- ¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 402, see also p. 403.
- ¹¹⁰Easton, "New Revolution," p. 346.
- ¹¹¹Besides other critics mentioned earlier see Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and on Interpretation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, 1966.
- ¹¹²Landau, Political Theory, p. 39.
- ¹¹³Ibid., p. 44.
- ¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 46.
- ¹¹⁵Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, p. 220.
- ¹¹⁶C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Grove Press, 1959), pp. 107-08.
- ¹¹⁷Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Edition, 1964).
- ¹¹⁸Landau, Political Theory, p. 72. Landau refers here to David Truman, "Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline," American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, 1965, 865-73. Gabriel Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, 1966, 860-79. Heinz Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Contemporary Political Science (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967). Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics", in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: Free Press, 1970).
- ¹¹⁹Landau, Political Theory, p. 73.
- ¹²⁰Sheldon S. Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theories," in Preston King and B. C. Parekh, ed., Politics and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), and the critics quoted earlier.
- ¹²¹Landau, Political Theory, p. 75.

CHAPTER IV

THE OTHER SIDE OF BEHAVIORALISM

It can be safely assumed that some behavioralists have a stereotyped image of political philosophers as engaging in endless "fact-free" speculations and hair-splitting debates over some ancient and irrelevant manuscripts. My concern in this chapter is, however, with a stereotyped image that political philosophers and other non-behavioral political scientists have of behavioralists as immersed in trivia, conservative, ahistorical, apolitical and totally irrelevant to the great events unfolding before our eyes and to the great problems faced by modern society.

The questions I will attempt to answer in this chapter are basically these: is behavioralism inherently and inevitably conservative as Charles A. McCoy and John Playford assert when they write of the "inevitable tendencies within the behavioral approach to view with approval the political system as static, closed conservative"?¹ Is behavioralism inherently and inevitably imprisoned within the "Mannheim paradox", as Joseph LaPalombara and J. Peter Euben and Eugene F. Miller assert?² Is behavioralism inherently apolitical, ahistorical and irrelevant as many of its critics claimed? Can there be a political, historical and relevant behavioralism? Are there parts of behavioralism that the critics neglected? Have they seen just one side of behavioralism?

In the previous chapters I have demonstrated that logically, there is nothing in the basic tenets of behavioralism to make it inherently conservative. There is nothing in the search for law-

like generalizations, in an emphasis on one or another unit of analysis or in a search for increasing the objectivity of political science to make the findings of behavioralism conservative. The fact that most behavioralists were conservatives does not make behavioralism conservative. Critics of behavioralism have failed to make the distinction between behavioralists, a group of political scientists, and behavioralism, a set of ideas to serve as guidelines for increasing the scientific validity of research in political science. There is nothing in these guidelines to cause the findings of such research to be conservative. The fact that the social sciences cannot become value free does not mean that they must become conservative. One can study reality according to the canons of behavioralism and conclude by sharply indicting it. The "Mannheim paradox" has already been refuted logically in these pages. A proposition which asserts that all knowledge is inevitably conditioned by social, cultural and economic forces is itself thus conditioned, unobjective and one has no logical reason to accept it.

But both charges of the inevitable conservatism and the inevitable imprisonment within the "Mannheim paradox" can and should also be refuted empirically, by demonstrating that there were and are political scientists who followed behavioralist canons of research but were not conservative. This would also demonstrate that political scientists who wrote in the same historical and cultural environment did not all have similarly conditioned views.

A. Harold D. Lasswell

Harold D. Lasswell is the most prolific,³ controversial,⁴ and influential behavioralist. It was Lasswell who pointed out the inadequacy

of institutional categories and the need to examine behavior and its motivations for a full understanding of politics long before these ideas became the rallying ideas of the behavioral movement. It would be impossible to discuss here all of his writings, instead, attention will be focused on three aspects of his work: i) his definition of the political, ii) his contributions to political psychology, and iii) his values.

1) Lasswell and the Political

a. Lasswell distinguishes two ways of defining the political, "I will speak of them as the 'institutional' and the functional methods of definition,"⁵ the identification of political institutions is relatively easy, they are those institutions that settle disputes and defend and extend collective interests. Many institutions engage in the settlement of disputes but a "government" performs most of that function.

In the functional definition of politics "politics is found whenever, to use the older terminology, 'wills are in conflict'."⁶ Viewed as a conflict of wills politics is everywhere, no social, economic or religious institution is free of conflict. Accepting the functional standpoint enlarges tremendously the scope of the political: "It should be observed that politicians are not limited to government, and that businessmen are not limited to private ventures. The 'boss' is one form of the businessman in government; the director of a large private concern may be a politician."⁷ The difference in the two definitions is a result of different observation points, one can observe an institution, or one can observe a function performed by different institutions. The functional definition of politics does not replace an institutional focus: "The use of institutional categories in describing political life is indispensable."⁸

b. Power and Politics

Lasswell is best known for the emphasis he put on the concept of power as the central concept and focus of political science. "The concept of power is perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political science."⁹ Power is a relationship "in which severe deprivations are expected to follow the breach of a pattern of conduct."¹⁰ Power is differentiated from influence by the fact that in its exercise a threat or actuality of severe deprivations is employed. This does not mean that the exercise of power is always accompanied by violence, people will obey the powerful because of loyalty, habit, self-interest, or apathy. When a policy is expected to be enforced by imposing extreme deprivations, it is a decision, and power here is viewed as "participation in the making of decisions."¹¹ Political institutions are thus those institutions which threaten or apply severe sanctions in the implementation of their policies. The power concept also widens the scope of political science by focusing attention not only on political institutions. There are powerful institutions which are not part of the "government" in the formal sense, business corporations and trade unions can inflict severe deprivations on a community.

Lasswell distinguishes between the weight, the domain, and the scope of power. The weight of power is the degree to which one influences a decision. The domain of power is the people who are affected by it. The scope of power is the number of values affected by it. Power is a value, something that is desired.

Power can be transformed into other values, power can also be attained through the transformation of other values into power. Power can be derived from power, by being born into a powerful family, for instance. Power can be acquired through the value of well being, by having some

special physical property such as strength, beauty or energy. Power can be easily acquired from a base of wealth. Knowledge has also often served as a base for power as, for instance, when a scholar becomes an adviser to a ruler. Affection may bring men or women closer to power holders and increase their power, and even a "reputation for moral integrity" may serve as a power base.

The relationship of power to other values is not one directional, not only can other values be transformed to power, power can be transformed into other values. Power can be used to accumulate wealth, to achieve physical well being, to acquire knowledge, and skill. Power is very often used to acquire respect, especially when the powerful is from humble origin, and it can be used to acquire rectitude, especially if the power holder is concerned with religious issues.

The empirical identification and measurement of power relationships have so far eluded behavioralists. Robert A. Dahl¹² enumerates some reasons for the difficulties in measuring power.

1) We do not know what the original position of the persons in a power relationship was, as a consequence we cannot know how "much" one has changed his position as the result of power exerted by the other. In politics people will often present false initial power positions for bargaining purposes.

2) While two persons may change their initial positions in what seems as an equal "amount" due to a power exerted, both may have actually changed in different "amounts" subjectively. They simply did not attach the same amount of subjective importance to their own original position.

3) It is very difficult to find the scope of one's power, in

what areas is his power effective, and in which is it ineffective. It is also difficult to compare one's power in one area with his power in another, how much power in international affairs equals how much power in domestic affairs?

4) If one influences more people than another, this does not necessarily mean any differences in their powers. One may influence more people because it requires very little or no change from their initial position.

5) Both Lasswell and Dahl view participation in decision making as an indicator of power. The problem here is, of course, that "non-decision making" may limit the range of the decisions to be made.¹³

Lasswell is aware of the ubiquity of power relationships and politics in all social organizations, be they governmental, economic or scientific. Lasswell did not identify power with corruption, he did not make this hypothetical relationship into a certainty. The whole thrust of Lasswell's book Power, Corruption and Rectitude,¹⁴ which he wrote in collaboration with Arnold A. Rogow, is to refute Lord Acton's famous aphorism on the inevitable relationships between power and corruption. Not only are power, politics and corruption not inevitably connected, paradoxically, what is needed to combat corruption, the authors say, is not less power and politics, but better politics and a more responsible use of power. Despite various attempts to take matters "out of politics," "there has been neither more democracy, nor probably less corruption."¹⁵ In the absence of powerful and responsible parties, interest group power increased and "as a result governmental decision-making is often less a consequence of majority party policy than of minority interest group policy."¹⁶ Thus powerlessness may be

the cause of corruption, and power its antidote.

2) Lasswell and Units of Analysis

"Political science without biography is a form of taxidermy."¹⁷

One of Lasswell's major contributions to political science was his emphasis on leadership as a crucial political phenomenon. His famous Psychopathology and Politics was first published in 1930, and from then on, Lasswell put special emphasis on the individual as the unit of political analysis.

A great deal of political behavior can be explained without regard to individual preferences. People do obey the rules of law, the maxims of their culture or nationality despite great differences in their personalities and temperaments. However, the higher one goes in the political hierarchy the more he is bound to find the creators and manipulators of these laws and maxims. Fred I. Greenstein wrote: "Personality variations will be more evident to the degree that the individual occupies a position 'free from elaborate expectations of fixed content.' Typically these are leadership positions."¹⁸ The problem that Lasswell faced, and that behavioralists face to this day is what makes an individual's behavior political. The most obvious answer, given by many behavioralists, was to look at the individual in a political context, such as individuals in political parties, in legislatures, in courts, etc. However, a serious problem arises here which is usually overlooked. The political is defined by the structural properties and relational properties of the group to which the individual belongs. A party, for instance, is political because of its structural properties, its special organizational structure, and because of its relational properties, its power relationships to other groups in a society. The problem of the behavioralist is

that by studying the behavior of individuals one is studying the distributive properties of the group, not its structural and relational properties. Thus the behaviorist defines "political behavior" in terms of structural and relational group properties and then actually studies distributive group properties.

Lasswell follows a different path in studying political behavior. While admitting the indispensability of institutional categories for political science, Lasswell, following his functional definition of politics, refuses to accept institutional categories as the only signposts of the political, and seeks a link between the integral properties of the individual and the relational properties of society, a link embodied in his notion of the "political type."

Lasswell distinguishes between three different types. A political type may be constructed to describe a nuclear relation: "The political man is the one whose principal value is the pursuit of power."¹⁹ The political man has a special relation to power as a value, among values he chooses power to work with for the achievement of his goals. The political type is an ideal-type, a pure type, a methodological construct. Obviously no person chooses only power as a goal, or as the only means to achieve his goals, but the construct enables the analyst to discover and classify those persons who accentuate power above other goals. The great value of the typology is that it reveals and illuminates political life outside the confines of political institutions.

Lasswell goes on to refine further this ideal type by stressing the particular form of activity which the political man chooses, and makes his famous classification of political men into administrators, agitators, and theorists.

The agitator is distinguished by the high value he attaches to emotional public response. He is highly moralistic, views all those who disagree with him as evil. His main concern is with grand designs, he has no inclination for routine, organization and detail. Lasswell searches for an explanation for this type of behavior in the formative years of agitators. He examined life histories of some agitators and concluded that over-repression of affect and aggression may result in agitator-like behavior. In the agitator repressed aggression is displaced upon various kinds of "public enemies." Affection which was blocked from moving to other people is directed toward the self, leading to narcissism and a need for mass approval. Different defense mechanisms are employed by the agitator to transform private emotional problems into public issues he espouses. One of the subjects that Lasswell studied, who hated his brother with whom he competed for the affection of the father, by the unconscious defense mechanisms of reaction formation and displacement transformed this hatred into love for all humanity, and espoused the issues of pacifism and socialism. Uncertain about his ability to control his over-repressed sexual impulse, the agitator sets out to control others and keep them from "evil."

"Administrators" as a class are distinguished by a fondness for detail, strictness, compulsive adherence to rules and regulations, and rigidity in interpersonal relationships. Though at first glance the administrator type seems a competent public servant, he actually shies away from initiative and responsibility. Examination of life histories of administrators reveals that their rigidity, strictness and compulsive busyness are strategies they use to control their over-repressed hostility to authority and at the same time to prove their potency.

Different political convictions, beliefs and ideologies may serve as rationalizations for inner compulsions. A son may accept his family's party preference to atone for guilt resulting from hostility to the father or incestuous designs on the mother. Militarism may be adopted so that one may expose himself to death in war because of an unconscious need for punishment. Examination of life histories and of the development of personality may explain a great variety of political behavior.

The co-relational type is a further refinement of the nuclear relational type. The range of variables is increased by an attempt to demonstrate a relationship between a person, the value power, and other values or activities which may serve as compensation values.

But Lasswell's main interest is focused on the developmental type, the question that Lasswell asks is: Is there anything in their life history which disposes certain persons to be power seekers? Why does a man become a political man? "Are there early experiences in childhood and youth which, impinging upon a basic biological type, culminate in personalities oriented toward power? Is there, in a word, a homo politicus, a basic political type?"²⁰ Lasswell suggests a general formula to describe the developmental sequence of political man.

In his early years the future political man has suffered deprivation, when the deprivation is too harsh, it may lead to withdrawal and apathy. But when the deprivation is not overwhelming, when it is accompanied by some indulgence it may lead the individual to view power as a value to compensate him for past deprivations, and to rationalize his

quest for power in terms of the public interest. The general formula of the developmental political type thus reads: the political man displaces his private motives upon public objects and rationalizes them in terms of the public interests.

In effect, Lasswell is engaged in what is probably the most difficult task of the social sciences, that is, making valid generalizations with which to explain the phenomenon of leadership. One can embrace a Lenin or Tolstoy style substitute leadership type of general law which views leaders as products of holistic collective social forces, with the sui generis unique characteristics of the particular leader having no impact. The opposing view depicts leaders as totally sui generis and unique phenomena whose actions cannot be explained by reference to any general law and must be simply described. Lasswell seeks a link between the private and the public, between the individual and the collective. He relies on psychoanalytic theory with its emphasis on the early years of the individual as shaping his personality, its emphasis on the development of the personality through time, its emphasis on the unconscious, and especially the defense mechanisms (displacement) as both aids to the individual in achieving self-respect, and at the same time as obstacles to the function of reality-testing. Psychoanalysis enables Lasswell to make that difficult link between the individual and the collective.

By choosing the individual as the unit of analysis, by emphasizing the search for power as a compensatory value, by viewing the political in his political man as merely a result of displacement of private objects, by viewing the public interest as merely a rationalization of

private motives does not Lasswell actually reduce the political to the psychological? And even worse, does not Lasswell reduce the political to the psychopathological? Doesn't he reduce politics to madness?

A further word about the problem of reduction is needed here. Social scientists have been unable so far to reduce "holistic" group properties to the more "psychological" and individualistic distributive group properties. The term "reduction" is used by many social scientists with abandon, very often as a pejorative, and very often without an understanding of its meaning. Reduction in the social sciences would mean a significant achievement which would manifoldly increase the reliability of their findings. It will make for knowledge which is less disjointed, more cumulative, and will thus greatly increase the range of social science generalizations and the power of its explanations. The disjointed nature of social science knowledge is a direct result of different social scientists studying different group properties with different units of analysis, which prevents them from a scientific linkage of all these findings into broad generalizations. Social scientists have devised at least four ways to escape their predicament:

1. Emphasizing one type of group property while ignoring all others. Bentham, for example, views as real only distributive group properties ignoring such holistic emergent properties as "community" and "nationality." The collective properties have not been reduced, they simply have been declared as non-existent. The same is also true of David Truman who denies the existence of a "national interest."

2. One set of properties is declared to be the cause of all

other properties, with no empirical evidence for support and with no attention to the linkage of different units of analysis. Here Marx is the obvious example, he declared the group's structural properties, its mode of production, to be the determinant of its other properties such as its constitution, ideology, and even its distributive properties, the psychological makeup of its members.

3. A social scientist might study a set of group properties, and declare that he has actually studied another set of group properties. The authors of the Civic Culture studied the distribution of attitudes in five nations, or the distributive properties of these nations, but then they call this distribution of attitudes "political culture," which is, in effect, the emergent property of these groups.

4. Social scientists will sum up the distributive properties of a group and claim that they have reconstructed these properties into another group of properties, claiming in effect that they have succeeded in reducing a collective property into a distributive property. Heinz Eulau, for example, claimed that he succeeded in reconstructing the behavior of the four legislatures he studied from the behavior of individuals he studied in these legislatures. Eulau later admitted his error.

The unit of analysis problem becomes even more confused when ideological issues are mixed with purely methodological problems. Philosophers have emphasized holistic properties such as the "will of the state" to which the will of the individual has to be subservient. Karl Popper, for one, wrongly assumed that studying collective group properties of necessity implies historicism and totalitarianism. In

effect, one can study holistic group properties without being either historicist or totalitarian.

To return now to Lasswell, he is well aware of the "thorny problem of the relations between research on the individual and research upon society."²¹ He is also aware, as already mentioned, of the indispensability of institutional categories for understanding politics. He rejects as "fictitious" the separation between the study of the individual and the study of society: "There is no cleavage; there is but a gradual gradation of reference points."²² In studying "individualistic" or "holistic" phenomena, one is not studying different "things," but different properties of the same phenomenon. Lasswell refuses to limit the scope of the social sciences by studying external behavior alone, a social scientist must look at the subjective experience of the actors involved. A state can be defined by such external characteristics as the use of coercion, but this definition will be only partial if subjective experiences such as a "sense of community" are not included. Lasswell refuses to view the state as a super-individual. The state is made up of individuals, but is "independent of any one individual,"²³ i.e., it has properties that are different from the properties of the individuals composing it. For example, the duration of a state, an integral property, is different from the duration of individuals in a state. Lasswell refutes Hans Kelsen's critique of such concepts as "common emotion, common volition and common idea" which "can never mean anything more than a description of the coincidence in consciousness of a number of individuals."²⁴ Kelsen refuses to recognize the reality of a group's relational emergent properties. He views only

the state's distributive properties as "real" and concludes, that since these distributive properties, such as individual beliefs, values and emotions can and do rapidly change, such feelings as community loyalty are of short duration and are superfluous in any definition of the state. Lasswell, however, understands that such terms as "common emotion, common volition and common idea" describe relational emergent group properties, which may have a very long historic duration, and which are not "the coincidence in consciousness of a number of individuals"--a description of the distributive properties of the state. "The concept of the state includes this idea of a temporal frame, and can best be grasped as a relational system (a manifold) in which a certain frequency of subjective events is maintained."²⁵ The state is a "manifold of events," it is a group having different types of properties which cannot be reduced to each other and must be studied on their own levels of analyses.²⁶

Lasswell, then, is not reducing the political; on the contrary, he warns that such reduction is impossible, that relational emergent properties cannot be reconstructed by summing up the properties of members of such groups. A state is a "manifold of events" which can and must be studied from different properties. Lasswell does not seek to substitute one level for all others, he does not seek to make the individual the only unit of analysis of political science. He is aware of a multiplicity of levels of analysis and of the inability of the social sciences to reduce all these levels to a single one. In an age in which political scientists focused exclusively on integral and structural group properties, when they examined only the constitutional

and institutional aspects of society, Lasswell seeks to add a new dimension to the study of politics. The individual, especially in a leadership position, is a most important political phenomenon. A focus on the legalistic and institutional arrangements of society will do little to explain the great and growing impact of political leadership on political life. A good theory of human nature would be more appropriate to an understanding of a leader's behavior. Here Lasswell turned to psychoanalysis, which is probably still the best theory of human behavior, despite its shortcomings. Of this Lasswell was well aware. He was among the first to insist on the need for the objectification of the prolonged interview technique if it is to be scientific, that is, if it is to enable replication or falsification of psychoanalytic theory.²⁷

Lasswell's formula describing the developmental political type does not mean that he views all politics as an epiphenomenon, a dependent variable, a result of displacement and rationalization of individual private motives. "Crises like wars, revolutions and elections enter the lives of people in far reaching ways. The effect of crises on mental attitude is an important and uncertain field."²⁸ Here political events are seen as independent variables, explaining changes in mental attitudes. Politics is replete with symbols of authority, of conflict, of drama and tension and is readily available to individuals to displace and project their private motives on. No explanation of political behavior, especially the behavior of political leaders, will be complete without an examination of the early formative years of those leaders, and the impact of unconscious motivations, formed during those early years on their subsequent political behavior.²⁹

3) Lasswell and Values

a. The Policy Sciences

"This book," claimed Lasswell in his famous Politics, Who Gets What, When, How, "restricted to political analysis, declares no preferences. It states conditions."³⁰ "The present work is an attempt to formulate the basic concepts and hypotheses of political science. It contains no elaborations of political doctrine, of what the state and society ought to be,"³¹ he wrote in the introduction to Power and Society. These assertions of ethical neutrality must, however, be viewed as only one facet of the many faceted and complex work of Harold D. Lasswell. In many of his works Lasswell exhibits an interest in the contributions that the social sciences can and should make to improve the lot of mankind. From his early writings Lasswell was interested in what he called "the politics of prevention." The task of "the politics of prevention" is to measure continuously the world level of insecurity. "The political psychiatrist, assuming the desirability of enabling human activities to evolve at a minimum of human cost, approaches the problem of war and revolution as one detail of the whole task of mastering the sources and mitigating the consequences of human insecurity in our unstable world."³² The purpose of "the politics of prevention," is to try and detect insecurities, tensions, conflicts and to prevent them from turning into action destructive of human life. In his later writings, Lasswell changed the politics of prevention, or preventive politics, to the "policy sciences of democracy." "Social psychiatry becomes equivalent in scope to the policy sciences of democracy, the sciences which discover the factors that condition the democratic

equilibrium."³³ Lasswell's emphasis on preventive politics, political psychiatry and the policy sciences of democracy reveals his unbound idealism and his faith in a political science that would contribute to the making of a world free of misery and destructiveness. Lasswell boldly makes the analogy between political science and the science of medicine and views the role of the social scientists as curing social ills. Not that Lasswell is not aware of the dangers of such an analogy. The notions of "health" and "disease" are problematic even in medicine, "health," despite its ambiguities is the paramount value of the science of medicine. But if the heart of politics is conflict over values, what then is political "health?"

There are other critiques of the idea of the policy sciences. Easton's objections to Lasswell's conception of the policy sciences have been already discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation.³⁴ Easton fears that the policy scientist "unwittingly accepts the value premises of those he serves." Theodore J. Lowi is totally opposed to any involvement of political scientists in policy making: "It means that the intellectual agenda of the discipline is set by the needs of the clientele, not by the inner logic of political science."³⁵ Lowi opts for a detached and critical political science, where any attachment to a political regime will diminish the critical capacity of the discipline.

The proper relationship between the political scientist and the society of which he is a part is a crucial problem to which there is no single and easy answer. Should the political scientist utilize his knowledge in solving social problems, or should he remain a detached

observer and critic? Can a political scientist work within the power structure without being corrupted by it? Will the power structure utilize the knowledge provided by the policy scientist for its own ends rather than for those of the community? Can changes in policy be affected more by critics from without or by working within the power structure? Lasswell for one is convinced that political science is doomed to sterility unless it contributes to the improvement of social life.

b. The Democratic Personality

One of Lasswell's most radical ideas is his notion of the democratic personality. "The progressive democratization of society calls for the amending of social institutions for the purpose of aiding the development of democratic personality."³⁶ The criterion by which social and political institutions are to be judged is whether they aid or hinder the development of democratic personalities. These institutions and social procedures which hinder that development must be changed.

Lasswell suggests an eight value scheme to serve in developing profiles of different societies. Every individual, every culture has a different ranking of these values in different times. In western society different institutions specialize in the management of different values; this is how Lasswell lists the values and the institutions.

<u>Value</u>	<u>Institution</u>
Power	Government
Respect	Social class distinctions
Affection	Family, friendship, intimacy
Rectitude	Church, home
Well-being	Hospital, clinic
Wealth	Business
Enlightenment	Research, education, information
Skill	Occupations. ³⁷

Obviously values are not monopolized by the specialized institutions in any society. Power is not monopolized by government, nor is respect limited to class distinctions.

A profile of democracy utilizing this scheme will show democracy differing from other types of society by the fact that these values are widely shared among its citizens. A democracy is a community of shared power, respect, enlightenment and wealth; the stability of such a community depends, above all, on the existence of sufficient numbers of democratic personalities -- personalities that will insist on the sharing of power and respect, that will be active and will participate in public affairs. The outstanding feature of the democratic personality is high self esteem, "democratic character develops only in those who esteem themselves enough to esteem others."³⁸ Low esteem of the self causes the individual to resort to a host of defense mechanisms which warp his image of reality, and may even cause him to turn to dependence on despotic leaders, to give up the direction of his own life and to "escape from freedom and responsibility."

Rather than put his faith in institutional arrangements such as checks and balances whose purpose was to defeat human nature while defending liberty, Lasswell views the democratic personality as the strongest guarantee of liberty against despotism. While many behaviorists hailed the contributions of apathy to democratic stability, Lasswell opted for a responsible, active, well-informed, independent minded, self-and other-respecting democratic citizenry.

c. The Garrison State

Another idea which puts Lasswell on the "other side of behaviorism" is his idea of the garrison state. His motives for bringing it

forth are clear, he gives "priority to problems connected with the survival of democratic society."³⁹ Methodologically, the idea is presented in the form of a "developmental construct," which is not a scientific prediction derived from subsuming an event under a general law, nor is it an extrapolation of past trends into the future, it "is frankly imaginative though disciplined by careful considerations of the past."⁴⁰ The purpose of a developmental construct is to direct scientific attention to what seems like a significant and "relevant" problem for political science. While past social philosophers, like Comte and Spencer, did envision types of military states, the "garrison state" will be different because of modern technology. This technology will bring forth a new breed of "specialists on violence" who will not resemble the familiar officer-types of the past. These new specialists will be skilled in the civilian sciences of business management, and public relations. Modern technology is also the cause of an increased unification of the state, because modern weapons erased the distinction between soldiers and civilians to create a "socialization of danger." In the garrison state the specialists on violence will be the supreme rulers, they will utilize coercion, propaganda and even modern drugs to unify the nation behind them and to reduce criticism and opposition. Power will be concentrated and monopolized, all possible rival power centers will be eliminated. The rulers will have a professional interest in "multiplying gadgets specialized to acts of violence."⁴¹ Priority will be given to the fulfillment of military needs over civilian needs.

This future picture of the garrison state remains to this day a

chilly reminder of the vulnerability of democracy. While some would object to its pessimistic tone, others would find that some parts of the picture have actually materialized. Once more, the difference between Lasswell and other behavioralists is marked. While other behavioralists saw science and technology as a force which makes for increased rationality, Lasswell is well aware that technology can be utilized for ends which are destructive to democracy. While other social scientists saw technology as a force of progress and development, Lasswell warned of the dangers it posed when at the service of unscrupulous elites. Lasswell did not hesitate to include the United States among his possible future garrison states, when other behavioralists celebrated the virtues of American democracy, Lasswell served a warning of democratic vulnerability everywhere.

B. V. O. Key, Jr. A Political
Behavioralist

One of the most important and paradoxical figures in American political science was the late V. O. Key, Jr. Highly esteemed by behavioralists and non-behavioralists alike, a unique achievement, he nevertheless remained as Walter Dean Burnham noticed an "isolated figure"⁴² among behavioralists, with few followers and little impact on the direction of behavioralism, a situation that only lately is beginning to change.

1) Key's Notion of the Political

The clearest presentation of Key's idea of politics is found

in the first chapter of his Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, titled "The Nature of Politics."⁴³ "Government is a universal, if not always an admirable, feature of society,"⁴⁴ begins Key. No society, no people can dispense with government, it is needed for defense from enemies without and for keeping internal order and peace. Though universal, government is also diverse, in different societies different groups govern, organized in numerous forms, from an occasional meeting of tribal chiefs to well-differentiated permanent organizations. There are governments which perform a great variety of functions and governments with a limited scope of action, the governors may be few or many, may be limited by law or rule unrestricted. What all governments, however great their diversity, have in common is that "they possess authority; they exercise power."⁴⁵ Key subscribes here to the Lasswellian notion of politics as power, and of power as relational. He opposes the idea which depicts power "as a substance in a keg, something a person does or does not have."⁴⁶ The essence of politics is the relationship between those who wield power and those affected by it, both sides are essential to the political formula. Power relationships are fluid, transitory and fluctuating, the impact of the rulers upon the ruled and the ruled upon the rulers constantly changing. The different structures of government are thus structures of power, as each society stabilizes and constitutionalizes its power relationships.

Key then analyzes power relationships in democracies. He rejects Mosca's "general law" which states that in every society, no matter what its state of development, or professed constitution,

there will always be found two classes, the rulers and the ruled. But Key also rejects a pluralistic view of power in democracies, which claims an equal dispersion of power among various groups. "A democracy may have within it a touch of aristocracy; it may have a dash of tyranny; and on occasion, it may be powerless to act."⁴⁷ Democracies, however, have properties by which they may be distinguished from other kinds of regimes. Democracies have managed to provide a peaceful solution to one of the most crucial and central of political problems, the problem of succession. "Periodic elections are both a peaceful means for deciding who governs, and a method for the termination of the life of a government."⁴⁸ Another characteristic of democracy is its source of legitimacy, the idea of the consent of the governed is unique and different from other legitimizing ideas. Key discusses dispersion of power and competition among power centers but never subscribes to the ideas that claim the equality in the power of those centers or of a universal access to them. Key views political parties in a democracy as mobilizers of support or opposition to public policy and as performing the essential task of managing the succession of government. Representative bodies serve to represent various interests and as a channel for consulting the governed and for voicing discontent.

Key is well aware that democratic institutions perform "only within an appropriate matrix of public attitudes and beliefs,"⁴⁹ transforming democratic institutions to a different matrix will result in their collapse. But employing the ceteris paribus clause, he considers this matrix, or "environment" as a given, and

concentrates instead on what he sees as truly political--political institutions. Key is not unaware of the importance of the "environment" for politics, besides such purely political customs as "senatorial courtesy" there are less political customs in society at large which strongly affect the workings of political institutions, what would be called today the "political culture." Key mentions such American customs as willingness to compromise, the prevalence of the idea of fair play and more, he is also aware of the role of the family, the church and the media of communications as instruments of political power in what is called today "political socialization." Key is not as politically naive as the many behavioralists who perpetuated the myth of the great American consensus, he knows that "even in democratic orders violence and the threat of violence play a part."⁵⁰ He knows that violence will not be used when fundamental value questions are not at issue, but is not tempted to facile universal generalizations from a brief historical period, "the circumstances under which only pacific means are used are transient and may be easily upset."⁵¹ Furthermore, non-violent methods sometimes succeed in settling political conflicts because of the threat of violence in the background "Armies have their domestic potentialities as well as their foreign uses."⁵² Knowledgeable in American history, Key knew that violence was used throughout it, in the civil war, in labor disputes, and in the South against the Negro. Had he lived to experience the events of the late 60's, Key would not have been surprised or shocked and would not have had to undertake a total reassessment of his values

like Dahl and Easton. Key is also aware of the great role economic sanctions and rewards play in the political process. "The line separating the corrupt from the correct is tenuous indeed. Material advantages and expectations of material advantage occupy no small place in the construction of political coalitions and in the maintenance of systems of power."⁵³ But he never considers politics and corruption identical and interchangeable.

2) Southern Politics

Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups was a "traditional" descriptive and institutional work. Key's first, and unquestionably best behavioral work is Southern Politics in State and Nation.⁵⁴

This work will now be examined in the light of three criteria:

1. its position on a uniqueness-generality scale, 2. the units of analysis employed, 3. the author's values as revealed implicitly or explicitly in the work.

a. Southern Politics--uniqueness and generality

A first look at this work may convince the reader that it should be as close as possible to the "uniqueness" or idiographic side of the scale. Key himself speaks about telling a "story,"⁵⁵ the book is full of descriptions of personalities, geographical areas, local customs, etc. According to David Butler it has been described as "scholarly journalism."⁵⁶ A closer examination reveals, however, that Key is theoretical, that he provides explanations by subsuming unique events under more general propositions, and the question now is: how scientific is Key, how do his explanations measure up to the ideal of scientific explanation?

According to Hempel, a sentence can be regarded as a law only "if a statement of its meaning does not require reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location," and a truly scientific explanation is only that where a unique event is subsumed under such a law. Here now is a list of Key's major explanations in Southern Politics.

1) Key's major explanation of southern political behavior was that the whites in the "black belts," those areas in the South where Negroes were the majority, succeeded, despite their small numbers, in their efforts to unify, rally and lead the whole South on the race issue. "The fundamental explanation of southern politics is that the black belt whites succeeded in imposing their will on their states and thereby presented a solid regional front in national politics on the race issue."⁵⁷

2) Next Key explains the lack of a viable two-party system in the South.

The raising of a fearful specter of Negro rule and the ruthless application of social pressures against those who treasonably fused with the Republicans under Populist leadership put down for decades the threat of the revival of two party competition.⁵⁸

By exploiting the fears of all southerners of "Negro rule" the whites in the black belts were responsible for the lack of a two party system in the South.

3) Key now seeks to explain southern unity on the national scene. This unity was essential to guard against any attempt at intervention in southern affairs by the North.

4) How does Key account for the well-known and bizarre personalities that rose to positions of leadership in the South? The quality of leadership in a democracy depends on conflict within the "better elements" who seek the support of the masses. When the better elements are unified and exploitative, as was the case in Louisiana, leaders may arise, who like Huey Long, will not be from the better elements, will be demagogical in order to achieve mass support, and will have little understanding of administrative and governmental matters.

5) Key finds that the cohesiveness of the majority party is a function of the existence of even a small opposition. "In both North Carolina and Tennessee the majority Democratic factions derive unity from the opposition of Republicans."⁵⁹

6) Who benefits from the "disorganized politics" Key found in the South? Since southern politics is a politics of factions rather than parties, factions which have no stable organizational structure, there is "no institutional mechanism for the expression of lower bracket viewpoints."⁶⁰

How scientific are these explanations? Are the events and situations to be explained, subsumed under general probabilistic laws, assuming for the moment that they have been tested and verified? The explanations obviously are full of referents to "particular objects" and "spatio-temporal locations," but can they be cast in a general probabilistic form? As a matter of fact, some of them can. Explanation number 4 can be cast in a Lenin-style substitute-leadership law which sees leaders or "the great men in history" not as sui generis, but as

products of social forces. This law would not account for the special qualities of southern leaders like Huey Long, but Key, like Lenin, sees Huey Long as a product of social forces. The weaknesses of the general law are: 1) Its holism, those social forces which give rise to great leaders are difficult to observe. 2) Cannot a great leader change the direction and balance of social forces? 3) Key specifies the conditions that cause a certain type of leadership, but these conditions refer to spatio-temporal referents; even if those could be generalized the probability for the event to occur will not be known with any precision.

Another of Key's explanations has been subsumed under a general law by William Riker in his Theory of Political Coalitions.⁶¹ Riker's mode of theory building is different from the empirical Key. He deduces propositions from the theory of games viewed as a model of political behavior. From the model Riker deduced a general-probabilistic law which he names the "size-principle." The law states: "In social situations similar to n-person, zero sum games with side payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe ensure winning and no larger."⁶² Riker finds explanation 5 as subsumed under his general law, it is:

A simple inference from the size principle. When the Democratic party is a coalition of the whole, it is worth nothing. But when an opposition exists, the coalition is worth something. Hence, a majority faction inside the Democratic party appears to take charge of the winning.⁶³

The main weakness of Riker's size principle is the inability to verify it empirically. The relative weight of each member of a coalition cannot be ascertained with any degree of precision, and coalition

builders are prone to deviations from the principle, reducing its utility for explanatory and predictive purposes, and making it more a heuristic normative rule for behavior, i.e., "it pays to have a winning coalition as small as possible," rather than a description of behavior.

Can Key's major explanation of southern political behavior be subsumed under a general law? To generalize the properties of the United States, the South, the different states in the South, and the "black-belts", is an endless task with little apparent utility, and although some situations may resemble the South when studied by Key, as in South Africa or Rhodesia, the differences are too great to subsume these cases under a general-probabilistic law. Thus, a law which states that "whites in a minority among blacks will tend to suppress these blacks" still refers to particular objects, and a law which states that a "minority in power will tend to suppress the majority" is more of a truism⁶⁴ than a general law. In effect, Key's explanations, which contain references to particular objects and spatio-temporal locations are far more convincing and much better empirically substantiated than the general laws under which they supposedly have to be subsumed to become scientific.

In Southern Politics Key has achieved a rare balance between the idiographic and the nomothetic, the descriptive and the theoretical-explanatory. Although not derived from empirically verified general-probabilistic laws, which simply do not exist in the social sciences, his generalizations and explanations can be cast in a more general form that goes beyond the politics of the South. The rise of charismatic leadership in a disorganized politics may well explain similar

developments in many emerging nations. Key has arrived at a high level of generalization without sacrificing any of the unique particular color or flavor of southern politics.

b. Units of Analysis in Southern Politics

Unlike Eulau, Key puts no self-imposed limitation on his quest for data to test and verify his hypotheses. 538 interviews were conducted by Key's assistants over a period of 15 months in every state in the South. Those interviewed

. . . were in large measure active or retired politicians, including congressmen, governors and other state officials, state legislators, campaign managers, Democratic and Republican party officials, precinct leaders and individuals charged with the administration of the poll tax, registration and election. A large number of other persons, participants in the political scene or close observers, were consulted. These included among others, publishers, editors, leaders in labor and industry and from organizations, plantation owners, small farmers, influential Negroes, leading spirits in reform movements and students of government and politics.⁶⁵

The interviews were not structured in a "survey research" form. To measure southern unity on the national scene he utilizes aggregate voting statistics to find that "by consistent support of the Democratic presidential candidates, the South has sought to defend its peculiar regional interest."⁶⁶ He examines Senate roll calls for seven sessions to find how "solid" is the "solid" South. Key utilizes Stuart A. Rice's relatively primitive index of cohesion, when a group divides in half over a roll call, its cohesion is at zero, when all in the group vote together, its cohesion is 100. When a group votes 75 to 25 in different directions, its cohesion as measured by the index is 50. H. Douglas Price, employing the more modern and sophisticated Guttman scale praises Key for not being among "research neoplatonists", "those unwitting users

of Neo-Platonic doctrine that universals or abstractions (such as liberalism or isolationism) do exist in nature,"⁶⁷ and then go on to measure such attributes by cardinal numbers, which implies that the variables measured have a zero point and a well defined unit of measurement, an implication with no basis in reality. The Guttman scale is an ordinal scale and a variable is measured only after its unidimensionality has been established--no easy task.⁶⁸ Key discovered that it was on the race issue only that the South was solid in the Senate. On other issues, no such solidarity existed. He found the same pattern in the voting of southern House members.

Key does not in the least hesitate to use documents and even newspapers as data, as for example when he quotes rules of the Democratic party in different states in the South that were designed to ensure its hold on the area by 1) preventing Republican voters from voting in Democratic primaries, 2) ensure that the voter will vote for the nominee in the general elections, and 3) prevent the defeated candidate from challenging the party nominee in the general election.⁶⁹

His attitude to history is sharp and clear: "It is impossible to speculate on the nature of political behavior without attributing to events long past their profound influence in the establishment of current habits of action"⁷⁰--a complete contrast to many other behavioralists. Key frequently utilizes aggregate voting statistics, when he shows for example a tight correlation between votes for a conservative governor and counties where a large number (over 45 percent) of Negroes reside, verifying his central hypothesis.⁷¹ He uses such imprecise data as "political gossip."⁷² He speaks of such emergent and non-observable properties as a "corporate or collective spirit"⁷³ that the well

organized majority factions of Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee have, properties ignored by most behavioralists.

Key ranks so high on the generality scale precisely because of his seeming lack of concern for the canons of methodological individualism.

He is much more concerned with providing good explanations for important political phenomena than with being methodologically impeccable. Like a true scientist, he relies on all the empirical evidence he can find, rather than choose among his evidence only those parts open to observation and quantification. If the oft heard proposition that the significant and "relevant" should take precedent over the search for exactitude has any meaning, this is embodied in Southern Politics.

c. Key's Values

In none of Key's books and articles is there any declaration of his value neutrality, he never claims to be value free, his values are explicitly stated for everyone to see and they do not distort his facts. The highest value for Key is the pursuit and discovery of truth, and no attempt is made on his part to "beautify" his findings. Ardent democrat that he is, he is never blind to the serious shortcomings of American democracy.

In Southern Politics Key asks what is probably the most important political and moral question, a question that since Lasswell's Who Gets What, When, and How was hardly ever asked by any behavioralist; who benefits from the existing order? After examining the Byrd machine in Virginia, Key concludes, after calling it an "oligarchy," that "organization spokesmen in Congress look out for the interests of business, and

the state government, although well managed, manifests a continuing interest in the well-being of the well to do."⁷⁴ And if this is not enough to make any pluralist shudder, he concludes by saying that "the traditional concepts of democracy have no marked relevance in the discussion of Virginia politics."⁷⁵ Of the Crump machine in Memphis he wrote: "Crump's critics--who have been few in Memphis--generally concede that they have efficient government, a clean city, and other blessings, but all without freedom or liberty."⁷⁶ He describes Huey P. Long's rule in Louisiana as more resembling "The power of a South American dictator than that of any other American state boss."⁷⁷ And after classifying southern politics as disorganized politics, Key concludes that "over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics," he views the low turnout of voters in the South as "dismaying," and rather than rejoice at the great contribution of voter apathy to the regime's stability, he warns that "if certain groups or classes of citizens habitually do not vote, their interest will be neglected in the actions and politics of government."⁷⁸

3) Key--A Self-Critical Behavioralist

Besides being political, historical, "relevant" and critical of the status quo, Key had another quality which made him unique among behavioralists. Besides David Truman he was the only voice to be critical of behavioralism to come from its own ranks before the wave of self criticism that came in the late 60's. In their article "Social Determinism and Electorate Decision: The Case of Indiana"⁷⁹ Key and Frank Munger criticize the authors of The People's Choice for 1) viewing the political as a reflection or epiphenomenon, a dependent variable, and

not as an explanatory variable, 2) for being ahistorical, 3) for concentrating on the distributive properties of the electorate rather than on its relational properties.

The relegation of the political to an epiphenomenon is expressed in The People's Choice by a short sentence that Key sees as the "theoretical heart" of the study: "social characteristics determine political preferences." As a consequence, the study concentrates on the "capacity of the nonpolitical group to induce conformity to its political standard by the individual voter."⁸⁰ By choosing the individual as the empirical unit of analysis only the distributive properties of the electorate can be examined, neglecting its relational properties, those more political properties.

Key warns against generalizations made from research limited to a certain period. A sample may be statistically significant but historically insignificant. "Often electoral decision is not an action whose outcome is in doubt but a reaffirmation of past decisions, at least for the community as a whole. For generations, the Democrats may carry this county and the Republicans may predominate in an adjacent county."⁸¹ Key is more concerned with the "decision of the community" a relational property, rather than with the distributive properties of the members of the community, and the only way of empirically verifying such a "community decision" is by a diachronical comparison of its aggregate voting patterns.

Key refutes any attempt to reconcile social determinism with the persistence of party alignment by linking the stability of geographical interests to the parallel stability of party alignment. The party alignment remains stable, says Key, despite changes in regional

"interests," and this for Key points "toward a 'political' grouping at least to some extent independent of other social groupings."⁸² Traditional lines of voting are obviously not eternal in their persistence and Key suggests their use as benchmarks for the analysis of change.

Key finds that from 1920 to 1948 the Democrats gained 10 percent or more of the vote in 15 counties in Indiana. He rejects a "cultural lag" type of explanation for this phenomenon, namely, that a time lag exists between socio-economic characteristics and political preferences which will close in time, and again social characteristics will determine political preferences. Key opts for a political explanation of electoral choice, he looks at the output side of the political equation and declares: "Social characteristics do not operate in a political vacuum. It is just as meaningful, perhaps more, to assert that changes in the structure of political alternatives govern electoral choice as it is to say that social characteristics determine political preference."⁸³ Key frees the voter from the determinist grip of his social group, he endows him with rationality and free will to choose among political alternatives.⁸⁴ Despite their methodological individualism, the authors of The People's Choice did not hesitate to view a holistic emergent and nonobservable property such as "group pressure," as a determinant of political behavior. Social characteristics gain significance because politicians may appeal to voters on the basis of these characteristics and invest them with political significance. In conclusion Key wrote:

. . . A major burden of the argument has been that the isolation of the electorate from the total governing process and its subjection to microscopic analysis tends to make electoral study a nonpolitical

endeavor. That isolation tends, perhaps not of necessity but because of the blinders associated with the method, to divorce the subjects of microscopic examination from their place in the larger political situation. Hence all the studies of so called "political behavior" do not add impressively to our comprehension of the awesome process by which the community or nation makes decisions at the ballot box.⁸⁵

It may not be unimportant to note, that unlike many other behavioralists, Key sees the voters' behavior in accordance with classical democratic theory.⁸⁶

In his article "The Politically Relevant in Surveys"⁸⁷ (incidentally, Key used the term "relevant" long before it became fashionable among critics of behavioralism), Key is critical of the behavioralists' favorite research tool, the sample survey. He characterizes sample survey as a "tool singularly difficult to bring to bear upon significant questions of politics."⁸⁸ The findings of survey research have been of "sociological or psychological interest" rather than political. The main concern of political scientists must be political institutions, what Key calls the "state apparatus," and survey research has focused the attention of political scientists away from these institutions. Survey research has enormously enriched the amount of knowledge we have about individual actors:

We demonstrate that the primary group mightily influences or at least reinforces the individual's voting decision. We show that men tend to identify with the party of their fathers. We learn that women usually vote in the same way as their husbands. We find that cross-pressured persons make up their minds, if they do, later in the campaign than do others. We discover that persons who identify with a reference group tend to vote as they perceive the group to be voting.⁸⁹

But the important question, the political question is how does this knowledge bear on the "explanation of the workings of the political system." Key's answer is, very little, there is no simple way of

accumulating the findings about individual behavior to the behavior of a whole political system. Key criticizes survey research for being static, for giving only a "snapshot" picture of life because it focuses only on "what may be readily observed." Many important political actions take place over a long period of time and there is always the danger that we overgeneralize from a time-bound truth.⁹⁰ Turning now to review the American Voter⁹¹ Key finds the work valuable despite the fact that its main research tool was the sample survey. He specifically praises the study for 1) being historical, the study is based on data from four elections from 1952 to 1958. 2) for being political, which for Key meant being holistic, thus the authors of the study succeeded with the aid of computers, in determining "the direction and relative weight in the electorate as a whole of each category of attitude."⁹² They found, for example, that in 1952 attitudes toward party contributed more to Eisenhower's election than attitudes towards his personality, while in 1956 attitudes towards Eisenhower's personality were predominant in his re-election.⁹³ Key also praises a focus on attitudes for viewing the voter as having more free will than the view in a sociological study of voting which usually deduces the voter's behavior from his socio-economic-geographic position.

The authors of The American Voter are also praised by Key for viewing elections as "grand entities," that is, as holistic units of analysis, and for building a typology of elections. Starting from the assumption that identification with party is a major "stabilizing force" in the whole electorate, they distinguished between 1) a "maintaining election," or election in which identification with a party largely determines the

results. 2) A "deviating election" or election in which the major party loses because of a contemporary issue or personality, and 3) "realigning election," in which party loyalty itself changes.⁹⁴

The authors are also praised by Key for integrating survey and aggregate data, finding that variations in survey data result from variables particular to a community, thus in a community with a past record of unemployment persons of all classes have attitudes favorable to Federal programs designed to maintain employment,⁹⁵ here historic and holistic data go a long way to explain individuals' attitudes, and for finding little or no evidence for Lipset's "working-class authoritarianism" hypothesis.⁹⁶

4) Key and Public Opinion

"It is, one most concede, a truly formidable task to build a bridge from observation of the atoms of the political system to the system itself."⁹⁷ It is this "formidable task" which Key undertakes in his book Public Opinion and American Democracy.⁹⁸ Key was not satisfied with just a critique of survey research and its findings, and here he seeks to increase the relevance of these findings for political knowledge. He seeks to "place the newer knowledge about public opinion in a political context"⁹⁹ by linking public opinion to the working of political institutions in America. Since, as Key is well aware, these relationships cannot be demonstrated scientifically, by observation, he does not hesitate to speculate and to admit it many times throughout the book.¹⁰⁰ Key's Public Opinion and American Democracy is the first book in which he utilizes the findings of survey research. Here he utilizes specifically the findings of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.

Key starts by criticizing the two extreme positions on public opinion, the idealistic position which depicts government as the servant of a rational and enlightened public, and the opposing realist view best illustrated in Walter Lippman's famous Public Opinion which thoroughly refuted the idealistic view of an enlightened and deciding public. He also criticizes the prevalent reifications and personifications of the public such as "the public desires" etc., which view the public as an organism having an opinion. Key concedes, however, that a "public" may have an "opinion": "great national populations may be swept by a common concern about a momentous issue."¹⁰¹ In the language of the philosophy of science, a national group may have a relational emergent property. Key defines public opinion as "those opinions that may influence government," vague as it is, this definition has its merits. It does not necessitate a view of the public as an organic whole, every issue can be examined in relation to its particular public. Moreover, all opinions that are relevant politically are within the domain of his definition, even those of a more enduring nature, including opinions on public issues, public institutions, political personalities or social and economic conditions.

Key never accepted the widespread belief of American social scientists in the great American consensus, a widespread agreement on fundamental values which allows the American democratic political system to function smoothly, without social upheavals and conflicts which were regarded usually as the lot of other less "developed" countries. Conflict in America focused only on well defined narrow gauge matters of fact which could be solved by incremental change. Key, historically informed, finds historical evidence which runs counter to this view,

"the American characteristically manifests an uncommonly high degree of loyalty and satisfaction with things American, an attitude that, on occasion, approaches smugness and, at times, extreme intolerance of matters regarded as un-American."¹⁰² Not only can consensus be highly irrational, it may actually be repressive and inimical to a democratic polity. Key knows of "a long history of repression of deviants--anarchists, socialists, communists, free-lovers, nudists, pinks."¹⁰³ It took a depression to make Americans accept social security, before the depression the suggestion was always vulnerable to being branded as "un-American." Key also states that consensus may simply be a euphemism for the apathy that Americans exhibit to politics, "Characteristics, beliefs, and attitudes attributed to the mass of the people are often only projections of the anxieties, the preferences, or the fantasies of the intellectual analyst"¹⁰⁴ concludes Key. Above all, he finds behavioral evidence that does little to support the consensus hypothesis. He finds that in 1956 the American population was almost evenly divided over the desirability of school desegregation, that in 1958 a somewhat similar U-shaped distribution was found over the desirability of governmental intervention in the economic realm, and another U-shaped distribution of opinion on national health care insurance.¹⁰⁵ All these, needless to say, are very "fundamental" issues in American politics to this day.

Key never hesitates to be frankly and openly normative, his democratic "bias" is clear throughout his work. Discussing political participation he comments: "if political order is to be democratic, political activists must be sprinkled in some such manner through all levels

of the economic-occupational hierarchy."¹⁰⁶ A political system in which the political strata, those most actively participating in politics, is recruited from only one socio-economic level can hardly be called a democracy. At the opposite end of the participation scale, Key never rejoices at the political apathy so prevalent in America. The apathetic, warns Key, "are probably far more susceptible to manipulation and influence irrelevant to policy."¹⁰⁷ Key also discovered in the survey data political alienation in America long before the term and the phenomenon became fashionable among social scientists. He found that in 1956 10% of the electorate who were in favor of low cost health care did not vote because of a low sense of political efficacy, and warns of the "pathology of democracies in the existence of patches of intense opinion held by persons who despair of making themselves felt through the normal channels of democratic action."¹⁰⁸

Key succeeds in establishing some linkage between micro and macro phenomena. He found, for example, the great import of party loyalty for electoral decision making. "The population does not consist of a mass of unanchored individuals susceptible to volatile movement by men who appeal to them under strong and changing banners"¹⁰⁹ (this is the kind of politics Key found in the South). The political party serves as an anchoring device, an institution that lends a measure of continuity and stability to a political system, an institution which serves as a "standard of reference," as a guiding post to the electorate. Thus, for example, in 1952 more Democrats approved of American entry into the Korean war than Republicans, despite a similar level of education.¹¹⁰ There are, of course, other variables, like new political issues, new personalities, etc., which will always be agents of change and compete

with party in its role as a guiding post for the electorate. But party loyalty remains a strong and continuous force contributing to the stability and predictability of the American political system. In another linkage example, Key attempts to find the relation between the voting patterns of legislators and the attitudes of the citizens in their districts. Despite the non-availability of attitude data from congressional districts, Key succeeds, by using demographic characteristics of districts such as their urbanity to find that the more liberal Republicans come from metropolitan districts, a fact which he interprets as some evidence for the strength of constituency in comparison with party loyalty.¹¹¹

5) The Theory of Critical Elections

In 1955, Key set out to build a theory of critical elections. "An election itself is a formal act of collective decision that occurs in a stream of connected antecedent and subsequent behavior."¹¹² Here Key established: 1) that unlike most behavioral students of elections he is going to view the election itself, this "collective decision," as the unit of analysis. This is brought out more clearly when he wrote in 1960, "if the specialist in electoral behavior is to be a student of politics, his major concern must be the population of elections, not the population of individual voters."¹¹³ To increase the political relevance of his research Key uses elections, holistic collective phenomena as his units of analysis. 2) To increase the range of his theory, its generality, Key examines elections diachronically; over time, elections occur "in a stream of connected antecedent and subsequent behavior." Investigating elections across time, Key discovered a certain particular type of election, the critical election, which he differentiates by four criteria. A critical

election is different from other elections because 1) the voters are deeply concerned, 2) turnout is relatively high, 3) the election results bring about a sharp change in the antecedent cleavage in the electorate, 4) the new cleavage persists for a considerable length of time.

Key also relies on aggregate election statistics for evidence, he finds that the 1928 election can be considered a critical election in the New England states. He finds that in the city of Somerville in Massachusetts, which was populated mainly by foreign-born and descendants of foreign-born citizens, with a large proportion of Catholics, the Democrats have steadily gained in strength from 1928 to 1952. While in the town of Ashfield, also in Massachusetts, a rural community with a large native-born and Protestant population, the Democrats steadily grew weaker to 1952. Next Key enlarges his sample to include 59 towns and cities in Massachusetts and finds similar results, a sharp cleavage which occurred in 1928 and persisted to 1952, with the Democrats consistently gaining in strength in urban areas populated by foreign-born and Catholics, and losing consistently in rural areas with a native-born Protestant population. The same results were found in other states in New England. Key also finds the election of 1896 to be a critical election, creating another persistent realignment that differed from that of 1928 in that "both city and country voters shifted in the same direction"¹¹⁴--away from the Democrats who did not recover until 1916.

A holistic political and historical approach to the study of elections thus reveals a different picture of American political life than the one presented by behavioralists using the individual as their unit

of analysis and limited in their time span. The authors of the American Voter found

. . . the low emotional involvement of the electorate in politics; its slight awareness of public affairs; its failure to think in structural, ideological terms; and its pervasive sense of attachment to one or the other of the two major parties.¹¹⁵

Key's concept of a critical election does not directly refute this tranquil picture of American politics. By putting it into a historical perspective it limits the time range of this supposedly universal generalization. The generalization is time-bound, it may hold for a certain time but is always susceptible to reversal by occurrence of a "critical election," an event that occurred in the past, and may occur in the future. Thus, paradoxically, Key is both more political and scientific than other behavioralists, his generalizations are far broader than theirs, they include both regular and "irregular" events, both value agreement and value-conflict. Key never equated scientific regularity with political regularity and tranquility.

The theory of critical elections was for Key a vehicle for asking even broader political questions: "What are the consequences for public administration, for the legislative process, for the operation of the economy of frequent serious upheavals within the electorate?"¹¹⁶ What are the social forces that cause or hinder such upheavals? Does the absence of critical elections signify satisfaction of or indifference to the political system by the electorate? What are the consequences for the political system when the electorate does not "render a decisive and clear cut popular verdict that promises not to be upset by caprice at the next round of polling?"¹¹⁷ It remained for Walter Dean Burnham, another behavioralist from the "other side of

behavioralism" to attempt to answer some of these questions.

C. Walter Dean Burnham

In his article "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe"¹¹⁸ Burnham's main concern is the low level of political participation in America, especially voter participation. Like Key, Burnham analyzes aggregate voting statistics over a long period of time, going back to the 19th century. He discovered that in the 19th century, despite a low level of education and poor communications, the farm vote had "awesome rates of turnout"¹¹⁹ with stability in voting patterns, in marked contrast to the current scene where in rural counties turnout was lower than in large cities and differed widely among elections. All this to Burnham is indicative of an "emergent political alienation in such areas,"¹²⁰ with the realignment of 1930 having little impact on that situation.

Burnham's explanation for this "changing shape of the American political universe," from a highly democratic almost fully mobilized political system, having a stable party system with high conflict intensity between the parties, with a willingness to settle issues in a clear cut manner in critical elections, to a political system having very low voter turnout with low level partisan conflict and where issues are left ambiguous and undecided for long periods, is as follows:

"The early stages of industrialization have been a brutal and exploitative process everywhere, whether managed by capitalists or communists."¹²¹ Every industrializing country needs to control those elements in the population most harmed by industrialization. This posed

a special problem in the United States, because here, unlike anywhere else, democratization preceded industrialization, making the industrializing elite vulnerable to defeat by anti-industrialists. The two groups most adversely affected by industrialization were industrial workers and small cash-crop farmers. The 1896 election was the most far-reaching critical election in American history and produced the most far reaching changes in the American political landscape. The Democrats-populists failed to create an anti-industrial coalition, industrial workers voted Republican because of three factors. 1) The depression of 1893 occurred under a Democratic administration. 2) The Democratic platform and campaign were directed mainly toward the interests of the farmers. 3) Cultural differences between the urban and the rural populations stood in the way of a coalition between them. Thus the election of 1896 gave the Republican party and the industrializing elite it represented the insulation it sought from those exploited by industrialization. With the aid of the Supreme Court it went on to consolidate this position of supremacy. Although little change was made in the form of American democracy, its content was radically altered by a lack of political participation of about 40 million Americans who find parties which do not represent their grievances and elections which do not decide issues. Burnham directly refutes Lipset's hypothesis that increased participation tends to result in totalitarianism.¹²² Like Key he warns of the susceptibility of a large apolitical strata to mobilization by demagogues.

Burnham increases the power of his explanation by enlarging the range of the generalization under which the event he wishes to explain

is subsumed, by using both historical and cross-sectional data. He views the United States within a geographically broad context of an "industrialization theory." His historical perspective directs him to the unique elements in the American experience, a uniqueness which nevertheless can be explained by the broader theory. Like Key he achieves a satisfying blend of the unique and general without sacrifices in explanatory power or particularistic description. Like Key, Burnham remains first and foremost political, he seeks to explain changes in the balance of political power of forces in America as expressed in critical elections, and in his values he is a realist, a democrat who does not hesitate to expose the "pathology of democracy."

Examining the 1964 election¹²³ in a historical perspective, Burnham finds similarities between the 1964 and 1896 elections which lead him to the conclusion that there exist in the United States "latent cleavages" such as the sectional cleavage exhibited in both the 1896 and 1964 elections. These cleavages, though laying dormant for many years, at the appropriate moment, when the electorate, or the relevant part of it, is awakened to political consciousness by a certain candidate or issue, can be activated and radically change the "typical" image of American voting behavior. The surprise and shock that many behavioralists experienced at the 1964 election, with its high emotional intensity and its not unclear alternatives, and the other events of the late 60's, would have been less shocking, more anticipated, better understood, and maybe even averted, had behavioralists not ignored historical evidence.

In a book published in 1970¹²⁴ Burnham sets out to explain contemporary American political behavior in the light of historical

evidence. He first sets out on a redefinition of the concept of critical elections.

1. A critical election can be distinguished by a "very intense disruption of traditional patterns of voting behavior."¹²⁵ The critical election expresses a shift in the balance of power among groups in the electorate.

2. Shifts in the balance of power are usually accompanied by increase in ideological intensity.

3. Critical elections occur periodically in American political history.

4. Realignments in the balance of power, or critical elections, occur because of a tension between the socio-economic system and the political system, as a result of the latter's failure to aggregate and articulate the demands of certain groups. Once an adjustment is made, its consequence will be changes in policy output.

After a thorough analysis of voting data in Pennsylvania for over a century, Burnham comes to the following conclusions:

1. There are periods in electoral behavior which he calls "normal", those periods can be distinguished by "great internal stability in voting alignments, enduring for considerable periods of time."¹²⁶

2. Those stable periods are only one half of a total "dialectical process." Periodically intense political conflicts erupt, "often preceded by third party uprisings against the existing major parties and followed by "abnormal" mass movements--mobilization of hitherto inactive strata in the political electorate and the movement of decisively large minorities from one major party commitment to another."¹²⁷

3. Each critical election made for a new balance of power, for example, elections in the 1890's saw the ascendancy of Republican industrialists, while the New Deal increased the power of labor and the new immigrants.

4. While the two major parties remain--their constituencies change after each critical election.

After a re-examination of the fully mobilized system of pre-1896, Burnham focuses on the contemporary American political scene. He sees two contradictory trends taking shape in America:

1. "Electoral disaggregation"--compared with the pre-1896 system Burnham sees a major contraction in the reach and the functions of the American parties. The New Deal shifted some power back to non-business elites but just as "the minimum price, in all probability, of system survival,"¹²⁸ still leaving large segments of the electorate unarticulated, unaggregated or recruited into the major parties. As far as political parties are the instruments provided in a democracy for the many to check the powerful few, the reduction in party scope and impact is a clear advantage to the few.

2. The second trend that Burnham perceives in American politics is an unfolding of a new critical realignment. Critical elections occur when injured sections in the socio-economic system press for political action. These sections can be mobilized by third parties or they can shift from one major party to another. The major American parties are ill-equipped to recruit these new emerging demanding sections because party heads are busy keeping their old coalitions in balance, and because the incremental change strategy for policy making with bargaining as its rule cannot cope with intense value demands. So, paradoxically, "a

necessary consequence of incremental bargaining in the United States [is] that they will tend to produce crises which lead to nonincremental change."¹²⁹ The protesting sections will cause a "countermobilization" by those sections which benefit from the status quo for self-defense. Burnham sees a new polarization emerging in the United States between the Democratic Party, representing the top and bottom of the socio-economic system, the poor and the deprived in a coalition with the better educated and the modern, against the Republican Party representing white "middle-America"--those defenders of the old American values, with high intensity conflict between the two parties. The famous American consensus becomes, of course, a casualty in any critical realignment; , Burnham never emphasized that consensus as much as most behavioralists, he saw it as far more "procedural and political than substantive or social."¹³⁰

Besides intense polarization, Burnham sees a need for a "detonator" to bring about a critical realignment, an event like the 1929 depression that would cause mass mobilization of values to change the status quo, but cannot find any such "detonator" at present to cause such a realignment. To Burnham, the American political system is distinguished by its lack of modernity,¹³¹ in marked contrast to other behavioralists who posited the American system as the epitome of modernity and then compared other systems, usually unfavorably, to it. While the socio-economic system was rapidly changing, the political parties remained unchanged. Because of the Lockean political culture, the incremental change strategy, the emphasis on bargaining and compromise among the pluralist power centers, the parties were unable to deal effectively with serious maladjustments in the socio-economic system such

as poverty, race, urban decay, etc., problems that need centralized collective non-incremental policy-making and implementing. Since it is the majority which stands to lose in case such a transformation takes place, its chances to occur are very limited and the chances for a new critical realignment which would bring the deprived sections into the mainstream of American politics seem very slim.

Conclusions

In previous chapters I demonstrated that logically, behavioralists are not imprisoned within the Mannheim paradox, nor within their different methods. This chapter served to present empirical proof of this argument. One can search for regularities, observe, measure, state and test hypotheses, discover generalizations and provide explanations and still be critical of the political order, study conflict rather than ignore it, study history rather than avoid it. A behavioralist can be relevant, can examine scientifically "great issues," can be objective without being neutral.

Footnotes

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²Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology," J. Peter Euben, "Political Science and Political Silence" in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science, p. 27. Eugene F. Miller, "Positivism, Historicism and Political Inquiry" in American Political Science Review, September 1972, pp. 796-817.

³Jerry Gaston compiled a bibliography of Lasswell's works, the output is astonishing, in Arnold A. Rogow, ed., Politics, Personality and Social Science in the Twentieth Century, Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 407-443.

⁴Two famous critiques of Lasswell are 1) Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959), pp. 176-209. 2) Robert Horwitz, "Scientific Propaganda: Harold D. Lasswell", Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), pp. 225-304.

⁵Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, (New York, The Viking Press, Compass Books Edition, 1960). The work was originally published in 1930, p. 42.

⁶Ibid., p. 44.

⁷Ibid., p. 48.

⁸Ibid., p. 2.

⁹Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1950), p. 75.

¹⁰Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality, (New York, The Viking Press, Compass Edition, 1962), p. 12. The work was originally published in 1948.

¹¹Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, p. 75.

¹²Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 40-47.

¹³Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, December 1962.

- ¹⁴Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell, Power, Corruption and Rectitude, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1963).
- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 22.
- ¹⁶Ibid., pp. 22-23.
- ¹⁷Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, p. 1.
- ¹⁸Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, (Chicago, Markham Publishing Company, 1969), p. 56.
- ¹⁹Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, p. 50.
- ²⁰Lasswell, Power and Personality, p. 19.
- ²¹Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, p. 240.
- ²²Ibid., p. 240.
- ²³Ibid., p. 242.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 244.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 244.
- ²⁶These points are also stressed in Harold D. Lasswell, "General Framework, Person, Personality, Group, Culture" in his The Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach, (Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1966), pp. 195-234. Heinz Eulau discusses these issues in "The Maddening Methods of Harold D. Lasswell" in Arnold A. Rogow, ed., Politics, Personality and Social Science, pp. 15-40.
- ²⁷Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 204-20.
- ²⁸Ibid., p. 198.
- ²⁹Two works directly influenced by Lasswell which make use of his political formula are Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, (New York, John Daz, 1956), and Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal: A Study of Personality Politics and Policy, (New York, MacMillan, 1963).
- ³⁰Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, (New York, Peter Smith, 1950), p. 3. The book was originally published in 1936.
- ³¹Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, p. xi.

³²Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, (New York, The Free Press, 1965), p. 20. The book was originally published in 1935. See also the chapter titled "The Politics of Prevention," in Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 173-203.

³³Lasswell, Power and Personality, p. 146. For a further refinement of the policy sciences concept see Lasswell's article "the Policy Orientation" in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 3-15.

³⁴Chapter 1.

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³⁷Ibid., p. 17.

³⁸Ibid., p. 162.

³⁹Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence" in his The Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach, (Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 146.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 147.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 153.

⁴²Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), p. xi.

⁴³V. O. Key, Jr. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, (New York: Thomas Crowell, Fifth Edition, 1967), originally published in 1942, pp. 1-16.

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⁴⁶Ibid., p. 2.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 11.

- 50 Ibid., p. 13.
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- 53 Ibid., p. 15.
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- 60 Ibid., p. 309.
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- 64 See Michael Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations," in Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History, (New York, The Free Press, 1959), pp. 443-75.
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- 69 V. O. Key, Southern Politics, pp. 424-42.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 554.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 42-43.

⁷²Ibid., p. 473.

⁷³Ibid., p. 299.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 27.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 27.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 63.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 156.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 508.

⁷⁹V. O. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., American Voting Behavior, (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281-99.

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⁸¹Ibid., p. 283.

⁸²Ibid., p. 287.

⁸³Ibid., p. 291.

⁸⁴This notion of Key was later stressed in his The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkrop Press of Harvard University Press, 1966).

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- ⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 531-38.
- ⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 382-84.
- ⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 512-15.
- ⁹⁷V. O. Key, Jr., "The Politically Relevant," p. 55.
- ⁹⁸V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).
- ⁹⁹Ibid., p. vii.
- ¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 154, 176, 536.
- ¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 9.
- ¹⁰²Ibid., p. 42.
- ¹⁰³Ibid., p. 43.
- ¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 49.
- ¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 57-58.
- ¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 199.
- ¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 200.
- ¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 233.
- ¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 247.
- ¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 245-46.
- ¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 483-86.
- ¹¹²V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections." The Journal of Politics, Vol. 17, February 1955, pp. 3-18. Reprinted in Polsby Dentler and Smith, Politics and Social Life, pp. 465-75, this quote is from p. 465.
- ¹¹³V. O. Key, Jr. "The Politically Relevant," p. 55.
- ¹¹⁴V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," p. 473.

- 115 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter, p. 541.
- 116 V. O. Key, Jr. "Theory of Critical Elections," p. 474.
- 117 Ibid., p. 475.
- 118 Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," American Political Science Review, March 1965, pp. 7-28.
- 119 Ibid., p. 16.
- 120 Ibid., p. 17.
- 121 Ibid., p. 24.
- 122 Lipset, Political Man, pp. 179-219.
- 123 Walter Dean Burnham, "American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. XII, February 1968, Reprinted in Melvin Richter, ed., Theory and History, pp. 186-200.
- 124 Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970).
- 125 Ibid., p. 6.
- 126 Ibid., p. 66.
- 127 Ibid., p. 67.
- 128 Ibid., p. 131.
- 129 Ibid., p. 137.
- 130 Ibid., p. 169.
- 131 Burnham develops this theme further in his "Party Systems and the Political Process" in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 277-307.

CONCLUSIONS

By way of a conclusion I will address myself to three main questions.

1. Not all the techniques and approaches utilized by behavioralists have been examined in this dissertation. But the complexity of behavioralism is apparent even from an examination of those approaches and techniques that were examined here. What makes these parts of "behavioralism"? What do they have in common and what are the differences among them? What are the "family resemblances" among them?

2. The second issue to be discussed here is how did the critics of behavioralism fare in their critiques? How many critiques have withstood the logical and empirical tests they were subjected to? How many failed to withstand those tests? Did the critics distinguish between errors made by individual behavioralists and problems associated with certain approaches and techniques? Were the critics aware of the varieties of behavioralism or did they attribute to behavioralism as a whole the shortcomings of one of its varieties?

3. What light, if any, can the findings of this dissertation throw on the future prospects of behavioralism?

1) A partial profile of behavioralism

Behavioralists are united in their goal, a science of politics. The

programmatic statements of behavioralists stress six "canons and conventions of modern empirical science." Behavioralists are to search for regularities in human behavior to be expressed in generalizations for the purpose of explanation. They ought to separate statements of fact from statements of value. They should observe political phenomena, attempt to quantify as many of these as possible, and present their findings in a way that would enable replication and verification. Behavioralists are also interested in closer ties with the other social sciences.

The investigation of research done by different behavioralists reveals that in effect they have different conceptions of a science of politics they see as their goal. Thus those who utilize survey research emphasize observation and quantification, and closer ties with the other social sciences, but their findings are of a limited theoretical scope. They can examine only a group's distributive properties and their findings have short temporal validity. Attitudes and beliefs change fast, especially at times of economic and political dislocations. More surveys over a long period will increase the theoretical scope of such studies.

Replication and verification of the findings of survey research, besides being impractical because of the great expense involved, are almost impossible also because of the speed with which opinions can change.

Group theory, and structural-functional analysis, have wide theoretical scope, they purport to explain the workings of a whole political system. But those who utilize these approaches cannot deduce the collective properties they describe from the actions and interactions of individuals. As a result, these findings cannot be replicated and verified empirically. Both of these approaches are closely tied up with other

social sciences. Truman relied a great deal on the findings of social psychologists, functionalism was borrowed by political scientists from sociology and anthropology.

Those who rely on aggregate data have at their disposal data that have accumulated over long periods, as a result the temporal validity of their generalizations is greatly enhanced. The data are "hard", in quantitative form, and can be easily verified. Moreover, aggregate data are free from sample error because they consist of a complete count of the vote, although errors are, of course, possible. The greatest deficiency of these data is that they cannot explain the voting behavior of individuals, i.e., the meaning they attach to their vote.

Not all behaviorists are committed to any particular approach or technique. Some have sought explanations for political phenomena and utilized all the data they could find, with little regard for its purity. Here the emphasis is on broader generalizations and better explanations rather than on observation, quantification and verification.

The greatest variety among behaviorists is found in their views concerning the fact-value separation. We have met behaviorists who supported the status quo and behaviorists who criticized it, behaviorists who minimized the importance of great issues by declaring an agreement on values, or by neutralizing commitment to values. We have met behaviorists in the positivist tradition who have proclaimed the elimination of values from political life by the combined onslaught of science and affluence. We have also seen behaviorists who evaluated their empirical findings in the light of a common good. Moreover, some major behaviorist figures have changed their values as a result of serious

political dislocations and mounting criticism.

As I stressed throughout the dissertation, there is no correlation between any approach or technique and any particular value orientation. Almond and Verba utilized survey research and praised the American political system, V. O. Key also utilized survey research but was highly critical of American Politics. I believe the same is true for any other behavioral approach or technique.

Summary

Behavioralism is a collective term, an abstraction referring to a collective social phenomenon. Like every collective social phenomenon, behavioralism consists of individuals who share many attributes. While lacking in organizational properties, behavioralists can be distinguished by a common purpose - a science of politics, and by agreement on certain rules that would lead to the achievement of that purpose. An examination of the behavior of behavioralists in the light of these rules reveals that different behavioralists adhere to different rules, ignore others, or act contrary to some. In effect, different behavioralists have different conceptions of the meaning of a science of politics.

2) Critiques of behavioralism

The difficulty of elucidating the meaning of collective terms is notorious, critics of behavioralism have spent little or no effort in attempting to elucidate the meaning of the term behavioralism, the consequences of this will soon become apparent.

I examined ten critiques directed at behavioralism by various

critics. With regard to values, behavioralists have been criticized for an inability to perceive experience clearly because of a priori preconceptions that distort experience, or because of social and economic conditions that determine the content of their knowledge. They have been criticized for not being committed to any values and being neutral in the conflict between liberal democracy and its enemies. They were accused of their science being in harmony with liberal democracy, of it being inherently conservative, and for treating all values as equal.

Concerning the political, behavioralists were criticized for ignoring problems of political significance, and concentrating on those aspects of political life that lend themselves to quantification. They have also been criticized for neglecting research on the legal and institutional arrangements of society, and for ignoring history and conflict because their method can only be utilized when the political world is "regular."

The first two critiques of behavioralism are remarkable because they question the behavioralists' objectivity before they even embark upon their research. My examination of research done by different behavioralists reveals varying degrees of objectivity. V. O. Key's description of Southern Politics is more objective than David Truman's description of American politics. Harold Lasswell's warning of a "Garrison State" was definitely more objective than the view of American politics in the writings of Robert E. Lane. Moreover, behavioralists who lived in a world of phantasy, a world devoid of conflict, of concern for the normative, were jolted out of this fool's paradise by hard objective "facts" which exploded in their faces and caused some of them to change their values. Both psychological preconceptions and social and economic

forces are there to obstruct objectivity. The behaviorist, however, is not their helpless prisoner.

The third critique, which claims that behaviorists are not committed to any values cannot be taken seriously and is a slur rather than a serious criticism. From the fact that behaviorists seek objectivity it does not follow logically that they are not committed to any values. The critics here fail to distinguish between objectivity and neutrality. One can be objective and not neutral. The search for objectivity itself is a commitment to truth as a value. As to the charge that behaviorists are neutral in the struggle between democracy and its enemies, the truth is that behaviorists were not neutral, but they were also unobjective. They were so immersed in that struggle that they failed to follow their canons of research. Referring now to the charge that behavioralism is inherently conservative, here the critics have committed three methodological errors. 1. They have ignored the "other side of behavioralism" - those behaviorists who were not conservative. 2. They have failed to distinguish between errors committed by individual behaviorists - and behavioralism. Some behavioral writers whose writings were conservative described American politics as worthy of praise by committing many methodological fallacies. Some examples from this dissertation include the authors of Voting who overgeneralized from the distributive properties of a small community to the emergent properties of the United States. This same overgeneralization is also evident in Who Governs. The authors of the American Voter overgeneralized the temporal validity of their findings and David Truman declared the non-existence of a collective national interest which may conflict with private group interests. 3. The critics

have in effect created a straw man, or to use a more fashionable term, a "paradigm." They have collected errors made by behavioralists, called these "behavioralism," and easily disposed of behavioralism by branding it inherently conservative. The critics have overgeneralized from errors made by individual behavioralists to a collective social phenomenon - behavioralism. As was amply demonstrated, behavioralists can choose to be conservative, liberal, radical or any other ideological orientation. The charge that behavioralists treat all values as equal should also be readily dismissed. It is also a result of confusion between objectivity and neutrality. If one seeks objectivity it does not follow logically that he will treat all values as equal.

With regard to the political, behavioralists were criticized for doing their research in accordance with narrow methodological principles rather than in the light of the great issues. David Easton has provided good evidence as to the veracity of this criticism, which is serious. While we saw some major behavioral figures, Lasswell, Key, Dahl, employ a wide definition of behavioralism and search for answers to major political problems, many other behavioralists ignored such problems for the sake of precision.

There can be little doubt that many behavioralists neglected to examine the legal and institutional arrangements of society as the critics have correctly claimed. They often also viewed political institutions as epiphenomena rather than as forces that can shape the destiny of a political system. Truman viewed political institutions as mere reflections of the real Governmental Process - group conflict and adjustment. He also minimized the importance of the institution of the presidency. This same

critique also applies to structural-functional analysis. Heinz Eulau and his collaborators did investigate state legislatures, but their main concern was with the attitudes of the legislators rather than with the more holistic properties of the legislatures. Little or no attention to the holistic properties of the nations they studied was paid by the authors of The Civic Culture. Lasswell, however, spoke of the importance of institutional categories for understanding politics, and V. O. Key, Jr. did not neglect political institutions and their impact on political life. However, the most important problem confronting all behavioralists is that of the reduction of collective group properties, or the deduction of such properties from actions and interactions of individuals. Some critics claimed that a search for regularities in human behavior necessitates a "regular" social world, and as a result the behavioralist is prevented from studying political upheavals and history. It is true, as Dahl stated, that many behavioralists have not incorporated historical data into their research. As a result they were ignorant of upheavals in American history, and viewing a tranquil present, did not anticipate any future upheavals. However, social irregularities can be expressed in theoretical regularities, generalizations and explanations, as indeed they were expressed by other behavioralists.

V. O. Key, Jr. and Walter Dean Burnham have utilized historical evidence and have explained both conflict and tranquility in American politics. Again, the critics of behavioralism have confused errors of individual behavioralists with problems inherent in behavioralism. To ignore conflict and history is not social science or behavioralism, but a misconception of science and wrong behavioralism.

Thus the debate between behavioralists and their critics is distinguished more by acrimony, diatribe and error than by cool-headed objective analysis.

3) What light do the findings of this dissertation throw on the future prospects of behavioralism?

Predictions are a hazardous undertaking at best, it was Robert Dahl, a political scientist of no small stature, who in 1961 wrote an epitaph to behavioralism as a "successful protest." Now we are informed that the discipline is in the midst of the "Post-Behavioral Era" after it passed the "Post-Behavioral Revolution."

What exactly is meant by this new era and by this new revolution? Have behavioralists stopped conducting surveys, quantifying, analyzing aggregate data, suggesting and testing hypotheses, building mathematical models or utilizing the different approaches? Despite those who think that by wishing it away behavioralism already has, or will soon, disappear, behavioralism is here to stay. This, at least, is the opinion of this student. The impact of the behavioral revolution on the discipline is irrevocable, a return to pre-behavioral modes of research seems inconceivable. More and more political scientists will seek closer ties with the other social sciences. More and more political scientists will quantify, utilize old or invent new approaches, formulate and test hypotheses.

However, the evidence in this dissertation suggests some new tendencies within the behavioral movement.

- a) An attempt to go beyond examination of individual behavior to

research of the more holistic political phenomena. A scientific quantitative linkage of all group properties is still impossible. But as Lasswell and Key have demonstrated, with daring and imagination, this scientific ideal can be approximated. Paradoxically, new and better research techniques will be developed the more behavioralists will venture into these new areas of research. Scientific instruments are usually invented when a need for them is perceived.

b) A growing awareness among behavioralists of the importance of history for political understanding. More behavioralists are seeking historical evidence to increase the temporal range of their generalizations and explanations.

c) More behavioralists are studying both conflict and consensus rather than focus solely on the merits of consensus. Conflict is just as susceptible to scientific investigation as is consensus.

d) Above all, there is a new tendency among behavioralists with regard to the fact-value controversy. Major behavioralist figures have ceased to claim ethical neutrality, have renounced past beliefs and have adopted a new critical outlook toward society. Detachment may lead to greater objectivity, but it may also lead to moral sterility. Moral commitment may lead to distorted perceptions and dogmatism, but it may also lead to sharper perceptions and originality.

e) The more behavioralists learn about the limitations inherent in their different techniques and approaches, and concomitantly, the less they make claims for far ranging theoretical advances where only small steps have been taken, the more seriously are they going to be taken by their critics. No longer will the critics have a ready supply of

ammunition, they will have to work harder to criticize behavioralism. This may result in a more mature and productive debate between behaviorists and their critics, rather than in an emotional and destructive one.

These new tendencies mark not a retreat from social science, but a growing respect for the spirit of science. How widespread are these new tendencies within the behavioral movement is difficult to gauge. It is easier to walk in a well trodden path than to open a new one. One can only hope that these new tendencies will become the directions in which the behavioral movement will move in the future. For as this dissertation has hopefully demonstrated, one can be relevant, historical, political and behavioralist at the same time.

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